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PREFACE 
This is the second volume of a two-volume report covering 
work performed in the period between June, 1978, and April, 
1981, on a p~oject entitled "Definition and Analysis of Sys-
tems Data Communication Structures." This project was spon-
sored by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 
Langley Resea~ch Cente~, Hampton, Virginia . The Technical 
Contract Monitor was Mr. J. Larry Spencer. 
The fi~st volume is p~ima~ily concerned with communica-
tion methodology, while this volume treats communication is-
sues at the aircraft system level. 
The autho~s would like to express their gratitude to the 
personnel of NASA Langley who, along with Mr. Spencer, have 
made significant technical contributions to this work, espe-
cially Messrs. Brian Lupton and Nicholas Murray. Thanks a~e 
also due to Mr. Billy Dove, whose foresight and confidence 
made this project possible. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this study is to develop a technology 
base consisting of concepts, data, and trade-o~f analyses to 
support the design of the data communication structures for 
future aircraft avionic systems. For this study, avionics 
is broadly defined to include almost all electronic func-
tions expected to be performed on future aircraft. These 
functions extend from life critical fly-by-wire active con-
trol to the maintenance support. 
In this study, we assume that the design of future avion-
ic systems will be highly integrated and that a fault-toler-
ant computer system will be the heart of the system. The 
communication system studied is thus primarily to provide 
the necessary data transfer between the fault-tolerant com-
puter and the sensors, displays, controls, and actuators 
necessary to perform all required avionic functions. This 
study consists of the identification of a number of alterna-
tives for ·providing this communication function, and an 
analysis of their relative characteristics, including: per-
formance, cost, reliability, and maintainability. 
An init i al decision was made that a study of communica-
tion systems could not be effectively conducted in isolation 
from the systems in which they are used. The approach taken 
for this study is first to establish as realistic an envi-
ronment as possible for the communication problem. This en-
vironment is established first by defining a set of func-
tional ~nd operational requirements that must be met by the 
avionic systems in a future target time period. Next, a set 
of basic hardware .elements is hypothesized that would be 
necessary to meet these requirements . A range of potential 
system configurations are then studied that would organize 
the hardware elements. From this study, three basic system 
configurations are chosen to represent the system configura-
tions most likely to emerge at various stages of future de-
velopment. Communication structures are ~hen studied in the 
context of these system configurations . 
Alternative communication struc t ures are designed for 
each system conf i guration . A relatively complete descrip-
tion for each of these total systems gives a more concise 
picture of of the communication problem . Each system is 
then analyzed to provide trade-off information among the 
- 1 -
communication alte~natives. An extensive ~eliability and 
th~oughput capacity analysis is pe~fo~med on the candidate 
systems to assu~e that each meets the ~equi~ements. These 
analyses establish the basis fo~ a trade-off comparison 
am ong candidates . The alte~native systems a re then compared 
in te~ms of relative c~mplexity and other -factors that could 
affect the choice for the most effective system for a par-
ticular application. 
The following chapter gives the baseline system require-
ments to be met by the avionics system. Chapter 3 discusses 
the baseline equipment requirements. Chapter 4 defines al-
ternate system configurations that represent those to be 
used in the future to meet these requirements. Chapter 5 
gives the alte~nate communication structures for each of 
three representative system configurations and a desc~iption 
of each total system. Chapter 6 presents the results of the 
trade-off analysis of these system alternatives. Chapter 7 
provides the conclusions and recommendations . 
- 2 -
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Chapter 2 
BASELINE REQUIREMENTS FOR DATA COMMUNICATION 
STRUCTURES 
The purpose of this chapter is to establish baseline re-
quirements for the study of data communication structures. 
The requirements are based on considerations in the follow-
ing areas: The first consideration is the target time peri-
od where it is expected that the proposed communication 
structures be used. The next consideration is the defini-
tion of a representative set of functions to be performed by 
the avionics system and supported by the communication 
structure. The characteristics and requirements for these 
functions are discussed along with the operational ground 
rules for the aircraft. Finally, the system reliability re-
quirements are discussed as well as the hazard environment 
in which this reliability must be achieved. 
2.1 TIME PERIOD CONSIDERATIONS 
It is important to establish the time periods when the 
results of the research program should be used. The time 
period is needed to determine both the functional require-
ments for the communication structure and the technology 
likely available to implement the system. 
The time period considered for this study includes a 
range . of times, beginning with the earliest time the results 
of this work can be applied, and extending to an indefinite 
time in the future when the data communication system will 
be used in a full flight-critical active control system. 
The i ntroduction of digital communications will most likely 
be evolutionary. Aircraft currently being developed exten-
sively use digital communication. In future aircraft, the 
percentage of the avionics system involved in digital commu-
nication and the criticality of those communications are 
both expected to increase. This study will contribute to 
the technology base necessary to develop the most effective 
communication system through that time period. 
The communication structure cannot be developed as inde -
pendently as can individual devices, such as di splays or 
sensors. These latter items can be developed at their own 
pace and then introduced into a system when they are ready 
- 3 -
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or required. The communication structure is integral with 
the total system and is thus more dependent on the functions 
and requirements of the total system. Therefore, it is im-
portant to estimate the time periods when the systems are 
used, as well as to estimate the expected requirements for 
those systems, to create a realistic context to develop the 
most effective communication structure. 
The time period for this study is largely determined by 
the purposes of NASA research. The purpose of NASA is not 
usually to develop systems themselves, but rather to develop 
the technology base for these systems. The technology base 
must therefore be established sufficiently prior to the time 
the definition and development of the actual systems starts. 
This situation establishes the early bound for the target 
time period . 
To determine the earliest time the results of this study 
can be used, a brief look at the primary focus of this 
study, the commercial aviation industry, is necessary. One 
factor influencing the time frame is that new aircraft de-
velopments tend to come in groups or generations and that 
most major new system concepts are introduced with the new 
aircraft. Figure 1 gives the approximate time history of 
most major U.S. commercial aircraft developments since the 
introduction of the jet engine to civil aircraft. The be-
ginning of the bar for each aircraft is the approximate time 
of its development go-ahead, and the end is the time it en-
tered service . 
The standardization process will also influence the in-
troduction of new technology in commercial avionics. The 
airlines find it advantageous to develop form, fit, and 
function characteristics for electronic equipment to enhance 
interchangeability and competition. These ·characteristics 
are developed by the Airline Electronic Engineering Commit-
t e e (AEEC) with the support of Aeronautical Radio Inc . 
( AR I NC). The communication structure is a key item which 
must be included within the standardization process. The 
AEEC is just completing the most extensive round of new 
characteristic developments to date. The primary objective 
of these new characteristics is the conversion to a virtual-
ly total digital aircraft. The new equipment uses dedicated 
broa d c a st digital buses as defined by the ARINC Digital In-
formation Transfer System (DITS), Characterisitic 429. This 
n e w equipment will be used extensively in the Boeing 767 and 
757 aircraft. The same equipment may also be utilized on 
other new and derivative aircraft for the next few years. 1 
Th i s structure may change if a new concept offers sufficient 
Supercript numbers refer to the 
e nd of the report. 
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Figure 1: Generations Qf Aircraft Development 
1990 2000 
advantage to justify the cost of developing new standards 
and new equipment, or if new requirements emerge that cannot 
be met by the current equipment . In either case, new char-
acteristics that use a new communication structure would not 
be i n troduced before the next major new aircraf t deve l opment 
cycle. The timing of the next major aircraft de velop ment 
cycle will be primarily influenced by technology and the 
economy. By looking at past experience, as shown in Figure · 
1 , the go-ahead for the next generation will be around 1987 
with service to begin in 1990. The technology for this new 
aircraft must exist and be fully demonstrated at least one 
to four years before the go-ahead date. Thus, around 1985 
will be the beginning of the time period covered by this 
study. 
The upper bound on the time period is more open and a 
function of the level of technology rather than a specific 
date . This bound is also influenced by the purposes of NASA 
research. One purpose of this research is to create the op-
portunity for industry to utilize technology whose technical 
risk is too high for anyone company to undertake. The 
technology this research is expected to support will allow 
the inclusion of an entire avionics system in an integrated 
design to support fully flight critical functions. Such ad-
vanced technology will permit electronics to be embedded 
within equipment in all locations in the aircraft . The up-
per end of the time period is thus that time when this tech-
no l ogy is adopted . This time will be no earlier than the 
second major round of new aircraft development, presumably 
to occur in the mid 1990's. 
2.2 AIRCRAFT OPERATIONAL GROUNDRULES 
The communication system should be a part of a total sys-
tem t o achieve as high a level of self-monitoring and self-
correction as possible . This capability is necessary for 
both flight operations and maintenance. The design goal is 
that all single failures and most multiple failures be oper-
ationally in v isible to the crew. The failed component 
should be automatically identified to a high degree of con-
fidence so that unconfirmed removals are almost e liminated . 
The system sho u ld also be capable of automatically checking 
out and revalidating itself after repairs . 
The aircraft is assumed to be certified for full Category 
III B autoland capability . The aircraft should be dispat-
cha b le , at least with Category II capability, with any sin-
g l e fa i lure and most combinations of failures . 
- 6 -
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2.3 AIRCRAFT FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
To establish the scope of the task to be accomplished by 
the communication system. some idea should be obtained about 
the functions performed by the equipment using the system. 
For this purpose. a set of functions to be performed by the 
avionics system is presented . along with the characteristics 
and requirements of those functions important for the commu-
nication system. This list is not the result of a defini-
tive design of any particular airplane. but is considered 
adequate to establish the requirements for the communication 
system . . 
An assumption made for the purpose of this study is that 
the communication system ~ill be involved in virtually all 
electronic functions on the aircraft. The resulting avion-
ics system is not necessarily highly integrated, although 
such integration is a strong possibility. and the communica-
tion system should be capable of supporting that possibili-
ty . In any case. the majority of all data transfer within 
the aircraft will use digital communication with a common 
format except in a few cases where dedicated links are nec-
essary for the most effective design. Consequently. the 
functions listed here include all elect~onic functions per-
formed now or expected to be performed in the target time 
period. The expected evolution of these functions during 
the time period is also discussed. The only major function 
assumed to remain independent (and is thus not included) is 
the passenger service and entertainment system. 
The functions are discussed in the following broad cat-
egories: 
1) flight control 
2) flight monitoring and warning 
3) flight management 
4) navigation 
5) communications and surveillance 
6) engine control and monitoring 
7) aircraft systems management 
8) aircraft and systems support functions 
This chapter discusses the functions themselves; the follow-
ing chapter discusses the equipment and data requirements 
necessary to implement the functions. 
- 7 -
2.3. 1 Flight Control Functions 
The flight control functions are crucial in establishing 
the requirements for the communication system . Flight con-
trol is presumably the most flight-crit i ca l f unct i o n and h as 
some of the most stringent requirements for data r ate and 
transport delay. Flight control will also probably change 
signi ficantly during the target time period. The extent and 
complexity of these functions will presumably increase, and, 
in particular, the degree of flight criticality will become 
much greater. The categories of flight control functions 
include : stability and command augmentation, structural load 
relief, flight path control, and control surface linkage 
(fly-by-wire) . These functions are described in the follow-
ing paragraphs, along with an estimate of the functional 
failure rate requirement for each. 
2 . 3.1.1 stability and Command Augmentation 
The stability and command augmentation functions yrovide 
commands to the control surfaces that modify th~ inherent 
aerodynamic characteristics of the basic aircraft on the ba-
sis of inputs from flight data sensors . A typical stability 
augmentation function used for a number of years and ex-
pected to continue to be used, is a yaw damper that redu~es 
undesirable Dutch roll oscillations . Stability augmentation 
functions are expected to increase significantly in the tar-
get time period as equipment capability and reliability make 
possible the design of more efficient airframes . One of the 
most important in this category is .reduced longitudinal 
static stability. The reduction of the inherent static sta-
bility will allow for the reduction of both trim drag and 
the size of the horizontal tail. The ultimate will be a 
completely unstable aircraft . 
Command augmentation uses sensor data to augment the com-
mands from the pilot . These functions are also expected to 
increase to improve the handling qualities of increasingly 
more complex aircraft. These functions will impact the com-
mun i cation requirements in both data rate and reliability . 
To maintain a stable system , maintenance o f a mini mu m data 
rate and minimization of the ma x imum total delay from s e nsor 
input to control output are necessary . These requiremen t s 
will vary for different aircraft. Nominal rates of 50 sam-
ples per second with a maximum transport delay of 20 milli-
seconds is assumed here as representative. 
Th e reliability requirements are likely to have t h e 
greatest impact on the communication system . At the be g i n-
ning of the time period the stability augmen ta t ion funct ions 
are not totally flight critical. However, a co mplet e fai l-
- 8 -
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ure of the augmentation function may substantially reduce 
the operational flight envelope of . the aircraft and increase 
the probability of an accident. Consequently, it will be 
highly desirable for these functions to have a failure rate 
between 10- 6 and 10- 7 per hour . At the other end of the 
time period , one assumes that the aircraft i s complete ly un-
stable over a significant percentage of the flight regime so 
that a total loss of the stability augmentation system leads 
to an immediate loss of the aircraft . The communication 
system then must support a total system that has failure 
rate of less than 10- 9 pe~ hour. 
2 . 3 . 1 . 2 structural Load Relief Functions 
structural load relief functions are those active control 
functions that allow relaxation of the basic structural re-
quirements, making a more efficient structural design possi-
ble. The functiQns include: maneuver load control, gust 
load alleviation, elastic mode suppression, and flutter con-
trol. These functions are also expected to increase during 
the target time period. 
These functions will not be as flight critical as the 
stability augmentation functions. A failure may cause oper-
ational restrictions. However, an aircraft will not be made 
so structurally weak that it immediately fails when the ac-
tive control system fails. The only exception envisioned is 
a structure with a flutter mode within the normal operating 
speeds; however, we assume that a flutter mode with this de-
gree of criticality will not be used during the target time 
period. Thus, the reliability require ment for the structur-
al load relief functions is expected to range from 10- 5 to 
1 0- 7 per hour over the time period. 
Possibly the most important impact the structural relief 
functions will have on the communication system is the high 
data rate requirement for flutter control. The actual re-
qu i rement will depend on the flutter freq u ency for the par-
ticular aircraft . The requirement placed on the communica-
tion system will also depend on the organi z ation of the 
control system . The load will be greatest if t h e system re-
quires that the sensor signals and actuator signals be han-
dled by the primary communication system. The data rate re-
quirements may be so great that dedicatea signal lines are 
used for this function to remove the load f rom the primary 
system. possible flutter frequencies range from 1S to 2S 
Hz . With required samples rates of at least twice and up to 
ten times the frequency , sampling rates will range from 30 
to 2S0 times per second, with a sample rate of 100 times p e r 
second assumed here. 
- 9 -
2.3.1 .3 Flight Path Control Functions 
The flight path control functions cause the aircraft to 
automatically follow a desired path in space and time. 
These functions include: the traditional autopilot modes of 
attitude hold, heading select/hold, altitude select/hold, 
speed select/hold, vertical speed hold, etc. These func-
tions also include the automatic throttle and automatic 
landing functions, and, in the future, will provide complete 
time referenced flight path control from takeoff to landing. 
These functions are not expected to place any additional 
critical requirements on the communication system. The data 
rate requirements are not expected to be high. The most 
flight critical function will be automatic landing. The re-
quirements will not be any higher than those already 
achieved. Because of the low exposure time, the equipment 
failure rate requirement will range from 10- 6 to 10- 9 per 
hour. 
2.3.1.4 tlight Control Linkage 
Included here as a flight control function is the linkage 
between the automatic control system or the pilot and the 
control surface. Most aircraft now have dedicated analog 
electrical signals from the electronic system to the surface 
. actuators. Almost all aircraft (except the F-16) retain a 
mechanical linkage from the pilot to the critical control 
surfaces. It is expected that during the target time period 
the advantages of removing the mechanical linkage will be 
significant, particularly as the control surfaces become 
more complex to support structural load relief functions. 
Future systems are also likely to locate the · servo electron-
ics integrally within the servos. As these changes occur, 
they are likely to put some of the most severe requirements 
on the communication system. A complete failure in communi-
cations will result in an immediate loss of the aircraft. 
The reliability requirements will thus be essentially the 
same for a completely unstable airplane. The communication 
system will have to support a total system with a failure 
rate of less than 10- 9 per hour. 
2 . 3 . 2 Flight Monitoring and Warning Functions 
Flight monitoring and warning functions are presently a 
collection of warning functions for such conditions like : 
stall, overspeed, off altitude, gear up, ground proximity, 
etc. Warnings to be added in the near future are wind shear 
and mid air collision. Hopefully, during the target time 
- 10 -
period, much broader, more comprehensive and integrated 
functions will be performed to assure that the aircraft is 
always flown within a safe flight envelope, thus signifi-
cantly increasing flight safety. 
These functions will unlikely place any unique require-
ments on the communication ,system. The only influence will 
be by the addition of any unique parameters to the data that 
must be communicated. A high degree of confidence must be 
placed on the reliability of these functions, although it is 
improbable that a failure will be the direct cause of an ac-
cident. The required reliability is thus less than that of 
flight control functions. 
2.3.3 Flight Management Functions 
Flight management functions are those capabilities that 
assist the crew in conducting the flight. Included are: 
flight planning, navigation data handling, communication 
system management, optimal flight path computation, etc. 
These functions are not expected to place any significant 
reliability or data rate requirement on the communication 
system. The most significant requirement will be provisions 
for handling and updating large amounts of data. Presum-
ably, .some large capacity data storage device will be in-
cluded in the system, such as tape, disk, or possibly a new 
technology, such as bubble memory. The data will have to be 
updated periodically with a a carry-on device, such as a 
tape cartridge, or by data link using a VHF radio. Depend-
ing on the configuration of the systems, there may be, a re-
quirement for the communication system to move this data ef-
fectively . 
2.3.4 Navigation Functions 
The navigation function includes all of the sensors used 
primarily for navigation. These sensors include all those 
used now, plus those expected to be added during the target 
time period. The present sensors are VHF omni range (VOR), 
distance measuring equipment (DME), automatic direction fin-
der (ADF), marker beacon, instrument landing system (ILS), 
inertial , and Omega, while the new systems are the microwave 
landing system (MLS) and the Global Positioning System 
(GPS). The inertial navigation sensors are integrated into 
the flight control/instrumentation inertial sensors . Loran 
and doppler navigation are not included . 
The trend dUring the target time period is assumed to be 
toward greater integration of the navigation function. Data 
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from the various sensors will be combined to obtain the best 
estimate of the aircraft's position, and also to allow the 
sensors to calibrate and monitor each other . This integra-
tion should increase the load on the communication system, 
but not to a significant degree relative to the flight con-
trol functions . Also, the reliability requirements will not 
be as great. 
2.3.5 Communication and Surveillance Functions 
The traditional voice communications on VHF and HF radios 
will have little impact on the internal aircraft communica-
tion system . These radios will be interfaced into the sys-
tem to allow centralized communication frequency management. 
The reliability of this radio control function must be high 
but not as high as the flight control functions. 
A more significant impact on the aircraft communication 
system will come from the data link functions. During the 
target time period, there will be an extensive and growing 
utilization of digital data link. Data links are assumed 
both through the ARINC system using VHF and possibly HF for 
airline operational, maintenance, and passenger service mes-
sages , and through the Air Traffic Control (ATC) system us-
ing the Discrete Addr~ss Beacon System (DABS) data link for 
ATC commands , operat iona l data, weather data, etc. 
The primary impact of the ARINC data link is the gather-
ing and transferring of the data that will make up the data 
link messages. Most of this data will be a vailable for oth-
er reasons . However, a few new terminals on the communica-
tion network will most likely be dedicated, to data link 
functions, such as a cabin teletype terminal. The ARINC VHF 
data link is not expected to place critical timing require-
ments on the communication system. A dedicated link con-
troller and data buffer is part of the modulator/demodulator 
(m odem ), so that the internal aircraft communication system 
is not directly involved in the timing requirements of re-
sponding to ground interrogations. 
The DABS data link will place similar requirements on the 
aircraft communication system. The primary requirement will 
be the distribution of data coming up through the link to 
the appropriate devices and the collection of the data to be 
sent back down the link. A buffer is expected to lie be-
tween the DABS mode m and internal communication structure . 
A data communication interface has been defined as a part of 
the proposed technical characteristic for DABS.z This system 
can communicate DABS messages in both directions to the ap-
propriate peripheral devices, used primarily on smaller air-
craft with no other data communication system. This system 
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has timing requirements too severe to be made directly 
compatible with an aircraft communication system. For exam-
ple , response time to a message must be as short as 4 micro-
seconds . Thus, a dedicated buffer is used so the inte r nal 
communication system will be relieved of these extreme l y 
tight timing requirements. 
2 . 3 . 6 Engine Control and Monitoring Functions 
The thrust command is transmitted to current aircraft en-
gines by mechanical linkage. During the target time period, 
thrust control will be transmitted electrically, similar to 
commands to the aerodynamic control surfaces. Electrical 
commands £or thrust will probably be introduced sooner than 
for aerodynamic commands. Initially, these commands may use 
dedicated wire. However, by the end of the time period, 
these commands will presumably be handled by the communica-
tion system. The primary impact will be the reliability re-
quirement which will be essentially the same as for flight 
control. 
Also, there will be electronics directly associated with 
the engine for control and data acquisition. The communica-
tion system will be responsible for supplying the engine 
electronics with neGessary aircraft data, such as air data, 
and for transferring data needed for cockpit engine instru-
mentation" and for safety and maintenance monitoring. These 
communications will have a moderate data rate and reliabili-
ty requirement and thus not put constraints on the communi-
cation system. 
In the future, the possibility exists that for environ-
mental or other reasons, the engine control will be removed 
from the engine. In this case, the data rate and transport 
delay requirements £rom engine sensor inputs to £uel £low 
control outputs will be very tight; however , that this sepa-
ration will be made during the target time period, for both 
technical and management reasons, ~s highly unlikely. 
2.3.7 Aircraft Systems Management 
The management/control, and particularly the display for 
all aircraft systems, are expected to beco me more integrated 
in the future. Traditionally, most of these systems were 
designed and built independently with separate controls and 
displays with dedicated wiring. As these systems grew more 
complex, the clutter and confusion in the cockpit became un-
manageable. Thus, from the beginning of t he targ e t time 
period integrated displays will be used. The integration of 
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signals required to support an advanced display system 
encourages the inclusion of many auxiliary functions into a 
more integrate~ system. Several new ones that cannot be 
easily identified will probably be added . Aircraft systems 
likely to be involved in the data integration include : the 
fuel system, electri cal system, hydraulic system, landing 
gear and brakes, environmental control system, weight and 
balance, auxiliaIY power system, and pneumatic/anti-ice sys-
tem. 
The integration of this data will have a major impact on 
the communication system because of the sheer magnitude, the 
number of signals involved, and their locations. The total 
reliability of all these functions must be high but not as 
high as the flight control functions. A major question to 
consider in the system design is the degree to which all of 
these auxiliary functions can be integrated with the primary 
flight control functions, without degrading the reliability 
of the more critical flight control functions. The answers 
to these questions are beyond the scope of this study . The 
assumpti on made here is that the communication structure 
should be capable of handling completely integrated systems 
to allow system designers freedom to develop "the most effec-
:"tive approach. 
2.3.8 Aircraft and System Support Functions 
During the target time period, an increasing reliance 
will be placed on electronics to optimize the operat ional 
effectiveness of aircraft. This trend will be motivated in 
at least two ways: The rapid development of electronic 
technology means that the cost of electroni~s relative to 
benefits gained is constantly shifting in favor of more 
electronics, and the ability to synergistically use capabil-
ities that already exist to perform existing functions. The 
functions envisioned involve increased use of automatic mon-
itoring, testing, and reconfiguration management. These ca-
pabilities will identify more easily and accurately failed 
equipment or degraded performance , to allow maintenance to 
be anticipated, and to avoid operational delays. These ca-
pabilities will also: aid in system checkout after repairs 
are made, assist in record keeping for maintenance control 
purposes, and identify more quickly troublesome areas that 
need basic redesign . 
One of the most important elements of the maintenance 
support function is the avionics system itself . Efficient 
met h ods will be needed to maintain the required high l eve l 
of reliability and to confirm that this reliability is rees-
tablished after repairs are made . This automated mainte-
nance function will be required to ass ist in maintaining the 
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ce~tifiction of the system. Some contempo~a~y flight 
cont~ol systems use sepa~ate ha~dwa~e fo~ this function, but 
future systems are anticipated to incorporate this function 
into the prima~y system. 
Much of the senso~ information and p~ocessing capability 
to perform these functions will already exist in the system, 
although many more will most likely be added. The majo~ im-
pact on the communication system will be the large numbe~ 
and diversity of signals that must be handled. 
2.3.9 Summary of Functional Requirements 
The major factors that influence the communication system 
~esulting f~om this functional ~equi~ements study a~e summa-
rized he~e. The highest reliability requirements result 
from the stability augmentation and control surface linkage 
(fly-by-wire) flight control function. The flight control 
system must, at the beginning of the target time period, 
support a near-neutrally stable aircraft in some parts of 
the .flight envelope, while p~og~essing to a completely un-
stable ai~c~aft by the end of the time period. During this 
period, the mechanical linkages a~e ~emoved. The required 
failure rate for these functions is 10- 7 per hour at the be-
ginning of the time period, and decreasing to 10- 9 by the 
end. The failure rate w~ich can be appo~tioned to the com-
munication system will depend on the design of the system. 
Howeve~, communications should only contribute a relatively 
small part of the total . Failure rate requirements for the 
probability of a complete failure to communicate the minimum 
information necessary to perform the flight critical func-
tions range from 1 to 3 times 10- 8 pe~ hou~ at the beginning 
of the time period and 1 to 3 times 10- 10 at the end. 
The most severe data rate and transport delay require-
ments result from the flutter control fUnction. The assumed 
maximum data rate requirement is 100 samples per second. 
The rate requirement is assumed to drop to 50 samples per 
second when the fUnction is performed by a dedicated system . 
The total capacity requirements and the extent to which 
the communications are localized throughout the aircraft de-
pend on where the servo-electronics are located and how ex-
tensively the system is integrated, particularly with auxil-
iary functions. The following paragraphs discuss the 
environment in which these requirements must be met: 
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2.4 HAZARD ENVIRONMENT 
The fundamental requirements that all candidate communi-
cation systems must meet are : first, they must perform the 
basic communication tasks; second, they must perform these 
tasks reliably; and third, the technique must be practical 
from the cost , operational, and maintenance points of view. 
The preceding section established baseline requirements for 
the communication tasks and the reliability that these tasks 
must be performed. This section discusses the hazard envi-
ronment in which the reliability requirement must be met. 
The hazard categories include: random equipment failures, 
specification errors, and induced failures. 
2 .4. 1 Random Eguipment Failures 
The communication system must meet the reliability re-
quirements in an environment where the equipment malfunc-
tions from random failures. Each component of the active 
and passive equipment used to perform the communication 
function may fail to perform its required task. These fail-
ures are normally caused by the interaction of environmental 
stress, or a particular operational situation with an inher-
ent manufacturing fault in that component, or a deteriora-
tion in capability since it was manufactured. These fail-
ures are assumed to be random, with little correlation with 
each other. The rate of failure is determined by the quali-
ty of the original manufacturing, the extent of initial 
equipment burn-in, the thoroughness of initial tests, and by 
the environmental experience, both accumulative and instan-
taneous. The statistical failure rate for most of the com-
ponents that will comprise the communication, system are rel-
atively well known, based on past experience with that, or 
similar components. The environmental stress on the compo -
nents will be a function of location, and are assumed to be 
defined by Radio Technical Commission for Aer onautics 
DO-160. 3 
The reliability that can be achieved by individual elec-
tronic components does not normally approach the levels re-
quired for the system. Therefore, the system must be built 
to tolerate all potential faults in the electronic hardware. 
The s yste m must be designed to detect and isolate any poten-
tial failure that cannot itself be shown to have a probabil-
ity of occurrence significantly less than that required for 
the system. When a failure is detected, the system must 
have sufficient additional resources so that the essential 
functi ons can continue to be performed . Analysis is neces-
sary to show that the reliability of the failure detection, 
isolation, and reconfiguration meets the total syst e m reli-
ability requirements in an environment of random equip~ent 
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failure rates. For this study, the component failure rates 
relatively well defined and available from such sources as 
MIL-HNBK-217B.4 
2.4.2 Specification Errors 
The design of a communication system to meet reliability 
requirements approaching 10- 11 failures per hour in the 
presence of random failures is a difficult but achievable 
task using techniques beginning to mature. As these goals 
are achieved, the relative importance of other potential 
causes of system failure increases. An important category 
of potential failure sources are identified here as specifi-
cation errors, which include: generic faults in the design 
of the system hardware or software, errors in the manufac-
turing process itself, and errors in the operation of the 
system. When redundant channels provide coverage for random 
failures, specification errors may become a dominant source 
of failure because they can affect all redundant channels 
simultaneously to cause a complete system failure. 
These faults are more difficult to define, estimate the 
probability of occurrence, and provide protection against. 
By definition, almost no actual experience can help to un-
derstand these types of failures or estimate their rate of 
occurrence. This situation is illustrated by the following 
fact: If a particular design is accepted as a standard and 
used on all commercial aircraft for a typical generation of 
15 years, the total flight time is estimated to be between 
10 8 and 10 9 hours . Thus, if no failure arises (or only one) 
during this time period, it will contribute little to an in-
creased understanding and prove little about · the statistics. 
In any case, the information will be too late since the risk 
will already be taken. Therefore, the system must be de-
signed such that it is theoretically close to impossible to 
have a life-critical failure in the system. 
Two approaches to the problem are suggested here : First, 
the basic design can be done so that it is extremely impro-
bable that any error exists in the hardware or controlling 
software. Some of the techniques which might be used to ac-
complish this error free design are: 
strict requirements specification standards 
Enforced design methods standards-
Achieving the simplest possible design 
Using a design that can be proven correct 
mathematically 
Using independent design verification and 
validation teams. 
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The other approach is to design the system such that 
there is no single link in the design which allows anyone 
design error to cause a complete system failure .. This tech-
nique means there are redundant channels, where the channels 
ha ve diss i milar design , or where there is so me backup means 
to provid e all critical functions. The bac k up system would 
not u se the same des i gn a s t h e p~ima~y syste m. 
2 . 4 . 3 Induced Failures 
The final hazards discussed here arise from external 
events. The probability that the communication system con-
tinues to provide critical functions after the occurrence of 
one of these events must be proportional to the probability 
of that event. The external events considered here are : 
physical damage, fire, lightning, and extreme deviation from 
the design environment, including temperature, vibration, 
shock. and EMI. 
2.4 . 3. , Physical Damage and Fire 
The probability that physical damage and fire will affect 
the communication system can be significant relative to the 
very low failure rates required. Physical damage can result 
from the following: collision with other aircraft, birds, 
the ground or other statio~ary objects; excessive aerodynam-
i c loads, caused by abrupt maneuver or turbulence ; explosion 
( te rr orist or ,acc i dental) ; massive failure of engine or oth-
er e qu ip ment , such as an air conditioning turbine, including 
t he ef fects of parts thrown out; loose objects , such as car-
go ; a nd damage due to rapid decompression. Also, fire can 
result from many of the same causes, in addition to massive 
fai lu re of electrical and electronic equipment, cargo fires , 
acc i dental trash fire, such as a cigarette in a waste con-
taine r , e t c . Physical damages may also include liquid dam-
age from fuel, hydraulic, galley, and toilet leaks. 
The require ment for the communication system is that it 
cont i nue to provide all flight critical functions aft e r any 
damage or fire that is not so severe as to prevent flight 
otherwise. In other words, the primary cause of an accident 
sho u ld not be damage to the communication system. The prob-
abi l ity that the communication system can sur v ive the da~ ag e 
is proportional to the probability of that da mage . 
To ob t ain an initial e st i mate of the probability th a t a 
communication system i s d amaged , a survey wa s ma de of all 
air carrier accidents be t ween 1964 and 19 7 7. 5 6 The bri efs 
of the accide n ts in the Annual Re v iews of Air cr a ft Acci d e nt 
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D~ta, published by the National Transportation Safety Board 
(NTSB), were used. For each accident, a determination was 
first made on whether, if an advanced communication system 
were used, damage to that system could have contributed to 
an accident. Two classes of accidents were eliminated: 
those where it was judged unlikely that any part of a commu-
nication system would be damaged, and those where the re-
sults of the accident would be the same whether the communi-
cation system were damaged or not. A total of 722 accidents 
were included, 57 of these were considered to be ones where 
communicaton system damage could have been a factor. 
For each of these accidents, rough estimates are made in 
three categories: the probability of at least one electrical 
cable containing a communication line or communication ter-
minal was damaged, the probability that more than one line 
or terminal was damaged, and the probability that one par-
ticular area in the airplane was damaged which would corre-
spond to a controller of the communication system. These 
probabilities were summed to get a total number of events. 
The results were: 16.7 events for one line or terminal, 5.3 
for more then one, and 0.4 for a control center. The total 
operating hours for this time period was 70.6 million hours. 
The probability rates for damage events per hour are thus 
2.4 x 10- 7 for one line, 7.5 x 10- 8 for two lines, and 6 x 
10- 9 for a control center. Not included are incidents which 
may have caused damage · not serious enough to report. It is 
also assumed that no unusual care was taken to protect 
against damage. A more thorough analysis of selected acci-
dents and incidents is necessary to increase confidence in 
these numbers. (A more complete description of the analysis 
performed to estimate these damage probabilities is given in 
Appendix A.) 
2.4 .4 Lightning 
Lightning is also a significant component of the hazard 
environment for a communication system which achieves high 
reliability by redundancy and fault tolerance. Two factors 
must be considered: First, the probability that a lightning 
event with particular characteristics occurs, and second, 
the probability that, given lightning has these characteris-
tics, the system fails. 
The probability that an aircraft will be struck by light-
ning depends on the altitude, location in the world, and 
time of year. Data gathered by the UK for both European and 
world-wide operations found strike incidence rates varying 
from one in 780 hours to one in 19000 hours. The commonly 
accepted rate is once per year or once per 3000 hours. The 
indirect effects of lightning flashes nearby , but not strik-
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ing the aircraft, may also be significant when considering 
any effects on the communication system. The rates for 
nearby strikes are not known, but are not assumed to be sig-
nificantly more than double the direct strike rate. 
The effects of a lightning strike on the communication 
system depend on the varying intensity and characteristics 
of the strike. The assumed distributions for these charac- ' 
teristics are given in NASA Reference Publication 1008, 
Lightning Protection of Aircraft, pages 21 to 16. 7 The worst 
case strike is the same as that used for the Space Shuttle 
design and given in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2 : Diagrammatic Representation of Lightning Model 
The probability that a lightning strike with certain 
characte ristics will produce an error or cause a complete 
failure of a particular communication system is difficult to 
estimate . The mechanisms by which lightning might induce 
failu r es are not well understood, but depend on the design 
of the particular system, how it is installed in the air-
craft , and how it is protected from the effects of light-
ning . 
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A first estimate of the probability of effects of light-
ning on the system is obtained from past experience of indi-
rect effects of lightning on commercial aircraft, as report-
ed in NASA Reference Publication 1008, page 100 . The inter-
ference and outages on equipment, with direct connections 
outside the aircraft through antennas, etc . , were assumed 
not to apply to the internal communication system. The to-
tal of the other cases gave interference in 12% of ~he 
strikes and outages in 7%. Thus, the first estimate iives a 
probability of 4 x 10- 5 per hour of some interference, and a 
probability of 2.5 x 10- 5 per hour of some damage. 
Some of the candidate advanced communication systems may 
be more susceptible than current equipment due, for example, 
to the use of digital techn~logy ot wires that are more 
spread throughout the aircraft. On the other hand, a better 
understanding of interference mechanisms that allows the de-
velopment of protection techniques may reduce the probabili-
ty of faults. One technique that appears to offer signifi-
cant protection is the use of shields grounded at both ends. 
Sometimes, this may be an additional overall shield, where 
single-ended shields are needed to protect it from other 
types of noise. 
For this study, lightning is an unique hazard with the 
potential to affect diverse parts of the communication sys-
tem simultaneously in unpredictable ways. The methods 
available to bound these effects are limited and difficult 
to construct. For these reasons, the candidate communica-
tion systems must be made essentially immune from the ef-
fects of lightning phenomena : 
The immunity can be provided by either passive shielding 
or active reCovery techniques. The techniques which provide 
immunity may vary for different candidate systems. The 
costs for providing the immunity must be included in the 
cost trade-offs for each system, for example, the weight of 
any additional shielding. The lightning protection for the 
processing system that gives the basic supervisory control 
of the communication system is not part of this study . It 
is assumed, however, that the processing system is tolerant 
of lightning hazards and can implement any active recovery 
techniques in the communication system used by a particular 
design. 
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Chapter 3 
BASELINE EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS 
The preceding chapter discussed the functions to be per-
formed by the avionics system that must be supported by the 
communication structures investigated in this study. Some 
baseline assumptions must now be established for the elec-
tronic equipment necessary to perform these functions. This 
chapter identifies the basic hardware elements that: supply 
the required sensor information; provide the display and 
control interface with the crew; and interface with the ac-
tuators that control the aerodynamic surfaces, engines, and 
other aircraft systems. A parameter list is established 
corresponding to each sensor or effector to estimate the 
amount of data that must be communicated, along with re-
quirements for accuracy, data rates, time delay, and reli-
ability. The equipment set and associated parameter list 
are not based on a detailed design of a complete avionics 
system. They are assumed, however, to be sufficiently rep-
resentative to define a realistic baseline for the communi-
cation system study. The next chapter identifies alterna-
tive configurations which organize these hardware elements 
into a total system. 
The equipment and parameters discussed are primarily con-
cerned with sensor systems and effectors. No attempt is 
made here to predict the communication load attributable to 
the computer systems themselves, or to estimate intra-com-
puter system communications. These characteristics are too 
dependent on the particular system design to allow meaning-
ful estimates. 
The equipment and parameters are listed in major group-
ings roughly corresponding to the functional areas mentioned 
earlier. Table 1 depicts a typical parameter list . 
The i nformation with each parameter includes: the quantity, 
the required digital resolution. the data rate, the response 
time or allowable transport delay , the assumed criticality 
of that set of parameters (not necessarily of each individu-
al parameter in a redundant set), and the typical location 
of that signal in the aircraft. This information comes from 
a variety of sources. A primary source is the ARINC DITS 
Specification 429. 
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TABLE 
Flight Data Sensors 
Parameter Quantity Resolution (nITS) Samp./sec 
Angular Rate 9 13 SO 
Acceleration 9 12 SO 
Flutter Sensor 6 10 100 
Static Pressure 2 16 10 
Total Pressure 2 14 10 
Total Temperature 2 10 2 
Angle -of-Attack 2 11 SO 
I 
Magnetic Field Sensor 2 12 SO 
~ -
- ---- ----- --
* -9 VH Total Failure Rate less than 10 
H Total Failure Rate less than 10 -7 
M Total Failure Rate less than 10 -5 
L No Safety of Flight Requirement 
Resp. Time Cd tical! ty 
10 rns VII 
10 rns VII 
2 ms H 
SO ms II 
SO ms H 
1 s M 
10 ms M 
10 ms H 
- --
* Location 
Avionic Bay 
AB 
Wing 
AB 
AB 
Nose 
Nose 
Wing 
(AB) 
I 
~ 
I 
3.1 AIRCRAFT FLIGHT DATA SENSORS 
The first equipment considered is the set of aircraft 
flight data sensors needed primarily to support the flight 
control functions and used in several other functions, iu-
cluding flight warning and navigation. Table 1 provides the 
parameter list. This set of sensors is integrated to col-
lectively produce all necessary aircraft flight data for 
every function. The different functions, such as flight 
control, navigation, and cockpit instruments, will not have 
separate sensors. In this list, the sensor processing is 
also integrated so that only the basic sensor measurements 
need be transmitted. This degree of integration may not oc-
cur until later in the target time perio~. If the sensor 
system integration is not implemented, Table 2 gives typical 
data transfer requirements for a more conventional arrange-
ment for air data system and inertial reference system. 
Table 1 includes: strapped down angular rate and acceler-
ation sensors, flutter control sensors in the wing, air 
pressure and temperature sensors, angle-of-attack vanes, and 
flux gates . The total reliability requirement for inertial 
sensors is very high to support the active control of a ba-
sically unstable aircraft. Sensor redundancy achieves this 
high reliability. The number of sensors required depends on 
the basic reliability of the sensors and the redundancy 
scheme. A compromise is made here of nine sensors, each 
representative of either simple triple redundancy of high 
reliability sensors or a more sophisticated skewed arrange-
ment of less reliable . sensors. The reliability requirement 
for the other sensors is not as high because some alternate 
data or emergency procedures avoid a catastrophe in most 
cases . 
3.2 FLIGHT CONTROL ACTUATORS 
The parameter list for the flight control actuators is 
given in -Table 3. There are two groups: one for the command 
signals going to the actuators, and the other for the sur-
face position sensors bringing information back into the 
system. The parameter s listed are the interface between the 
flight control processing system and the servo electronics. 
Several other signals are necessary between the servo elec-
tronics and the hydraulic actuator, inclUding : position 
feedbacks, rate feedbacks, differential pressure sensors, 
engage discretes , etc . These signals are transferred by 
dedicated wires and do not involve the primary communication 
system. The location of the servo electronics, then, is 
crucial in establishing the requirements for the communica-
tion system. 
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Parameter 
Independent Flight Data 
C'omputers 
Inertial Reference System 
Air Data System 
TABLE 2 
Independent Flight Data Compute~s 
Quantity Parameters Resolution (BITS) 
3 14 18(max) 
(30 INC Navigation) 
2 13 18 (max) 
Samp./sec Reap. Time Criticality Location 
50 (max) 20 ms VH AB 
16 (max) 50 ms H AB 
N 
(J'> 
TABLE 3 
Flight Control Actuator Signals 
-
Resolution 
Parameter Quantity (BITS) Samp/Sec 
Flight Control Actuator Commands 
Wing Dynamic Control Surfaces 18 12 50 
(Roll, OLC, MLC, GLA, EMS) 
Wing Flutter Suppression 6 12 100 
Wing Configuration Contr ol 20 1 10 
(Flaps, Slats, Variable Chamber 
Spoilers) 
Tail Dynamic Control Surfaces 11 12 50 
Landing Gear Operation 6 1 1 
Steering 1 10 10 
Brakes 5 8 10 
Control Surface position Sensors 
Wing Dynamic Surfaces 8 12 50 
Wing Flutter Suppression 6 12 100 
Wing Configuration Analog 4 10 10 
Wing Configuration Discrete 20 1 10 
'rail Surfaces 6 12 50 
Landing Gear Analog 1 10 10 
Landing Gear Discrete 20 1 10 
- - ----
Resp. Time cd ticaU ty Location 
10 ms VH Wing 
2 ms H Wing 
100 ms M Wing 
10 ms VII Tail 
100 ms II 2 Nose Gear 
4 Main Gear 
50 ms L Nose Gear 
50 ms H 1 Nose Gear 
4 Main Gear 
, 
10 ms H Wing 
2 ms H Wing 
100 ms M Wing 
10 ms M Wing I 
10 ms II 'l'ail I 
50 ms L Landing Gears ! 
50 ms M Landing Gears 
r-
Servo electronics are currently included within the 
flight control system in the avionics bay. In the future, 
the electronics will most likely be included with the actua-
tors. This will be the case by the end of the target time 
period, and may also be true at the beginning of the time 
period for some of the actuators. This shift will not sig-
nificantly change the load on the communications but will 
affect its physical geometry. The distinction will be made" 
when summarizing the total requirements. 
The flutter control will probably be performed with a 
dedicated control loop, either locally or centrally. How-
ever, the data requirements are retained within the communi-
cation system to hold the option open. 
3.3 NAVIGATION SENSORS 
The navigation sensors are given in Table 4. Most of 
these data requirements are moderate and well defined. It 
is likely that the Global Positioning System (GPS) will be 
implemented at least by the end of the time period. The GPS 
function is assumed to be partially integrated. The basic 
control of the receivers will be retained in the GPS unit 
itself. The navigation equations, however, will be solved 
in the central computers where other navigation data will be 
combined to provide both mutual calibration and error detec-
tion functions. The highest data rate requirement will be 
line of sight velocity data from inertial sources that is 
fed back to the receiver units to improve the signal track-
ing loops . 
Weather radar is included as a navigation sensor. An 
ARINC standard has been established for the weather radar 
data output from the transmitter-receiver unit. This data 
is at a very high rate so dedicated lines are assumed that 
are not included in the primary communication system. 
3.4 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT 
The parameters 
given in Table S. 
small load on the 
nificant function 
involved with radio communications are 
The normal radio equipment will place a 
data communication system. The only sig-
will be the transfer of tuning and control 
messages to the transceivers. 
The load on the data communication system will be prima-
rily due to the data link functions of the radio communica-
tions system. The aircraft has full capability for both ATC 
DABS data link and company ARINC data link throughout the 
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Parameter 
VOR Angle 
DME Dist 
ADF Bearing 
ILS Lpcalizer 
ILS Glide Slope 
Marker Beacon 
Radio Altitude 
MLS Azimuth 
MLS Evaluation 1 
MLS Evaluation 2 
MLS Range 
MLS Data 
GPS Receiver 
GPS Data 
GPS Line of Sight Vel In 
Weather Radar Attitude 
Stab 
Weather Radar Data 
Navigation Frequency and 
Mode Control 
Quantity 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
6 
2 
· 2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
8 
1 
4 
2 
2 
10 
TABLE 4 
Navigation Sensors 
Resolution 
(BITS) Samp/Sec 
12 16 
16 16 
12 16 
13 16 
13 16 
1 1 
17 20 
13 10 
13 10 
13 10 
13 10 
90 0 . 1 
32 0.5 
1500 .008 (2/min) 
16 50 
14 50 
1600 512 
.21 5 
Resp. Time Criticality Location 
20 ms M AB 
20 ms M AB 
20 ms M AB 
20 ms II AB 
10 ms H AB 
100 ms M AB 
10 ms H AB 
I 10 ms H AB 
10 ms H AB 
10 ms H AB 
10 ms H AB 
1 sec M AB 
10 ms M AB 
N/A M AB 
10 ms M AB 
10 ms M Nose 
N/A M AB 
, 
100 inS H AS 
N 
I,Q 
Parameter 
Corom Receiver Frequency 
and Mode Control 
Transponder Control 
DABS Data Link 
ARINC Data Link 
Passenger Service Terminal 
* Non Buffered 
** Buffered 
TABLE 5 
Radio Communications Equipment 
Resolution 
Quantity (BITS) Samp./Sec Resp. Time Criticality Location 
5 21 5 100 ms H AB 
2 18 5 100 ms H AB 
• 4 88 1600 100 lls H AB 
16 250 ms" 
1 220 .5 1 sec L AB 
1 220 .5 10 sec L Cabin 
- -- - ----------_._._-._--
~'---
target time period. A dedicated bu££er is used with the 
DABS data link so that the data communications system can be 
~elieved from tight timing ~equi~ements. 
3 .5 COCKPIT EQUIPMENT 
The tasks pe~fo~med in the cockpit a~e involved in almost 
all ai~c~aft functions. These tasks a~e divided into five 
a~eas: the p~ima~y flight cont~ols (wheel, pedals, etc.), 
the primary £light displays, the aircra£t operational con-
t~ol and display (flight path commands, autopilot mode se-
lection and display, system status, etc . ), ai~c~aft systems 
cont~ol and display, and te~minals fo~ communicating with 
the avionics system. The estimated pa~amete~ list is given 
in Table 6. 
During the ta~get time pe~iod, the mechanical linkage 
will p~e sumably be ~emoved. The p~ima~y flight cont~ol thus 
becomes flight c~ucial. This task will place the highest 
~eliability ~equirement on the communication system f~om the 
cockpit . 
The p~ima~y flight displays and the g~eat majo~ity of 
ai~c~aft system displays will be multifunctional, using CRTs 
o~ some newe~ technology. These displays will no~mally be 
gene~ated in elect~onic units mounted in the prima~y elec-
t~onics bays. The communication between the display gene~a­
tors and display indicato~s a~e ve~y high f~equency video 
signals which ~emain dedicated and do not affect the commu-
nication systems. The basic data input into the display 
generato~s will be included in the communication requir e -
ments. The other cockpit data ~equirements . a~e mo~e mode~-
ate and a~e at the levels listed in Table 6 . 
3 . 6 ENGINE AND AIRCRAFT SYSTEM MONITORING, CONTROL, AND 
SUPPORT 
The communications necessa~y to suppo~t the monitoring, 
control , display, and maintenance aides fo~ the engines and 
all of the asso~ted ai~c~aft systems, a~e prima~ily distin-
guished by the large number of different signals scattered 
th~oughout the ai~craft. Table 7 gives a rough estimate of 
pa~amete~s that can be p~esently identified for each of the 
majo~ systems. Most likely, several more signals will be 
added, pa~ticula~ly fo~ maintenance suppo~t pu~poses. To 
account for these additional pa~ameters, the total load on 
the communica tion system doubles that shown in Table 7 . 
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TABLE 6 
Cockpit Cont~ols and Displays 
Resolution 
Parameter Quantity (BITS) Samp./Sec Resp. Time Criticality Location 
Cockpit Primary Controls 
Control Wheel 6 12 50 10 ms VH Cockpit (CP) 
Pedals (Rudder & Brakes) 6 12 50 10 ms VH CP 
Trim 9 1 10 50 ms II CP 
Flaps 3 8 10 50 ms II CP ! 
w 
Speed Brakes 3 1 10 50 ms If CP 
! 
Nose Wheel Steering 3 8 10 50 ms M CP I I I 
Primary Flight Displays 
Display Indicators 4 edicated ( 10 MHz) CP 
Flight Display Generator 2 576 50 10 ms H AB 
Systems Display Generator 2 . 528 10 50 ms H AB 
Flight Operational Control 
and Display 1 288 10 50 ms H CP 
Systems Control and Display 1 50 10 50 ms H CP 
Avionics System Terminal 2 80 10 50 ms M CP 
Cockpit Printer 1 640 1 N/A M . CP 
-
----------.-- ------ ------_. -'-------
- --- - ------- .--"- ----.- --- - --------
-------- --.---" . ~.-. ---~ .. -.--.----
l_ 
W 
N 
TABLE 7 
Engines and Aircraft Systems 
Resolution 
Parameter Quantity (BITS) Samp./Sec Resp. Time 
Aircraft Engine . 4 96 10 50 ms 
Hydraulic 1 96 1 100 ms 
Fuel 1 156 1 100 InS 
Electrical 1 168 1 100 ms 
Pressure/Oxygen 1 180 1 100 ms 
APU 1 102 10 100 ms 
Airconditioning 1 180 1 100 ms 
Bleed Air/Anti-Ice 1 24 1 100 ms 
Flight Data Recorder 1 768 1 N/A 
.-------- - --
cd ticali ty Location 
M Wings 
M Mid Fuselage(MF) 
M MF 
M MF 
M MF 
M Tail 
M MF 
M Wings 
M Tail 
- - ~--
----- ---.--------. 
I • 
3 . 7 MISCELLANEOUS EQUIPMENT 
Listed in Table 8 are two other _ pieces of equipment most 
likely used in support of several functions: One is a 
flight data storage unit which stores data for use in flight 
management and navigation, and can also store flight manual 
and maintenance manual type data for display in the cockpit. 
Provision must be made to update this data periodically, 
with some operational data to be updated every flight. Nav-
igation reference data must be updated at establisned times, 
such as every 60 days. The update may actually replace the 
memory medium, e.g., tape or by data link. 
The other device listed is an audio generator. This de-
vice would be commanded by the system to generate the inputs 
into the audio system for the warning functions, as well as 
be used for some of the ATe and company data link messages. 
3.8 SUMMARY OF DATA REQUIREMENTS 
The data requirements for the various types of equipment 
are summarized in Ta~le 9. Almost all parameters are trans-
mitted as 16 bit words, and discretes are packed into 16 bit 
words. The flight data storage system rates are not includ-
ed because this transfer should occur during a non-critical 
time, probably on the ground. Flutter control is included, 
while weather radar data is not because of the high data 
rates. 
Table 10 gives the data requirements by approximate loca-
tion in the aircraft, assuming both that the servo electron-
ics are in the avionics bay and alternatively located with 
the servos. The numbers in parentheses are for a system 
with flutter control parameters removed. 
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Parameter 
Flight Data Storage Unit 
Audio Generator 
(Tone and Voice Synthesis 
TABLE . 8 
Mis ce llaneous Equipment 
Resolution 
Quanti t y (BITS) Samp./S ec 
1 8000 1 
" 
2 80 1 
Resp. Time Criticality Locat ion 
N/A M AB 
100 ms H AS 
TABLE 9 
Summary of Communication Requirement 
Equipment Class Words/sec 
Flight Data Sensors 1744 
Flight Control Actuators 3500 
Navigation 641 
Communications 130 
Cockpit 3191 
Aircraft Systems 446 
Miscellaneous 10 
9662 
Bits/sec 155K 
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TABLE 10 
Communication Requirements by Area 
Central Dispersed 
Location Servo Electronics Servo Electronics 
Avionic Equipment Bays 131. Sk (98. Sk) 60k 
Nose & Nose Gear 2k 3.5k 
Wing lk 57.Sk(24.5k) 
Tail 2k lS.Sk 
Cockpit 17k 17k 
Fuse l age/Cabin/Main Gear 1.5k l.Sk 
I, 
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Chapter 4 
ALTERNATE SYSTEM CONFIGURATIONS 
This chapter discusses configurations of total systems 
that might be used to organize the basic hardware elements 
described in the preceding chapter. First, several factors 
are discussed that will influence the system design. Next, 
a broad range of potential system configurations is created. 
This range is then narrowed down to three alternative system 
designs that are representative of the configurations ex-
pected to develop through the target time period. 
4.1 SYSTEM DESIGN CHARACTERISTICS INFLUENCING THE 
COMMUNICATION SYSTEM 
Some characteristics of the potential avionics system 
configurations are discussed that influence the communica-
tion system. These include: the degree of functional inte-
gration. the physical location of the equipment. and the 
configur~tion of the central fault-tolerant computer system. 
4 . 1 • 1 Extent of Functional Integration 
One design characteristic which will have significant in-
fluence on communications is the degree to which individual 
functions are kept separate or integrated into the system. 
The degree of integration can influence the load on the com-
munication system in either direction, as illustrated in the 
following examples: 
The first example, the flutter control function, illus-
trates how greater integration can increase the amount of 
data handled. The flutter control function. previously de-
scribed, requires a very high data rate. If the control 
function is integrated into a central processor, high sensor 
and command signal data rates must be handled by the primary 
communication system . If this control loop is closed lo-
cally. ther e is essentially no load on the .communication 
system due to this function . The second example, the air 
data function. is one in which a greater degree of integra-
tion re duces the amount of data communicated . In current 
systems, a Digital Air Data System (DADS) processes measure-
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ments f~om the total and static p~essu~e senso~s. a total 
tempe~atu~e p~obe, and angle of attack sensors, to produce a 
set of pa~amete~s that can be de~ived f~om these measu~e­
ments. The DADS p~oduces as many as 16 output pa~amete~s. 
including: ba~omet~ic co~rected and uncorrected altitude , 
altitude ~ate. computed ai~speed, Mach number, true ai~­
speed. etc. In a system where other functions using air 
data a~e also not integ~ated. these paramete~s must be dis-
tributed to many different locations. In the current sys-
tem. the DADS output may go to as many as 19 other systems, 
such as: redundant flight control. flight augmentation, 
flight management. and warning computers. as well as the 
flight instruments, transponder. and cabin pressure control-
ler. In a more integ~ated system. only the basic sensor 
measurements a~e communicated. Also. assuming most other 
user functions a~e integrated, this data does not have to be 
distributed to many different places. 
4.1.2 Physical Location 
Another system characteristic which will have an impor-
tant influence on the communication system is the physical 
location of the electronics. or the degree the hardware is 
centralized or dispersed. Facto~s that influence the physi-
cal location of electronics a~e: 
1. Environment 
2. Maintainability 
3. Wiring costs 
4. Damage tolerance 
Environment and maintenance considerations will requi~e that 
the equipment be concent~ated in cent~al locations with good 
environmental cont~ol and easy access. Wire length and dam-
age tolerance considerations will require that equipment be 
dispersed and placed close~ to the equipment being serviced. 
The balance between these conflicting trends is determined 
by the pace of technological development. As electronic de-
vices become available to provide very high reliability in 
severe environments, the balance will shift to more dis-
persed systems. 
For the next generation of ai~craft to sta~t development 
at the beginning of the target time period. the most impor-
tant factor is the envi~onment, followed closely by mainte-
nance . Aircraft operators, especially airlines, want to im-
prove the failure rate of electronics and thus reduce 
maintenance costs. One of the majo~ causes of failures is 
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environmental stress, particularly temperature. New 
installation concepts are being developed particularly by 
the AEEC for the airline industry. The first phase of the 
work of the New Installations concepts (NIC) Subcommittee of 
AEEC has resulted in ARINC Characteristic 600 8 , which will 
be used for the generation of aircraft currently being de-
veloped , including the Boeing 767 and 757. The new ARINC 
characteristics allow electronic modules to be smaller, and 
to be more protected from the environment. Of particular 
interest is self-contained cooling, which operates when the 
aircraft is on the ground and the primary aircraft environ-
mental control system is not operating. Following phases of 
the NIC activity have already been identified which further 
improve the environment for electronics. This trend will 
encourage the electronics to become more concentrated as 
long as suitable precautions can be taken to avoid common 
mode failures due, for example, to physical damage or fire . 
If this trend prevails, a majority of the electronics in an 
aircraft may be relatively close to each other in a substan-
tially protected and controlled environment. The nature of 
the communication system that is most effective in this 
situation may significantly vary from one which supports 
equipment ~istributed throughout the aircraft in an arbi-
trarily poor environment. 
In the near term, the dominant factors will most likely 
4raw the equipment together. Electronic equipment is thus 
most likely to be in centrally located equipment bays that 
can be environmentally controlled and conveniently main-
tained. Some equipment previously dispersed in the aircraft 
may now be brought into central locations where the environ-
ment can b e more easily controlled. 
A competing trend arises from the advantages of embedding 
electronics within many aircraft subsystems. This trend is 
motivated not only because these subsystems are getting more 
co mplex, and thus more difficult to control , but also be-
cause the development of electronic technology is ma k ing 
available high capability at low cost . Manufacturers of 
various pieces of equipment will probably use embedded elec-
tronics to improve the performance and/or reduce the cost of 
their equipment. The explosion in electronic technology can 
give significant opportunities to greatly improve the effec-
tiveness of many existing devices, and make possible the use 
of completely new techniques. For example, simple digital 
processors are embedded ins i de pressure ~ransducers . The 
electronics provide functions, such as temp~rature compensa-
tion and output signal linearization, to make it possible to 
u se n ew t y pes of highly accura t e sensing devices. 
Another example is high technology e ng ines, which have 
become too complex t o be controlled by h y dromechanical con-
trollers alone. Production military engines and the engines 
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nOw being developed for commercial aircraft 
integrally mounted electronic controllers. 
already have 
Another situation which may have even greater impact on 
the communication structure is flight control surface actua-
tors. At least one manufacturer is interested in including 
the servo control electronics integrally with the servo. 
The moving of the servo electronics from the electronics bay 
to the actuators will probably be most influential in chang-
ing the nature of the communication system from one primari-
ly concentrated in avionics bays to one distributed through-
out the airplane. 
The communication technology itself can influence the 
spread of electronics. If fiber optic links can solve prob-
lems such as lightning interference, active electronics will 
most probably be employed on the remote end of these links 
to convert the signals to a usable form. Once active elec-
tronics are established at remote locations, they can sup-
port both the local equipment and the communication system. 
For many devices, electronic technology cannot provide 
the necessary reliablilty · in the severe environments associ-
ated with the devices. However, as more advanced technology 
becomes available, electronics are likely to be dispersed 
throughout the aircraft, independent of any explicit deci-
sion by those responsible for the design of the total sys-
tem. When this occurs, a more effective total system design 
can be produced by recognizing the existence of this dis-
persed electronic capability and by including it in the de-
sign concepts. For example, this dispersed electronics can 
support a more global communication structure. An assumption 
made here is that a majority of the electronics will be in 
centra l ized electronic bays at the beginning of the target 
time period, but that a greater percentage will be distrib-
uted in the aircraft by the end of the time period. 
4 . 1 . 2 . 1 Physical Location Alternatives 
These trends can now be used to identify a range of phys-
ical locations that might be used during the target time 
period. A trade-off analysis is performed to distinguish 
the relative characteristics of these locations. This in-
formation is used to narrow the alternatives down to the 
three that become the basis for the system configurations 
used in the remainder of this study. The system defined at 
one end of the range will have almost all electronics in one 
location. This choice of location represents some retreat 
from current practice. Now, a majority of the electronics 
are located in a primary avionics area, usually near the 
nose of the aircraft under the cockpit . Much equipment is 
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in other locations, however, such as in the wing root area, 
tail, and various other locations . This more concentrated 
configuration could result from equipment being drawn into a 
common location to take advantage of special environmen t a l 
control equipment that may be incorporated in future air-
craft. Nonetheless, this configuration is i nc l u ded i n th i s 
study to provide a baseline and a logical ex t reme for the 
requirements of the communication structure . 
Electronics may be dispersed from t hi s one location op-
tion for at least two reasons: One reason is to put the 
electronics closer to the equipment being serviced . This 
move could substantially reduce wiring and installation 
costs and possibly improve performance. The other reason is 
to reduce the probability that a common event, such as dam-
age, could cause complete failure of a critical function. 
The next location alternative defined for this study is 
to separate the single location into two or three compart-
ments in generally the same area of the aircraft. These 
compartments will be sufficiently separated or protected so 
that the probability of a single survivable event damaging 
equipment in more than one location will be extremely small. 
These locations mayor may not be related to the logical or-
ganization. For example, a dual-dual system may be put in 
two locations, and a triplex system in three, or a triplex 
system can be placed in two locations as long as probable 
damag~ at one location will not cause loss of a critical 
function. If a correspondence exists between the logical 
and physical organization, the redundancy within a compart-
ment may be r elaxed for items like power suppl i es or commu-
n i cation buses. 
The next extension in location alternatives is to move 
t h e electronics closer to the equipment being serviced. The 
primary driver in this process is the flight control servo 
electronics which may require as many as 13 wires for each 
c h annel. Flight critical fly-by-wire and active control 
f unctions require significantly larger numbers of actuator 
c h annels than at present both for redundancy and additional 
aerodynam i c surfaces . These actuators are almost all locat-
ed in the wing~ or tail. By creating electronics areas in 
t h e wing root area and aft fuselage , considerable wire can 
be saved. Within these three general areas, nose, wing 
root , and tail, the electronics can be located together or 
again separated into two or three compartments at each gen-
e ral location. 
Until now, there has been no significant disadvantage 
from environmental or maintenance considera t ions. All loca-
tions have essenti a lly t he same oppor t unity for environmen-
t al control and maintenance access. The onl y significant 
cost may be t hat special environmental equipme nt may ha ve to 
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be duplicated and maintenance pe~sonnel may have 
mo~e than one a~ea to make ~epai~s. 
to visit 
The next step in dispe~sing elect~onics involves moving 
outside the envi~onmentally controlled fuselage, thus con-
siderably increasing the envi~onmental and maintenance dis-
advantages. The final two options for this study create ad-
ditional areas for elect~onics both outside the fuselage in 
the wings and tail and embedded in the using equipment. 
The embedded alternative is most easily defined. Here, 
the electronics are included in the equipment being ser-
viced . Much of the electronic equipment, such as central 
compute~s, navigation sensors, and communication equipment, 
will be located in cent~al equipment compa~tments . Elec-
tronics associated with other aircraft equipment, such as 
actuators, engines, and environmental control systems, will 
be embedded di~ectly in the equipment being se~viced. This 
embedded electronics will be ~ecognized in the total system 
design and must be serviced by the communication structure. 
Finally, a physical location option is defined that is a 
compromise between the embedded system and those systems 
with all the equipment in the fuselage; this option is 
called a multilocation system. Though incentives exist to 
move the electronics as close as possible to the equipment 
being se~viced, it may not be desirable for environmental, 
space , or maintenance reasons to embed the elect~onics in 
the equipment. The ffiultilocation system would thus establish 
remote electronics areas in locations such as: the wing 
trailing edge, engine pylon, and tail, where the envi~onment 
is less severe than it might be on some of the equipment, 
and where maintenance access is reasonable. 
The range of possible locations studied is summarized in 
Table 11. The following section compares these locations 
and narrows down to three the numbe~ to be used in the sub-
sequent analysis of communication st~uctures. 
4. 1 .2 . 2 Comparison of Physical Locations 
A comparison of these physical location options is made 
in fou~ areas : wire lengths, damage tolerance, environmental 
penalties, and maintainability. Rough quantitative compari-
sons a~e made of the wiring differences, while the other 
comparisons are qualitative. 
To estimate relative wire lengths, assumptions are made 
about the number of wires involved in servicing the various 
pieces of aircraft equipment. These assumptions are listed 
in Table 12. The presumed size of the aircraft and the 
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TABLE 11 
. Location Options Considered 
1. One location: One compartment 
2. Two compartments 
3. Three compartments 
4. Three locations: One compartment each 
5. Two compartments each 
6. Three compartments each 
7. Multilocation 
8. Embedded 
--- -~-
equipment locations are shown in Figure 3. The calculation 
of estimated wire length is given in Table 13. The three 
alternative configurations in the same general location will 
have essentially the same wire lengths. For all configura-
tions, except the ones in one location, the wire saved will 
be offset to some extent by the wire necessary to intercon-
nect the equipment locations. This amount of wire depends 
on the communication technique used. The amount of wire in-
v'olved is relatively small compared to the wires necessary 
to service the equipment and will thus not significantly ef-
fect the results. A representative amount is used here. 
These results show that the biggest ch~nge in the amount 
of wire occurs when going from the one location systems to 
the three location system. The percentage reductions for 
the multilocation and embedded systems are less but still 
significant. 
Damage tolerance is a concern for a system contained in a 
single compartment in a single location. The results of the 
damage probability study discussed in Chapter 2 show that 
the probability of damage to a single location can be as 
high as 10- 8 per hour. This probability can be reduced to 
acceptable levels with some separation or protection between 
compartments so one event is unlikely to damage all redun-
dant equipment needed to perform any critical function. 
Care must also be exercised in systems where equipment is 
placed in three different locations ~n the aircraft to as-
sure that no particular function is vulnerable to damage. 
For example, to put all of the pitch control electronics in 
a single compartment in the tail of the aircraft would be 
unwise. The damage study indicates that the tail area is 
more likely to be damaged than an area near the nose. The 
pitch control function will be protected by placing redun-
dant pitch control electronics either in another location in 
the aircraft or by separate compartments in the tail. When 
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Figure 3: Assumed Wire Run Distances 
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TABLE 12 
Assumptions fo~ Wi~e Length Compa~ i sons 
EACH ACTUATOR CHANNEL: 
COMMAND 
ENGAGE 
RATE FEEDBACK 
POSITION FEEDBACK 
(PER AR"INC 701) 9 
MID EQUIPMENT AREA: 
WING: 
HYDRAULICS 
FUEL 
MAIN GEAR 
ELECTRICAL POWER 
PRESSURIZATION 
AIR CONDITIONING 
EN~INE (EACH 75) 
BLEED/ANTI-ICE 
AFT COMPARTMENT : 
ENGINE 
PRESSURIZATION 
AIR CONDITIONING 
2 
3 
4 
4 
13 
42 
43 
50 
50 
16 
33 
234 
150 
19 
169 
75 
16 
14 
105 
minimal p~ecautions a~e made to inc~ease damage tole~ance, 
damage will not be a significant facto~ in dete~mining loca-
tion. 
Envi~onment and maintenance a~e discussed only qualita-
tively. Neithe~ envi~onment no~ maintenance is significant-
ly affected as long as the equipment ~emains in the pressur-
ized fuselage. Only small penalties eX1st in going from 
systems located in gene~ally one a~ea to ones located in 
th~ee a~eas. Some envi~onmental cont~ol equipment may have 
to be duplicated and maintenance procedu~es may be slightly 
less efficient. These two facto~s become significantly more 
impo~tant when any equipment is located outside the p~essur­
ized fuselage. A multilocation system allows some conside~­
ation fo~ avoiding the wo~st envi~onments and provides loca-
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TA BLE 13 
Wire Length Comparison 
ONE LOCATION SYSTEM: 
WING ACTUATORS 24 ACT X 13 WIRES X 50 M = 15,600 
TAIL ACTUATORS 18 ACT X 1 3 WIRES X 70 M = 16,380 
234 WIRES X 30 M = 7,020 
169 WIRES X 50 M = 8,450 
105 WIRES X 70 M = 7,350 
54,800 
THREE LOCATION SYSTEM: 
WING ACTUATORS 24 ACT X 13 WIRES X 20 M = 6,240 
TAIL ACTUATORS 18 ACT X 1 3 WIRES X 1 0 M = 2,340 
MID EQUIPMENT 234 WIRES X 3 M = 702 
WING EQUIPMENT 169 WIRES X 20 M = 3,380 
AFT EQUIPMENT 105 WIRES X 5 M = 525 
BAY INTER CO NNE CT 4 BUSES X 6 WIRES X 30 M = 720 
4 BUSES X 6 WIRES x 70 M = 1,680 
15,587 
SAVINGS 39,213 M OR 7270 
MULTI LOCATI ON SYSTEM: 
WING ACTU·AT ORS 24 X 13 WIRES X '6 M = 1 ,872 
TAIL ACTUAT ORS 24 X 13 WIRES X 6 M = 702 
MID EQUIPMENT 234 WIRES X 2 M = 468 
WING EQUIPMENT 169 WIRES X 3 M = 507 
AFT EQUIPMENT 105 WIRES X 3 M = 315 
LOCATI ON 
INTERCONNECT 4 BUSES X 6 WIRES X 60 = 1,440 
4 BUSES X 6 WIRES X 80 = 1 , 920 
7,044 
SAVING 47,756 OR 8770 
EMBEDDED SYSTEM: 
TERMINAL INTERCONNECT 
ASSUME NETWORK 6 BUSES DEEP THROUGH FUSELAGE AND 
3 BUSES DEEP OUT EACH WING 
6 BUSES X 6 WIRES X 80 M = 2,88 0 
2 X 3 BUSES X 6 WIRES X 30 M = 1 , 080 
3,960 
SAVING 50,840 M OR 93% 
(ASSUME 1 TWISTED SHIELDED PAIR = 3 WIRES) 
- 46 -
------ - ~--.~------
tipns with reasonable access for maintenance. However, it 
will not likely be cost effective to provide any special 
equipment to control the environment at multiple locations. 
The -embedded electronics' is completely at the mercy of the 
equipment in which it is located. The environment may be 
considerably worse and maintenance may be complicated if the 
electronics cannot be removed without removing the equipment 
in which it is embedded. 
A summary of the results of the comparison of physical 
locations is given in Table 14. The environmental and main-
tenance factors are weighted from 0 to 10 where 10 is taken 
as ideal and numbers less than 10 correspond roughly to the 
relative standings of the locations with respect to the 
ideal. 
TABLE 14 
Summary of Physical Location Comparisons 
ONE THREE 
LOCATION LOCATION 
MULTI 
LOCATION 
EMBEDDED 
LOCATION 
DAMAGE 10- S 10- 9 /10- 11 <10- 11 «10- 11 
TOLERANCE 
WIRE LENGTH/ 0 72Y. 87Y. 
COST SAVINGS 
ENVIRONMENTAL 9 9 3 
CONDITIONS 
MAINTAINABILITY 9 8 5 
The systems placed in three locations in the aircraft can 
obtain a majority of the potential savings in wire length 
without significant disadvantages in environment or mainte-
nance. A multilocation system can save an additional 15Y. in 
wire. This additional wire savings may not compensate, how-
ever, for the disadvantages in environment and maintenance. 
The embedded system can save an additonal 21Y. in wire but 
has greater disadvantages in other categories. An embedded 
system will not be chosen on the basis of wire savings 
alone. As technology develops toward the end of the target 
time period to provide components with a high reliability in 
a severe environment, electronics are likely to be embedded 
to increase the effectiveness of the remote equipment it-
self, as previously discussed. 
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The location alte~natives can now be ~educed to a ~ep~e-
sentative set fo~ the communication study. As fa~ as the 
communication requirements are concerned, little distinction 
exists among configu~ation alte~natives whe~e the equipment 
is found in one or mo~e compa~tments in the same gene~al lo-
cation. When communication st~uctu~es a~e studied to the 
level of detail where this distinction is important, app~o­
priate extensions can be made to account for the separate 
compa~tments. The communication structures can be adequate- · 
ly studied using the smaller subset of configurations ob-
tained by merging the options where equipment is located in 
essentially the same places. 
The multilocation system has also been eliminated since 
it is not significantly different f~om the embedded system 
as far as communication requirements are conce~ned, and thus 
does not significantly cont~ibute to the study. No~ does it 
appear to offe~ sufficient advantages to the total system 
design for extensive use in future systems. 
The three basic system configurations chosen for this 
study are thus: a one location system, a th~ee location sys-
tem, and an embedded system. The one location system pro-
vides a logical extreme in the range and forms a good base-
line most rep~esentative of cu~~ent systems. The three 
location system is chosen as the one that app~a~s most effi-
cient for nea~ term systems. The embedded system provides 
the othe~ logical extreme and may be used . at the end of the 
target time period. 
4.1.3 computer Confiqu~ation 
The central fault-tolerant computer system could also 
have a significant impact on the communicat i on structure. 
Traditionally, computers have been large, relatively expen-
sive, and placed in some central location. However, with 
the explosion of microprocesso~ technology and the need for 
mUltiple interconnected computers, the central computer com-
plex will most likely be dispersed in the aircraft . For ex-
ample, in the three location system, a part of the computer 
could be in each location. 
A dispersed central computer could have an obvious impact 
on the nature of the communication structure. Depending on 
the particular design of the computer system, external 
equipment may be connected to the computer at each location. 
The various parts of the computer syste m will be intercon-
nected by its own data transfer technique. In these cases, 
the central computer will create a common data base . Th e 10-
cation-to-location communication thus implicitly occurs 
within the computer system. The need for a communication 
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structure to handle a large amount of data over long 
distances i n the aircraft is reduced. Thus , the optimum de-
sign f or the communication structure will probably be dif-
f e rent from one r espons i ble for communicating data through-
out the aircr af t to and from one central location. 
Ev en though a dispersed fault tolerant computer may be 
at t rac t ive f or some future systems, it is not considered in 
thi s study f or the following reasons. First of all , exist-
ing fau l t-to l e r ant computer designs are not dispersed, 
largely because it i s difficult to do so without enlarging 
the sy stem's cross section to damage. Second, the internal 
c ommunicat i o n s among the elements of a fault-tolerant com-
p ute r are a n i ntegral part of the design of the computer and 
ar e bey ond t h e scope of this study. The effective design of 
a s ystem of this type requires the integration of the design 
of a p a rticu l a r f ault-tolerant computer with the design of 
the c ommuni ca t ion with the external equipment. Since this 
study is n ot concerned with the design of fault-tolerant 
computers t h emselves , it is assumed that the central comput-
er is i n one location and the communication system under 
study must transfer all data from the various locations in 
the ai rcra f t to this one location. Also, a reasonable 
am o unt o f ca r e i n the design and some protection will reduce 
t h e pr ob a bili ty that a damage event will cause total failure 
of the co mpute r system . 
The ass u mpt ion t hat the computer is in one location also 
places t he hi ghest requirements on the communication system . 
The re s u l ts fr om this study apply to most systems with a 
di s tri buted c entral computer if proper adjustments are made. 
Each of the three a l ternat i ve system configur a tions will now 
be discussed in gre ater detail to create the environment for 
the study of communication structures . 
4.2 ONE LOCATION S YSTEM 
An overall diagr am of the one location system is shown in 
Figure 4. A ma j o r i t y of the electronic equipment is found 
in one or mo re compartments at this one location which is in 
some convenient place, usually under the cockpit near the 
nose gear and f orward of the cargo compartments. 
The electronics are packaged in standardized units and 
housed in envir onmentally controlled enclosures . These 
units c ont a in : the fault - tolerant computer , all the ele c-
tronics ne ce s sary to provide sensor inputs , effector outputs 
from the syste m, and the equipment necessary to support t he 
system, such as power supplies and environmental control 
equipment. To create a realistic environment for the co mmu-
nicati on structure , some electronics must be outside this 
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primary location. Of course, electronics will be in the 
cockpit to support the pilot controls and diplays. Elec-
tronic controls are already on the engines and will certain-
ly continue to be in future aircraft. A significant number 
of input signals in the wing root and tail areas of the air-
craft require remote data acquisition equipment, and this 
system description will thus include these remote electron-
ics. 
The following paragraphs describe a set of equipment de-
signed to meet the system requirements by providing the or-
ganization of the sensors and effectors described in Chapter 
3. The physical packaging of the equipment is first de-
scribed briefly. Next, the units involved in the most 
flight critical functions are described. The remaining mod-
ules are then briefly identified. The function and communi-
cation requirements of the remote electronic units are de-
scribed, and finally, a list is compiled of all equipment, 
along with the communication requirements for each unit. 
4.2. 1 Mechanical Packaging 
The equipment in the primary avionics location should 
conform to a later phase of the NIC packaging now introduced 
in the commercial avionics industry. The form factors and 
connectors should remain the same as described in ARINC 
Chiracteristic 600. The only significant change exp~cted is 
a more closely controlled environment. 
The ARINC Characteristic 600 provides for the electronic 
modules to have a common height and depth with incremental 
widths. The sizes of the units, called Modular Concept 
Units (MCU), are listed in Table 15. A typical installation 
is shown in Figure 5. Three types of low insertion force 
connectors are available. The smallest will handle 120 sig-
nal pins and several power and special purpose pins. 
The largest will handle 600 signal pins and more special 
purpose connections. The connectors permit wire wrap tech-
niques to be used to provide interconnection between units 
and with other connectors for the cables that interface with 
the rest of the aircraft. In some installations, the inter-
connect backboard may be removable from the aircraft to re-
duce the initial costs of aircraft wiring and to greatly 
simplify modifications. The modules comprising the system 
for this study will probably require five to six shelves, 
approximately four feet long. 
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TABLE 15 
Modular Concept Unit (MCU) Sizes 
MCU WIDTH LENGTH HEIGHT 
(MM) (MM) (MM) 
25. 1 (1.0 IN) 318 ( 12.5 IN) 194 
2 57.2 " 
3 90.4 " 
4 124.0 
" 
5 157.2 " 
6 190.5 
" 
7 223.3 " 
8 256.3 " 
9 289.3 " 
10 322.3 
" 
1 1 355.3 " 
12 388.4 " 
4 . 2.2 Module Descriptions 
4.2 . 2.1 Fault-Tolerant Computer System 
The fault tolerant central computer is housed in some 
number of units depending on the design of the particular 
system. The assumption is made that the computer will have 
provision for a variable number of interface ports necessary 
to support the communication system. The central computer 
also is assumed to have the primary responsibility for the 
control, monitoring, and redundancy management of the commu-
nication system. 
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4.2.2.2 Servo Electronics Module 
These modules are a key part of the flight control func-
tion . They provide the interface between the communication 
str u cture and the actuators and will normally contain: digi-
tal~to-analog (d/a) converters , the servo positioning con-
trol electronics, and , possibly, actuator monitoring and 
equialization circuits. 
A diagram of what may be contained in a servo electronics 
module is shown in Figure 6. The basic elements of the de-
sign include : the interface with the digital communication 
system to accept commands from the central computer, a d/a 
converter to put the command in the proper form for the ser-
vo electronics, and the servo electronics themselves, w~ich 
command the actuator to the desired position using position 
and possibly rate feedback signals. The module may also 
contain: the drives for the engage discretes to the actua-
tors, equalization circuits that receive delta pressure s i g-
nals from other channels of a force-voted redundant actuator 
to prevent force fights, and monitoring circuits that use 
information such as the cross wired delta pressures to de-
tect actuator failures. Most likely, a servo electronic 
module will be designed to control more than one actuator, 
either by duplicating the circuits within the unit or by 
demultiplexing the outputs of the d/a converter using sam-
ple-and-hold circuits . Redundant electronics in two differ-
ent servo modules may also control a single actuator chan-
nel . This redundancy would achieve a more balanced design 
between the relative costs and reliabilities of the actuator 
versus the electronics . A single actuator channel can have 
a mean time before failure (MTBF) as high as 100,000 hours, 
where the electronics may have an MTBF around 10,000 hours 
but be considerably less expensive . Thus, the total design 
may be more balanced if an actuator continues service after 
a failure of the servo electronics channel by the utiliza-
tion of redundant electronics and some technique like dual 
windings in the electro hydraulic valve. This redundancy 
can have a significant impact on the communication load by 
requiring two commands to be communicated for each actuator 
channel. 
Most likely, a basic design principle of future systems 
wil l be the complete monitoring of all units so any failure 
wil l be detected and the failed unit will be positively 
identified. In some cases, this may be performed by built-
in test equipment. In other system designs. however , a 
higher level of failure coverage and a more effective total 
des i gn can be achieved if the monitoring capability is pro-
vided by other equipment and that the monitoring proc e ss be 
con t rolled by the central system . In the system design as-
sumed for this study, the servo electronics modules ar e mon-
itored by feeding the output signals back into the syste m 
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Figu~e 6: Typical Se~vo Elect~onics and Data Acquisition 
Units 
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using the data acquisition modules desc~ibed next. The 
se~vo modules a~e then monito~ed by compa~ing the measu~ed 
output with the intended command sent to the module. Fo~ 
the most c~itical channels, it may be necessa~y to feed the . 
output commands into two diffe~ent data acquistion modules 
fo~ positive identification of the failu~e. Again, these 
additional signals can have a significant impact on the to-
tal load on the communication system. 
4.2.2.3 Data Acquisition Modules 
The system will use seve~al data acquisition modules 
which conve~t all necessa~y analog ac and dc signals and 
disc~ete signals to the p~ope~ fo~m and inte~face them into 
the communication st~uctu~e. A diag~am of a typical data 
acquisition module is given in Figu~e 6. Each data acquisi-
tion module contains a set of signal conditioning ci~cuits 
fo~ the va~iety of typical signals on an ai~c~aft. Among 
the most c~itical will be the se~vo monito~ing signals and 
the pilot cont~ol input signals. These will include both dc 
and ac, such as f~om linea~ va~iable diffe~ential t~ansfo~m­
e~s (LVDT). Some form of standa~d unit will p~obably be de-
veloped, such as the Analog and Disc~ete Data Conversion 
System (ADDCS) now being defined by an AEEC committee. In 
this standa~d unit, a mix of signals can be p~og~ammed fo~ a 
pa~ticular application. The signal conditioning ci~cuits 
may o~ may not be multiplexed, depending on what will give 
the mos·t efficient design. P~esumably one o~ m·ore a/d con-
ve~te~s will be multiplexed. The resulting data would be 
buffe~ed and t~ansfe~~ed to the cent~al compute~ system 
th~ough the communication system when ~equested. The data 
acquisition process will be cont~olled p~imarily by the mod-
ule itself. The sampling sequence and rate may either be 
fixed o~ programmed by commands from the central system as a 
function of flight phase o~ equipment failure status. 
4.2.2.4 Power Supply Module 
The electrical power conditioning and control module also 
has an impo~tant role in critical functions. A diag~am of 
the module is shown in Figu~e 7. The module ~eceives 
powe~ f~om the auxiliary o~ g~ound powe~ unit, and f~om the 
airc~aft batte~ies. This module removes all powe~ spikes, 
ove~-voltages, under-voltages, and inter~uptions caused by 
the ~aw supply sources. Since advancing technology reduces 
the size of the digital circuits, this design avoids the in-
efficiencies of a power supply in each module which would 
othe~wise ~equi~e a la~ge percentage of a typical unit vol-
ume. Separate powe~ supply modules also allow more flexi-
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bility in the reconfiguration of a system after failures. 
The module receives power from the aircraft primary genera-
tor buses, 
Power from a power supply module is supplied to each of 
the other system modules through individual current regula-
tor/circuit breaker circuits. The power supply module con-
nects to the communication structure to allow the integrated 
system control of the power to the other modules . This 
ability has several advantages: First, the number of cir-
cuit breakers necessary in the cockpit is reduced. Next, 
and probably most important, this ability can be used in the 
overall redundancy management of the system. Power can be 
removed from a failed module, greatly reducing the probabil -
ity that it will have any adverse effect on any good module. 
Finally, power control can remove power from a module not in 
opeation, particularly when the aircraft is on the ground 
and the engines and environmental control systems are not 
running. This feature could significantly improve the envi-
ronmental control problem. 
4 . 2.2.5 other Modules 
other types of modules will be in the avionics compart-
ments. as well. Many of these modules . will contain the sen-
sors needed by the aircraft systems. The inertial sensors 
will probably be most flight critical and have a high data 
rate. These sensors include both qyros and accelerometers 
and provide data for the inter -loop flight control func-
tions, as well as the altitude and inertial heading data for 
outer-loop functions. The inertial data may also be uti-
lized for inertial navigation or inertial smoothing of radio 
navigation data. In some unique situations, inertial sen-
sors may have to be put at remote locations in the aircraft 
either because of structural mode interaction or to directly 
sense a structural mode being controlled, such as a wing 
bending mode or flutter. In the above instances, the sen-
sors would either be wired to electronics in the avionics 
compartments or to a remo~e data acquisition unit. Another 
important sensor module will be for air data. The primary 
pressure sensors will most likely be in this module. other 
sensors, such as angle-of-attack vanes, will be remote and 
hard wired to the electronics module. 
Several modules will be devoted to radio navigation sen-
sors, such as: VOR, DME, ILS, MLS, and Omega. Several radio 
communication modules will also be included: VHF, HF, DABS, 
.and digital data link. Some modules will generate the sym-
bology for the CRT type display in the cockpit, as well as 
the weather radar which will feed the radar data into the 
display generators. Finally, modules outside the central 
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computer will perform the data format conversion necessary 
to interface with the communication structure to serve the 
remote electronic units. 
4.2.3 Remote Electronics 
4.2.3.1 Cockpit Electronics 
The primary flight and aircraft system displays are ser-
viced by display generation electronics in the primary 
avionics area, which are connected to the cockpit by dedi-
cated wires. However, numerous controls and dedicated dis-
plays in the cockpit must be serviced by active electronics 
to eliminate an excessive number of wires. The most criti-
cal electronics in the cockpit service the flight operation-
al control and display unit. This unit, sometimes called 
the autopilot controller or glare shield controller. is the 
primary means for the pilots to control the operation of the 
automatic flight control system. These controls include: 
the selection and display of the commanded f~ight parame-
ters, such as desired heading, altitude, and speed; the com-
manded flight mode. such as control wheel steering; the au-
tomatic coupled modes. such as cruise. approach, and 
landing.. In addition, this unit will provide the primary 
dis'play status of the control system including the warning 
of degraded functional capabilty due to equipment failure. 
Because of the critical nature of this unit. redundant elec-
tronics will be involved. For this study. the unit will be 
serviced by two communication terminals for interface to the 
central system. Thus. the entire system will continue to 
function after any failure and have a functional reliability 
goal of 10- 6 per hour. The controller is not fully flight 
crucial. however. since all critical functions can be per-
formed either by other control units or by dedicated wires. 
Another essentially equivalent unit controls the electri-
cal, hydraulic. fuel, and environmental control systems, and 
may also be involved in the control of the engines. Because 
of the critical nature of these controls. this unit will 
also contain ~ edundant electronics with two communication 
system terminals. 
At least two terminals in the cockpit will allow the crew 
to communicate with the avionics system. These terminals 
will service a general purpose display and keyboard and op-
erate like a conventional computer terminal. The unit will 
enter and review flight planning information. deter~ine sys-
tem status. allow manual involvement in the system reco-
nfiguration process, and operate as a backup to the other 
controllers . This now gives a total of at least six termi-
nals in the cockpit that must be serviced by the communica-
tion structure. 
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4.2.3.2 Remote Data Acquisition Units 
The system design for this _primarily one location system 
includes at least four remote data acquisition units wherev-
er a concentration of signals exist: Two will be in the 
wing root area to service equipment there, such as: the en-
vironmental control, electrical, and hydraulic systems, as 
well as signals coming in from the wings. Two other units 
will also be in the tail area to service the auxillary power 
unit (APU) and possibly auxillary engine functions if the 
aircraft has engines in the tail. 
These units will contain signal conditioners for a va-
riety of different types of signals, including: ac, dc, 
synchro, and various kinds of discrete signals. The outputs 
of these signal conditioners would be multiplexed into one 
or more a/d converters. The resulting data will be buffered 
for subsequent transmission to the central system over the 
communication system. Non-critical signals would be used 
for status and maintenance monitoring and would be wired 
into one unit. More critical signals would be wired into 
both units in that area, thus increasing the load on the 
communication system. Most likely, any flight critical sig-
nals would be w:ired directly to the primary electronics 
area. 
4.2.3.3 Engine Electronics 
For this study, the engines will use full authority elec-
tronic control . The engine manufacturer will provide the 
electronic fuel controls; these will be mounted directly on 
the engine. The electronics will have sufficient redundancy 
to give a total electronic reliability significantly better 
than the engine itself. The primary thrust command will 
reach the engine through the communication structure. Thus, 
each engine will have two terminals to provide the necessary 
reliability. The engine electronics are not directly in-
volved in gathering data that is not needed for the control 
of the engine itself and is thus not the responsibility of 
the engine manufacturer. These include: data needed for en-
gine monitoring and maintenance trend analysis, the control 
and monitoring of engine accessories, such as generators, 
hydraulics, and engine bleed air. These signals will be 
wired into the wing root data acquisition- units. 
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4.2.4 Summary of Terminals 
The total number of terminals that must be supported by 
the communication system fo~ the one location configu~ation 
is summa~ized in Table 16. A total of 66 terminals a~e in 
the prima~y electronics area, with a requirement to communi-
cate 16K 16 bit words pe~ second. In addition, a total of 
16 remote te~minals a~e distributed th~oughout the aircraft! 
6 in the cockpit, 2 on each of 3 engines, and 4 remote data 
acquisition modules which requi~e anothe~ 2K words pe~ sec-
ond for communication. Thus, a total of 80 te~minals re-
qui~es the communication of almost 18K wo~ds. 
4.3 THREE LOCATION SYSTEM 
The th~ee location system will be similar to the one lo-
cation system. The compliment of electronic modules will be 
essentially the same, only with diffe~ent locations. The 
assumed set of modules fo~ each location is shown in Table 
17 . The p~imary change will be the movement of the se~vo 
elect~onics modules .to the wing root and tail a~eas closest 
to the actuators in service. The functions of the remote 
data acquisition units will be abso~bed by data acquisition 
modules within the elect~onics areas. If advantageous, oth-
er senso~ units may be moved to different a~eas. For exam-
ple. the inertial sensor modules may be prought to the wing 
~oot a~ea if closeness to the ai~craft's center of gravity 
were an advantage. 
The significant impact on the communication st~ucture is 
that a g~eat amount of c~itical data must be moved over 
longer distances between elect~onics a~eas. Thus. the na-
tu~e of the long distance communication system may signifi-
cantly va~y from the one location system. 
4 . 4 EMBEDDED SYSTEM 
The equipment to be serviced by the communication system 
in the embedded system configuration ~emains essentially the 
same as the previous two system configu~ations. The only 
significant difference is the placement of much of the elec-
tronics. By the end of the ta~get time period it is assumed 
that technology will have p~ogressed fa~ enough that elec-
t~onics can be placed in almost any location without signif-
icant reliability, maintainability. size, or cost penalties. 
With this capability available. electronics will most likely 
be placed in almost every piece of equipment. The most cru-
cial function. in te~ms of the communication st~ucture. is 
the support of elect~onics attached to the flight control 
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TABLE 1 6 
Sensor/Effector Units in the One Location System 
UNIT NUMBER SIZE DATA DATA RATE 
(MCU) (WORDS/RA TE) (WORDS/SEC) ~ I 
SERVO ELECTRONICS 12 3 5/20 MS 3000 
I 
DATA ACQUISITION 8 4 40) 16/20 MS 7296 
I e 48/SEC 4<il 64/SEC 
I INTERIA L SENSORS 6 8 8/20 MS 1920 
8/100 MS 
I AIR DATA 3 4 5/100 MS 150 
VOR 2 2 2/100 MS 40 
ILS 2 2 5/100 MS 100 
MLS 2 2 4/100 MS 82 
10/10 SEC 
RADIO ALT 2 2 1/20 MS 100 
TACAN 2 3 3/100 MS 60 
ADF 2 2 1/ 1 00 MS 20 
GPS 6 4/20 MS 209 
16/2 SEC 
100/2 MIN 
TRANSPONDER 2 3 2/4 SEC 2 
DABS 2 2 MAX 3 20/4 SEC 2 
NORM 4/4 SEC 
VHF COMM 3 2 l/SEC 3 
ARINC DATA LINK 14/2 SEC 7 
HF COMM 6 l/SEC 
VOICE/TONE SYNTH 2 20/SEC 20 
- I 
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TABLE l6 
Sensor/Effector Units (Cont.) 
UNIT 
WX RADAR 
FLIGHT DISPLAY 
GENERATOR 
SYSTEMS DISPLAY 
GENERATOR 
FLUTTER CONTROL 
POWER COND/CONT 
TOTALS IN 
PRIMARY LOCATION 
NUMBER 
2 
3 
2 
2 
3 
66 
REMOTE AVIONICS UNITS 
WING ROOT DATA ACQ. 
TAIL DATA ACQ. 
~NGINE CONTROL 
FLIGHT CONTROLLER 
SYSTEM CONTROLLER 
CONTROL AND DISPLAY 
TOTALS 
REMOTE 
UNITS 
TOTAL TERMINALS 
SIZE 
(MCU) 
8 
6 
6 
6 
8 
NUMBER 
2 
2 
6 
2 
2 
2 
1 6 
80 
DATA 
(WORDS/RATE) 
2/20 MS 
6/20 MS 
30/100 MS 
33/100 MS 
4/20 MS 
1/SEC 
DATA 
(WORDS/RATE) 
128/SEC 
32/SEC 
2/20 MS 
10/SEC 
10 /100 MS 
10/100 MS 
150/SEC 
actuators. Electronics are also likely to be directly 
DATA RATE 
(WORDS/SEC) 
200 
1800 
660 
400 
4 
16076 
DATA RATE 
(WORDS/SEC) 
256 
64 
660 
200 
300 
1680 
17756 
associated with most of the aircraft systems, such as: elec-
trical power, hydraulic power, envir onmental control, and 
the APU. Electronics involved with the engine, and particu-
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TABLE 17 
Sensor/Effector Units in Three Location System 
i 
UNIT NUMBER SIZE DATA DATA RATE - I 
(NOSE-MID-TAIL) (MCU) (WORDS/RATE) (WORDS/SEC) 
(NOSE-MID-TAIL) 
SERVO ELECTRONICS 10 8 3 5/20 MS 1666 1333 
DATA ACQUISITION 2 6 4 4 4cil 16/20 MS 1333 4000 2666 
f:. 48/SEC 
4cil 64/SEC 
INTERIAL SENSORS 6 8 8/20 MS 1920 
8/100 MS 
AIR DATA 3 4 5/100 MS 150 
VOR 2 2 2/100 MS 40 
ILS 2 2 5/100 MS 100 
MLS 2 2 4/100 MS 82 
10/10 SEC 
RADIO ALT 2 2 1/20 MS 100 
TACAN 2 3 3/100 MS 60 
ADF 2 2 1/ 1 00 MS 20 
GPS 2 6 4/20 MS 209 
16/2 SEC 
100/2 MIN 
TRANSPONDER 2 3 2/4 SEC 2 
DABS 2 2 MAX '320/4 SEC 2 
NORM 4/4 SEC 
VHF COMM 3 2 1/SEC 3 
ARINC DATA LINK 14/2 SEC 7 
HF COMM 6 l/SEC 
VOICE/TONE SYNTH 2 20/SEC 20 
~ I 
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TABLE 17 · 
Sensor/Effector Units in Three Location System (Cont.) 
UNITS NUMBER SIZE DATA DATA RATE 
(NOSE-MID-TAIL) (MCU) (WORDS/RATE) (WORDS/SEC) 
(NOSE-MID-TAIL) 
WX RADAR 2 
FLIGHT DISPLAY 3 
GENERATOR 
SYSTEMS DISPLAY 2 
GENERATOR 
FLUTTER CONTROL 2 
POWER COND/CONT 2 2 2 
TOT.US IN EACH 
LOCATION 36 28 1 6 
TOTAL: 80 
REMOTE AVIONICS UNITS 
ENGINE CONTROL 6 
FLIGHT CONTROLLER 2 
SYSTEM CONTROLLER 2 
CONTROL AND DISPLAY 2 
TOTALS UNITS 12 
REMOTE 
TOTAL TERMINALS 92 
larly with the engine accessories, 
significantly expand. 
8 2/20 MS 200 
6 6/20 MS 1809 
30/100 MS 
6 33/100 MS 660 
6 4/20 MS 
8 1/SEC 3 
4691 
2/20 MS 
10/SEC 
10/100 MS 
10/100 MS 
150/SEC 
will probably 
However, electronics will not be scattered in the air-
craft just for the sake of being scattered. Presumably, 
much of the electronics, such as : the basic central computer 
system, navigation equipment, and communication equipment 
located in equipment bays in the one and three location sys-
tem configurations, will remain in bays. The bays will be 
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400 
3 3 
8089 4003 
16783 
660 
200' 
200 
300 
1360 
18143 
retained for this equipment for maintenance convenience, and 
other logistics and installation reasons. 
A significant amount of other electronics will be embed-
ded in their respective equipments, particularly in the 
cockpit, around the engines, and in the primary aircraft 
equipment areas. The actual specifics of a candidate system 
configuration of an embedded system must necessarily be more 
speculative since it is in the distant future. However, to 
define a representative system as a baseline is crucial for 
analyzing the communication structure. In particular, the 
determination of how many communication terminals (nodes) 
must be serviced and what the data rates is vital for this 
analysis . 
The equipment used as a baseline for the embedded system 
studies is described in Tables 18 to 24. These tables gener-
ally follow the equipment requirements given in Chapter 3. 
The number of nodes and the communication rate necessary to 
support the system are shown in the tables. The number of 
nodes is established by a trade-off between reliability and 
costs. For example, more than one sensor is serviced by a 
commo~ node to reduce costs where there is no compromise in 
reliability. In other cases, a node is dedicated to a par-
ticular sensor or piece of equipment because of reliability 
or physical location considerations. A summary of the base-
line system configuration is given in Table 25. 
TABLE 18 
Flight Data Sensor 
PARAMETER 
ANGULAR RATE AND 
ACCELERATION 
FL UTTER SENSOR 
STATIC PRESSURE 
TOTAL PRESSURE 
TOTAL TEMPERATURE 
ANGLE OF ATTACK 
NODES 
6 
6 
3 
3 
MAGNETIC FIELD SENSOR 2 
TOTALS 20 
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DATA RATE 
(WORDS/SEC) 
1250 
1000 
160 
140 
20 
550 
600 
3720 
I 
I -
TABLE 19 
Cockpit Controls and Displays 
PARAMETER 
CONTROLS 
CONTROL WHEEL AND TRIM 
PED ALS 
THROTTLES 
FLAPS 
SPEED BRAKES 
NOSE WHEEL STEERING 
DISPLAYS 
} 
FLIGHT DISPLAY GENERATOR 
SYSTEM DISPLAY GENERATOR 
FLIGHT OPERATIONAL CONTROL 
CONTROL AND DISPLAY 
SYSTEMS CONTROL AND DISPLAY 
AVIONICS SYSTEM TERMINAL 
COCKPIT PRINTER 
TOTALS 
NODES 
4 
4 
4 
4 
2 
2 
25 
TABLE 20 
Flight Control Acutator Signals 
PARAMETER 
WING DYNAMIC CONTROL AND 
CONFIGURATION CONTROL 
TAIL DYNAMIC CONTROL 
SURFACES 
LANDING GEAR OPERATION 
STEERING 
BRA KES 
TOTALS 
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NODES 
18 
18 
9 
6 
52 
DATA RATE 
(WORDS/SEC) 
600 
600 
10 
80 
1 0 
80 
2,880 
5,280 
2,880 
500 
800 
640 
14,360 
DATA RATE 
(WORDS/SEC) 
372.0 
1200 
111 
100 
80 
52 1 1 
TABLE 21 
Navigation Sensors 
PARAMETER NODES DATA RATE 
(WORDS/SEC) 
VOR ANGLE 2 192 
DME DIST 2 256 
ADF BEARING 2 192 
ILS LOCALIZER 2 208 
ILS GLIDE SLOPE 208 
MARKER BEACON 2 
RADIO ALTITUDE 2 340 
MLS AZIMUTH 130 
MLS EVALUATION 1 2 130 
MLS EVALUATION 2 130 
MLS RANGE 2 130 
MLS DATA 9 
GPS RECEIVER 16 
GPS DATA 12 
GPS LINE OF SIGHT VEL 800 
WEATHER RADAR ATTITUDE STAB 700 
NAVIGATION FREQUENCY AND 
MODE CONTROL 3 105 
TOTALS 2 1 3559 
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TABLE 22 
Radio Communication Equipment 
PARAMETER NODES 
COMM RECEIVER FREQUENCY 
AND MODE CONTROL 
3 
TRANSPONDER CONTROL 
ARINC DATA LINK 
PASSENGER SERVICE 
TERMINAL 
TOTALS 
2 
7 
TABLE 23 
Engines and Aircraft Systems 
PARAMETER NODES 
AIRCRAFT ENGINE 9 
HYDRAULIC 3 
FUEL 5 
ELECTRICAL 3 
PRESSURE/OXYGEN 3 
APU 2 
AIR CONDITIONING 3 
BLEED AIR/ANTI-ICE 6 
FLIGHT DATA RECORDER 
TOTALS 35 
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DATA RATE 
(WORDS/SEC) 
105 
120 
110 
1 10 
445 
DATA RATE 
(WORDS/SEC) 
960 
96 
156 
168 
180 
1020 
180 
24 
768 
3552 
---- ~ - -----
TABLE 24 
Miscellaneous Equipment 
PARAMETER NODES 
FLIGHT DATA STORAGE UNIT 
AUDIO GENERATOR 2 
(TONE AND VOICE SYNTHESIS) 
TOTALS 3 
TABLE 25 
Summary 
EQUIPMENT CLASS WORDS/SEC 
FLIGHT DATA SENSORS 372 0 
COCKPIT 1.4360 
FLIGHT CONTROL ACTUATORS 5211 
NAVIGATION 3559 
COMMUNICATIONS 445 
ENGINES AND AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS 3552 
MISCELLANEOUS 80 
26923 
BITS/SEC (16 bit word) 431K 
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DATA RATE 
(WORDS/SEC) 
80 
80 
NODES 
20 
25 
52 
21 
7 
35 
3 
163 
Chapter 5 
CANDIDATE COMMUHICATIONS SYSTEMS STRUCTURES 
Candidate communication system structures are now pro-
posed for each of the three system configurations. The ba-
sic communication techniques used to construct these candi-
date communication systems consist of the following: (1) 
dedicated serial links from each device to the central com-
puter (or intermediate communication controller), (2) a mul-
tiplexed serial bus with several devices connected to the 
same wires, (3) a point-to-point communication network where 
devices are connected to each other and the central computer 
with multiple dedicated links, and (4) a local bus appropri-
ate for communication within an avionics compartment and us-
ing parallel wires for address, data, and control much like 
the internal bus in any computer system. Candidate communi-
cation structures are composed of one Or more of these basic 
techniques. 
This chapter first discusses some of the basic design 
choices made in constructing a communication system and how 
these options may be implemented in a broad range of candi-
date designs. The candidates are then narrowed to those de-
termined to be most promising and are then described in 
greater detail. The comparative analysis of these primary 
candidates is discussed in the following chapter. 
Broadcast data buses are not considered in this study . 
Broadcast buses are the basic philososphy of the current 
generation of commercial avionic systems. This t~chnique is 
compatible with a federated system design philosophy. Each 
subsystem in a federated system either performs some func-
tion or provides a particular type of data in an essentially 
autonomous way. The subsystems provide their data to the 
rest of the sy~tem using one or more broadcast buses . Mul-
tiple bus drivers are sometimes used for critical data to 
prevent one receiver from failing in a way that would pre-
vent data from being obtained by a receiver in a flight 
critical unit. Each subsystem that needs data from another 
subsystem has a 
that system . 
intermediate 
dedicated receiver for the bus coming from 
(In some cases, data may be passed through an 
third unit which already has the desired data 
necessity of additional interface hardware.) to avoid the 
This broadcast technique is not particularly appropriate 
for a highly integrated design with a central computer. Al-
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most all data transfer is to and from the central computer 
system and the sensor and effector units. A broadcast bus 
from each peripheral unit normally has only one receiver at 
the central computer system and thus degenerates to a dedi-
cated link system. A broadcast bus may be plausible for 
communication from the central computer to the remote units 
where addresses indicate which unit receives the data. This 
is a hybrid between dedicated lines and multiplex buses and 
is not specifically considered in this study. However, the 
characteristics of this combination can be inferred from the 
characteristics of the other combinations studied. 
S.1 BASIC DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS AND INITIAL COMMUNICATION 
STRUCTURE CANDIDATES 
The existence of hierarchical levels in the structure 
will have a significant influence on the nature of the com-
munication system. Will the communication system provide a 
direct link from each device to the central computer, or 
will devices be placed in subgroupings with their own inter-
communication and connected to a higher level communication 
structure through some intermediate communication control 
device? A multilevel structure could be used for both log-
ical and physical reasons: A multi-level system might be 
used with a system design that grouped related equipment 
into functional subsystems, such as flight control, naviga-
tion, display, etc. This type of system design is inconsis-
tent with the highly integrated design assumed for this 
study and is thus not considered. A multilevel system could 
also be incorporated into the logical design of the fault 
tolerant concept, where any failure within a sub-grouping 
would be prevented from propagating to other areas. A mul-
tilevel system could also be used either because of capacity 
considerations or limitations in device addressing capabili-
ty of the particular technique. Some techniques, such as 
the local bus, cannot communicate over long distances; con-
sequently, the physical requirements imply a second level 
for communications to remote units. 
In this study, we limit ourselves to one or two level 
systems. The local bus cannot be used for long distances 
thus can only be used as one level of a two level system. 
The other techniques can theoretically be utilized in a one 
level system or interchangeably on either level of a two 
level system. Therefore, three possibilities exist for a 
one level system , three possibilities for the upper level of 
a two level system, and four possibilities f or the lower 
level, making a total of 1S system structures. Some of 
these combinations are impractical and can be eliminated. 
The relative character istic s of the rema ining possibilities 
are discussed and narrowed down to those most promising. 
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In ' the one location system. if a local bus operates 
within the primary avionics location, a two level system 
must provide communications to the six remote terminals. 
Little physical justification would be possible for a two 
level system within the primary equipment location itself. 
However, there may be logical reasons, such as fault con-
tainment or address space limitations. These factors are 
not considered ~ n this study. Thus, for the one location 
system, three alternative single level communication struc-
tures are considered, two level systems are considered with 
the local bus for in the primary avionics location, and 
three alternatives for the communications to the 16 remote 
terminals. 
The three location configuration will most likely be able 
to effectively use a two level system. A communication 
structure will be established within each location. An up-
per level system will then provide communications between 
the avionics locations, the other remote terminals, and the 
central computer. If local buses are utilized in the avion-
ic areas, a two level system will be necessary. The other 
techniques can still be used as a single level system or as 
two levels with various combinations for the upper and lower 
level. A two level system with dedicated links will have 
obvious advantages over a single level dedicated system. 
Significant wire is saved by having a terminal in each area 
that distributes the messages to the individual units in 
that area. The advantages of a two level multiplex or net-
work system are less obvious but feasible. 
In the embedded system, many of the units to be serviced 
by the communication system are dispersed about the aircraft 
and offer little advantage for a two level system. In the 
early stages of the evolution toward an embedded system, 
much of the electronics will still probably be located in 
central areas. Within these areas there may still be an ad-
vantage in using a lower level communication system. How-
~ver, for the purposes of this study, the embedded system 
has been assumed to be the logical limit of a dispersed sys-
tem, offering little advantage for a two level system. 
Therefore, only single level systems are considered in this 
study for the ~mbedded system. 
The different communication structures considered are 
shown in Table 26 . Only single level communication systems 
are considered for both the one location- and the embedded 
systems, except for the servicing of the remote units when a 
local bus is used in the one location system. A full set of 
alternatives are considered for the three location configu-
ration. The zesults of the tradeoffs for the three location 
apply, at least in part, to cases where a two level system 
may be used with the other system configurations. 
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TABLE 26 
Initial Communication structure Candidates 
ONE LOCATION SYSTEM: 
ONE LEVEL 
DEDICATED BUS 
MULTIPLEX BUS 
MESH NETWORK 
THREE LOCATION SYSTEM: 
ONE LEVEL 
DEDICATED BUS 
MULTIPLEX BUS 
MESH NETWORK 
EMBEDDED SYSTEM: 
ONE LEVEL 
DEDICATED BUS 
MULTIPLEX BUS 
MESH NETWORK 
TWO LEVEL 
WITHIN LOCATION 
LOCAL BUS 
TO REMOTE TERMINALS 
DEDICATED BUS 
MULTIPLEX BUS 
MESH NETWORK 
TWO LEVEL (ALL COMBINATIONS) 
WITHIN LOCATION 
DEDICATED BUS 
MULTIPLEX BUS 
MESH NETWORK 
LOCAL BUS 
AMONG LOCATIONS AND 
REMOTE TERMINALS 
DEDICATED BUS 
MULTIPLEX BUS 
MESH NETWORK 
5 .2 COMMUNICATION STRUCTURE FOR THE ONE LOCATION SYSTEM 
5 . 2.1 Dedicated Bus 
The first communication structure considered for the one 
location system utilizes dedicated lines from the computer 
to each peripheral device. This option requires a minimum 
of hardware and complexity for the interface at the periph-
eral unit, with only one channel in and one out. The remote 
units do not have to distinguish the address of messages 
since they are all for that unit. The timing constraints 
are also likely to be tight . The mUltiplicity of interface 
electronics is on the computer end. A dedicated interface 
is required for each external device. Although any practi-
cal design presumably shares as much of the electronics as 
possible, the design is still cumbersome. 
Some of the primary advantages of a dedicated bus system 
are: 
* simple interface at the using equipment 
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* simple communications protocol 
* high th~oughput capacity 
* high degree of fault isolation 
The inte~face at the using equipment and the p~otocol will 
be simple because the units do not have to read and decode 
add~esses to dete~mine if they will ~espond to the messages. 
The timing const~aints can also be ~elaxed. A dedicated 
link will have high th~oughput since each link se~ves only 
one device. The communication channel does not have to be 
time mUltiplexed among a numbe~ of devices. A dedicated 
link system simplifies the task of assu~ing fault tole~ance. 
Each link is independent and cannot fail in a way that af-
fects other channels. 
The p~ima~y disadvantages of a dedicated bus system a~e: 
* inte~face on the compute~ end is cumbe~some 
* a ve~y la~ge numbe~ of wi~es is ~equired . 
* the system will not be flexible o~ expandable 
A dedicated interface is mandato~y fo~ each piece of exte~­
nal equipment. Nume~ous wi~es are ~equi~ed to focus at the 
compute~ and make the installation difficult and heavy. 
Mo~e interface hardware must be added to the computer every 
time a new device is added, . o~ additional spa~e inte~faces 
must be included in the o~iginal system. Even with spare 
inte~faces, mo~e wi~e must be added. A more quantitative 
measu~e of the relative advantages and disadvantages is in-
cluded in the next chapte~. 
5.2.2 Multiplex Bus 
The next communication st~ucture conside~ed fo~ the one 
location system is a multiplex bus system. The multiplex 
bus provides communication to a number of units using the 
same wi~es. Messages include an address which must be ~ec-
ognized and decoded by each unit to see if the message is 
intended fo~ it. More than one multiplex bus is used. The 
numbe~ of buses is dete~mined by requi~ements for total sys-
tem communication capacity, by the physical and logical lim-
itations on the nurnbe~ of devices on a single bus, and by 
the need to isolate failures which could prevent the use of 
the bus fo~ any of the devices connected to it. Since all 
devices on a single bus must share the time available, a 
number of buses is essential to provide the necessary commu-
nications capacity. There is also a limit to the number of 
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devices that can be put on one bus, as well as limits to the 
electrical loading that can be accommodated, and the number 
of unique addresses available in the address space. The 
MIL-STD-1553B bus is limited to 30 terminals. The system 
designed for this study uses six buses . 
The basic configuration of the communication system using 
multiplex buses is shown in Figure 8 . Each of the six buses 
has a primary and a backup controller to prevent most of the · 
single point controller failures from causing the loss of 
all the units on that bus. The critical units are distrib-
uted on the six buses so that all critical functions can 
still be performed after multiple bus failures. The most 
important units in this category are the actuator control 
modules. The analysis of a particular arrangement of these 
units is included in the reliability analysis in the follow-
ing chapter. Each multiplex bus extends out of the primary 
electronics area to provide communication with the 12 exter-
nal units. The assumed routing of these buses is shown in 
Figure 9. 
Some advantages of the multiplex bus are: 
* reduced interface equipment at the computer 
* reduced interconnecting wiring 
* flexible to system growth and modification. 
A multiplex bus system significantly reduces the number of 
interface circuits needed at the computer compared to a ded-
icated bus system. The communications with a number of dif-
ferent units can share the same channel using time multiplex 
techniques without the necessity of duplicating the inter-
face f or each unit. A similar advantage also applies to the 
a mount of wire necessary to support these communications. 
In particular, the concentration of wire terminating at the 
central computer system is essentially eliminated. The sys-
tem is also more flexible for system modification and expan-
sion . More units can be added by attaching them to the bus 
at some point and adding them to the communication control 
software without any change in hardware at the computer and 
with minimal change in the wiring. 
Some of the disadvantages of a multiplex system are : 
* the interface at the units is complex 
* the communications protocol is complex 
* the system throughput is limited 
* the system is vulnerable to a class of faults that 
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Figure 9: Multiplex Buses to Remote Terminals 
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can deny communications to a significant percentage 
of the total system 
The interface at the remote units and the protocol is more 
complex than necessary for a dedicated link system. Addi-
tional circuits must be included to receive and decode both 
the unit address and the control messages, in addition to 
providing the proper messages in the required time interval . 
The throughput is less than a dedicated link since the chan-
nels must be time shared among a number units. The through-
put is also reduced because of the greater overhead neces-
sary to support the communication protocol. The sharing of 
the communication channel among several different units also 
significantly increases the vulnerability of the system to 
common mode faults that can cause the loss of all of the 
units on that bus. These include: failures in the bus con-
troller that are not detected and prevent the backup con-
troller from taking over, physical brakes in the wire, some 
terminal failures, such as spurious transmissions that can-
not be stopped, and a terminal responding to the wrong ad-
dress. These failures cause all units connected to this bus 
to be lost. Some of the more important units may have ter-
minals on more than one bus; however these duplicate termi-
nals increase the hardware requirements. 
5.2.3 Network 
The next communication system defined for the one loca~ 
tion system is a point-to-point network. Each unit is con-
nec~ed to a node in this network; each node has dedicated 
links to three other nodes, or a port into the central com-
puter system. Communication is established . to each unit by 
'growing' a bus; the bus is 'grown' by sending messages from 
the computer to the individual nodes starting with those 
connected to the computer. These messages close electronic 
switches that establish a path to all operating nodes. Once 
the nodes are interconnected, communication is carried out 
as in a multiplex bus system. The communication links are 
'grown' at system initiation, or any time a failure occurs 
in either a node or a link that disrupts communication to 
any otherwise good device. (See Volume 1, Chapter 3 for a 
more detailed description of how a network is 'grown'.) 
For the system designed for this study, the network is 
connected into the central computer through six ports. The 
nodes are connected together in a regular pattern, with the 
remote terminals included within the pattern of the network, 
as shown by the labelled nodes in Figure 10 . The arrange-
ment of these links in the aircraft is shown in Figure 11. 
Some of the advantages of a network system are: 
- 79 -
r 
l 
0) 
o 
PRIfv1ARY AVJ(}HCS LOCATICN 
1- - - - --
/' -
1 
1 
I 
1 ____ _ 
-- ~ - -
I 
___ ::1 
Figu~e 10: Mesh Netwo~k for One Location System 
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Figure 11: Mesh Network to Remote Terminals 
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* vezy high degzee of pzotection against failuze 
and damage events 
* unifozm availability of communication to units 
th~oughout the system in the presence of failu~es. 
A netwozk system offers a very high degree of protection 
against viztually all types of equipment failu~es and damage 
events. A system has almost no failu~e modes that p~event 
communication with an otherwise good terminal. Communica-
tion can only be lost because of multiple failures. A mesh 
network is also invulnerable to the types of common mode 
failures that simultaneously cause a significant percentage 
of the total system to be lost. In any system that uses 
buses, a class of faults can cause the loss of every device 
on a particular bus. These faults restrict the ability of 
the system to use all resources to effectively reconfigure 
itself. With a mesh network, information f~om all function-
ing units is uniformly availabLe throughout the system. 
Some of the disadvantages of network system are: 
* complex node interfaces 
* restricted throughput 
The hardware in the interfaces in the nodes is greater than 
any of the other techniques, with at least three link inter-
faces in each node. The node must also have the ability to 
simultaneously receive and respond to messages on all of the 
links . This ability is needed to receive reconfiguration 
messages to provide p~otection from certain types of fail-
ures, which means that some of the control electronics must 
be duplicated. The disadvantage of complexity will diminish 
in time, pa~ticularly if a majority of the node functions 
are implemented in LSI circuits that are produced in rela-
tively large numbers. 
The th~oughput of a mesh netwo~k system may be less ~ela­
tive to multiple bus configurations. If the network system 
is configured as one logical bus, the capacity will obvious-
ly be less than the bus system, assuming the same data 
rates. A network can be configured as more than one logical 
bus to increase the capacity, or dedicated links can be es-
tablished between nodes where the data rate is high. These 
multiple links may not be supported after- failures, however, 
thus reducing throughput. The system, of course, will be de-
signed to maintain all critical communications after these 
failures. 
- 82 -
- - - ----~~- --~--~ _J 
, 
I L __ _ 
5.2.4 Local Bus 
The final candidate communication structures defined for 
the one location system are based on the use of local buses 
within the primary electronics location. This system is 
logically similar to the mUltiplex bus system, with six bus-
es, each controlled by a primary and backup controller. 
Since this local bus is inappropriate for long distances, 
another level of communication is necessary for the remote 
terminals. These remote terminals can be se%viced by dedi-
cated links, multiplex buses, or a network. 
Dedicated serial buses are a leading candidate for commu-
nication to the remote terminals. At least some of the data 
will be very critical, particularly the operational control 
data to the cockpit and the engine thrust control data. To 
support this critical data, at least four multiplex buses 
are required, or a network with at least four ports into the 
fault tolerant computer. Therefore, the small number of 
terminals is not likely to justify the complexity of a mul-
tiplex bus 0% network. A multiplex bus would have only 
three or four terminals. Although some of the signals are 
critical, they are not crucial enough to justify the fault-
and damage-tolerance characteristics of - a network. 
SDme advantages of a local bus system include: 
* simple interface at both the central compute% 
and the peripheral unit 
* high throughput 
The primary advantage of using a local bus within an avion-
ics compartment is the simplicity of the interface equipment 
and protocol. A local bus can be designed to closely relate 
to the internal bus structure normally found not only in the 
central computer system, but also in the microcomputers that 
are likely to be a part of almost every module. Consequent-
ly, considerably fewer data format conversions and less 
hardware lie between the existing internal buses and the 
communication structure. Also, the throughput can be con-
siderably greater than other techniques for two reasons: 
First, the data can be transmitted in parallel as opposed to 
the serial transmission used for all the other techniques 
studied. Second, the communication overhead and conversion 
delays can be considerably reduced. 
Potential disadvantages 
structure are: 
of a local bus 
* cannot be used over long distances 
communication 
* numbers of wires, connectors, and associated failure 
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rates can be large. 
A local bus is impractical over long distances for several 
reasons: The primary problem is the large number of wires 
involved, particularly if data and address are transmitted 
on separate and parallel lines. The number of lines can be 
reduced at the cost of greater complexity if data and ad-
dress are multiplexed on the same lines or if one or both 
are transmitted with a serial technique. Separate control 
and clock lines will still exist~ otherwise the advantage of 
simplicity will be lost and the technique will degenerate 
into the multiplex bus technique. These large numbers of 
wires have the obvious disadvantages of high installation 
weight, complexity, and cost. The signal levels for a local 
bus may also be inappropriate for long distances. The immu-
nity to interference may be degraded and problems may arise 
due to time skew between signals on parallel lines. The 
primary disadvantage of the inability to use the local bus 
over long distances is that a two level communication struc-
ture must be used. Extra hardware must translate from the 
local bus to the communication technique used for the remote 
terminals. The commonality and uniformity of the communica-
tion structure will thus be lost. 
The large number of wires and associated connectors lead 
to another disadvantage. Several failure modes, such as: 
broken or shorted wires, bad connections, and faults in line 
drivers and receivers, are generally directly proportional 
to the number of lines involved. This riumber is signifi-
cantly greater for the local bus than the other techniques. 
Also, a large number of line buffer circuits are needed and 
may require a special design to reduce the possibility of 
failures that cause the loss of the entire bus. 
5 . 3 THREE LOCATION SYSTEM 
The three location system configUration creates a poten-
tial for more communication structure candidates. All of 
the single level configurations are still potential candi-
dates for the three location configuration. Also, potential 
justifications p.xist for two level structures, one level 
within a location and the other among these primary loca-
tions and remote terminals. Many of the communication can-
didates will be similar to the one locat1on configuration, 
while others will vary due to the change in the basic system 
configuration . 
The one level candidates using dedicated, multiplex bus, 
and network communication techniques , will be almost identi-
cal. The logical organization and the interface hardware 
will be the same. The nature of the communication system 
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remains unchanged by the added distance between the central 
computer system and the peripheral terminals. The only sig-
nificant difference will be the lengths of the interconnect-
ing wires. The length of the wire has virtually no effect 
on the dedicated and network candidates, except for the cost 
and we~ght of the installation. which is more than offset by 
the significant reduction in the length of dedicated signal 
wire between the electronics and the equipment served, as 
shown in Chapter 3. The length of wire may have some effect 
on the multiplex bus system. Care must be exercised in 
routing the buses to assure that they do not become too long 
as far as loading is concerned. The routing must also as-
sure that the system is not vulnerable to single point dam-
age events. These problems should be surmountable, however, 
and the one level multiplex bus system will then have essen-
tially the same characteristics as it did for the one loca-
tion configuration. 
The three location configuration makes many different 
communications structures theoretically possible if two hi-
erarchical levels are used. A candidate structure could be 
formed from all combinations of techniques on the two levels 
except that the local bus would be unused on the upper lev-
el. This would have the potential for the full 12 different 
two level structures. Several of these can be eliminated as 
implausible alternatives. 
First, consider the combinations with the mUltiplex bus 
at the lower level. One possible justification for this 
candidate would be the need for increased throughput. As 
discussed for the one location system, at least six buses 
are ,needed to provide the redundancy necessary to meet the 
reliability requirements. These six buses would have ample 
capacity to meet the throughput requirements projected for 
the system. Thus, if each of the peripheral units has the 
capability to communicate on a multiplex bus, little logic 
exists in interposing any kind of intermediate communication 
controller between that unit and the central computer. This 
additional unit would only contribute to complexity, cost, 
and reduced reliability without making any compensating po-
sitive contribution. From these arguments, all candidates 
involving the multiplex bus on the lower level offer no ad-
vantages and can be eliminated. 
Similar arguments can be made for structural candidates 
with a network on the lower level. A network logically op-
erating as a single bus may have difficulty meeting the 
throughput requirements of some systems . However, these 
problems can best be solved by providing dedicated links be-
tween communication nodes where high data rates are re-
quired. Much of the fault tolerance of the network system 
would be lost if the system were divided into two levels. A 
much higher degree of fault tolerance can be achieved by 
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maintaining a globally homogeneous organization, where the 
network controller makes any combination of connections nec-
essary with _any node in the system. Again, by these argu-
ments, all two level structures where the lower level is a 
network are eliminated from consideration . 
An advantage for a two level system may exist when dedi-
cated links are used on the lower level. Considerable wire 
could be saved over a one level dedicated system if communi-
cation terminals in each location could receive messages 
from the central computer and distribute them to the units 
at that location. The upper level co mmun ication technique 
could be one of three alternatives; however, only a limited 
number of terminals must be interconnected on the upper lev-
el . Also , many of these terminals must handle a relatively 
high data rate and are critical to the reliability of the 
sys tem. Thus, each of these terminals should have its own 
dedicated link to the central computer system. A multiplex 
bus or network system would be unjustified for these few im-
portant terminals. The candidate selected thus has dedicat-
ed links on both levels. This configuration has the disad-
vantage of significantly increasing the effect of single 
point failures within these communication "terminals. Some 
form of redundancy and the associated redundancy management 
would be need e d, such as redundant circuits within the ter-
minals or the use of multiple terminals within each loca-
tion. 
The final set of candidate structures has the local bus 
on the lower level; The candidate structure using local 
buses will thus be similar to the one location candidate. 
In this case, two of the six local buses are placed in each 
location. For some central computer designs, support of 
these remote locations is possible without creating an addi-
tional level in the communication structure. The interface 
between the central computer and the local bus will be de-
signed with the ability to communicate over the greater dis-
tances involved. The logical design and the great majority 
of the hardware will be the same as for the one location 
configuration. The communications to the remote unit~ would 
also be simplified. Now fewer terminals exist since the re-
mote signal multiplex units have been absorbed into the two 
additional loca~ions. Also , the interface units for the 
links to the remote terminals can be placed in the nearest 
locations. For example, the links for the engines in the 
wings would originate in the wing root electronic location. 
Thus, the candidate structures for the three location 
configuration are essentially reduced to t hose for the one 
location configuration. The only new candidate is the two 
level dedicated link system. The advantages and disad van-
tages are also virtually the same for similar candida tes . 
The two level dedicated link system will have the previously 
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discussed advantage of significant wire savings over a one 
level dedicated system, but have the disadvantage of added 
failure modes. 
5.4 
EMBEDDED SYSTEM 
The embedded configuration in this study represents the 
limiting extreme of systems likely to emerge by the end of 
the target time period. These systems are assumed to be 
fully dispersed, with electronics embedded within sensors, 
actuators, and other pieces of aircraft equipment, as de-
fined in the previous chapter. Although any pratical system 
will still probably have electronics in equipment compart-
ments, for the purposes of this study the electronics are 
assumed to be fully dispersed. This configuration thus es-
tablishes a logical extreme in the environment it creates 
for the communication requirements. Consequently, this lim-
iting configuration will have significant implications on 
the appropriate candidate communication structures. 
Several combinations of structures can be eliminated as 
impractical or impossible: The local bus cannot be used 
since it is not usable over a significant distance in an un-
protected environment. Thus, any candidate configuration 
with a local bus can b~ eliminated. A system using dedicat-
ed links connecting a central computer system to 150 plus 
terminals would be so awkward that it also does not need to 
be considered. Therefore, the only . candidates considered 
are .those that use multiplex buses or mesh network. 
Two level communication candidates are also not consid-
ered . The same arguments can again . be made to eliminate the 
two level multiplex bus or network candidates in the three 
location configuration. Thus, the candidates are reduced to 
two: a one level multiplex bus system and mesh network. 
5.4 . 1 Multiplex Bus for the Embedded System 
The multiplex bus retains the same characteristics of the 
current MIL-STD-1553B. Therefore, each bus is limited to 30 
terminals . At least six buses must be used with essentially 
the same logical configuration used for the one and three 
location configurations. The problems of arranging viable 
paths for the buses are more severe, however. In the one 
and three loc~tion configurations, a majority of the termi-
nals are relatively close together, with only a few remote 
terminals . These remote terminals can be serviced with rea-
sonable bus connection designs, as shown in Figure 9. The 
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loss of communications to any of these ~emote te~minals is 
not immediately cata5t~ophic and so physical damage to the 
bus is not an over~iding conside~ation. The embedded con-
figuration conside~ably complicates the situation by impos-
ing conflicting ~equi~ements. Highly flight critical func-
tions must be perfo~med thr oughout the aircraft. The most 
critical tasks for the communication system is to provide 
commands to the flight cont~ol surface actuators in the 
wings and tail. Thus, redundant buses are essential for 
each of these c~itical locations. Significant problems are 
likely, however, if all redundant buses are routed to all 
locations. First, to design a bus that is consistently re-
liable over the long distances involved may be difficult. 
The A version of MIL-STD-1553 limited total length to 91 me-
ters (300 feet). This limitation is removed in the current 
B version so no formal restraint exists from attempting 
longer bus lengths. This does not mean all problems would 
be trivial, however. A single bus designed to support all 
areas of the aircraft could be as long as 200 meters. A bus 
run out into a wing must return before going to the the oth-
er wing or tail. A bus this long is likely to be vulnerable 
and difficult to design. Also, much wire, and thus an. in-
crease in the installation cost and weight is required. 
Probably the most important consideration for the design 
of a multiplex bus system is vulnerability to physical dam-
age. If it is necessary to route all redundant buses to all 
parts of the aircraft for reliability reasons, the cross 
section of the system to damage is made very large. If any 
part of the aircraft is substantially damaged, a large per-
centage of the total communication capability of the system 
could be lost with the unacceptable p~obability of cata-
strophic system failure. 
The solution to the problems of excessive bus length, 
wire weight, and damage vulnerability is a significant in-
crease in the number of buses. This design requires a com-
plete set of redundant buses for each major location, such 
as each wing and tail. The design thus becomes increasingly 
awkward. A large number of ports will be required at the 
central computer system. The system is susceptible to fail-
ure modes that cause the loss of a bus, and thus loss of all 
devices on that bus. 
5.4.2 Network for the Embedded System 
Because of these problems with a multiplex system, this 
study is primarily concerned with ~ mesh network system. A 
mesh network provides a homogenous, highly damage tolerant 
technique for providing communication to all devices 
throughout the aircraft and has no failure modes to cause 
simultaneous loss of multiple resources. 
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! Once a decision is made to use the point-to-point network 
technique for the embedded system, the network must be care-
fully implemented to develop ~ total stucture that eifec-· 
tively meets all requirements. The network can be laid out 
in the aircraft in several ways; these will be discussed, 
analyzed, and compared. 
The most straightfoward design for the network is a uni-
form, logical, rectangular layout. The design is shown in 
Figure 12. The pattern is one of regularly connected hexa-
gons or bricks. The rectangle is laid out to conform to the 
fuselage to minimize the wire length as much as possible, 
with the edges connected to complete the pattern. Of 
course, some areas have concentrations of communication 
nodes, particularly in the cockpit and wings. Figures 13 
and 14 show possible detail in the cockpit and wing, re-
spectively. Note that nodes physically adjacent tend to be 
connected. In particular, redundant nodes on the same LRU 
are connected. For example, a triply redundant hydraulic 
actuator is attached, as shown in Figure 15. 
TO OTHER USERS 
-, 
I 
1-. LRU 
I 
1 2 3 TRIPLY REDUNDftNf ACTUAJOR 
I I L ______________ ~ 
o NOrES 
Figure 15 : Network Connection to a Triplex Actuator 
Somewhat higher reliability can be achieved by logically 
separating these nodes in the network. However, such sepa-
ration increases the complexity and wire length without any 
sig n ificant increase in the total system reliability . As 
seen in F i gure 15, the actuator, as a unit, has five link s 
in the rest of the network to provide gr e ater reliability 
than the actuator itself. 
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Examination of Figures 13 and 14 show that the regular 
arrangement of node interconnections leads to an excessive 
number of links connecting various parts of the aircraft; 
for example, 14 links go into the wing. The amount of wire · 
can be significantly reduced without compromising safety, by 
establishing regular networks in various places in the air-
craft where concentrations of nodes exist. These subnet-
works are then interconnected by a sufficient number of 
links to give the required reliability. One possible con-
figuration is shown in Figure 16. 
A specialized network could be designed with each node 
having only enough interconnection to provide adequate reli-
ability and dispatchability, taking into consideration what 
type of unit is attached to the node. Also, the intercon-
nection between nodes could be specialized. The result 
would be some wire saving, but the design problem is greatly 
complicated by the necessity of assuring no way exists for 
the isolation of a crucial set of nodes after a small number 
of failures. This problem is worsened by the possibility 
that the aircraft must be dispatched with one or two exist-
ing node failures. 
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I Chapte~ 6 
TRADE-OFF ANALYSIS 
Several communication structures were described in the 
preceding chapter. In this chapter, an analysis of the dif-
ferences between these alternatives is made to determine 
their effectiveness in avionic system applications. Several 
factors can be used to measure the relative worth of differ-
ent alternatives. To determine the desirability of the dif-
ferent alternatives, consideration must be given to the 
overall performance and cost effectiveness of the system. 
Measures of the system's performance include: capacity, re-
liability, and availability. Cost effectiveness is deter-
mined primarily upon the cost needed to support the system, 
which includes maintainability and adaptability, in addition 
to the original cost of development and production. 
For a system which must support life critical functions, 
reliability itself cannot be considered a trade-off factor 
in the sense that one system is qhosen over another because 
it is more reliable. All systems must be able to meet the 
stringent reliabilit1 requirements before they can be cer-
tified. Little advantage is gained by significantly exceed-
ing the reliability requirements. Rather, the effectiveness 
of the total aircraft would be enhanced if efforts were made 
in other areas where the unreliability is greater. 
However, the reliability analysis of the communication 
structure does become an important indirect factor in the 
trade-off among alternative designs. The basic characteris-
tics of the system are dominated by how effectively the de-
sign can meet the reliability requirements. A system with 
characteristics that enhance reliability can meet the re-
quirements at a lower total cost. The reliability advantag-
es are thus reflected in other areas, such as increased per-
formance or especially lower life cycle costs. Therefore, a 
reliability analysis establishes a basis for all other com-
parisons, and thus forms a major part of this study. 
Capacity characteristics have much the same role as reli-
ability characteristics in that all communication systems 
must provide the required capacity. Systems with inherent 
characteristics that provide more efficient capacity will 
have advantages in other areas, such as life cycle costs. 
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~ This chapte~ fi~st discusses the ~eliability analysis 
t~chnique used in this study. (A mo~e complete description 
of the technique is given in Volume I, Chapter 6). The re-
liabilities of the candidate systems are then analyzed and 
compared. Next, the capacities of the various candidates are 
discussed. This reliability and capacity analysis provides 
the basis for many of the basic design decisions made in 
forming the candidate structures described in the preceding 
chapter. With the reliability and capacity requirements es-
tablished, the other characteristics of the candidate sys-
tems are discussed to help determine the best candidates for 
particular applications. 
6.1 BASIS FOR THE RELIABILITY ANALYSIS 
The purpose of the reliability analysis in this chapter 
is to determine the contribution made by the various candi-
date communication structures to the probability of failure 
of the critical functions performed by the total system. In 
Volume I of this study, general measures of the reliability 
of communication techniques were discussed, such as the con-
nectivity of mesh networks. In the final analysis, however, 
the reliability of a communication structure cannot be fully 
resolved in isolation from the particular critical functions 
it is suppo~ting. Tnerefore, the analysis in this chapter 
measures the reliability of the communication function in 
the context of the critical avionic functions. 
To ~erform a reliability analysis on a complete system, 
much less several alternate systems, would be too big a task 
and not within the scope of this study. However, the reli-
ability of the communication system can be effectively eval-
uated by analyzing a subset of the total system, represent-
ing the most critical communication tasks. The task chosen 
for this partic~lar study is the pitch control function, of-
ten the most critical function in a fly-by-wire flight con-
trol system. 
To create a realistic environment for the communication 
system, a representative actuator configuration is used. 
This configurati.on is necessary to define how communication 
failures contribute to failure of the function . Failure of 
the function will depend on various combinations of failures 
of actuator channels. Certainly, no one communication chan-
nel to a particular piece of equipment will be critical. A 
certain level of redundancy will be used both in the actua-
tor and the surfaces . A critical communication failure will 
occur if communications are lost to the minimum set of actu-
ator channels. Furthermore, the significance of a com muni-
cation failure mu st be judged in relation to failures of the 
actuat ors and other system elements. Combinations of fail-
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ures must also be considered. If actuator channels have 
xailed. communication xailures will be signixicant ix they 
cause loss ox communication to the remaining good channels. 
A typical conxiguration xor the primary equipment in-
volved in providing the pitch control function has been cho-
sen for this study. which realistically exercises the commu-
nication function. Presumably. the aircraft is built with 
reduced static stability and fly-by-wire linkage. thus com- " 
pletely dependent on the pitch control electronic function. 
If the electronic system fails, the aircraft is immediately 
lost so that a high degree ox reliability and thus redundan-
cy is required. Consequently. four pitch control aerodynam-
ic surfaces are used, each surface controlled by a triplex 
xorce voting actuator. 
Each actuator channel has two failure modes: a passive 
mode and an active mode. A triplex actuator can sustain one 
active failure or two passive failures. The aircraft itself 
can sustain the loss ox two surfaces. Therefore, the mini-
mum set of equipment that must be operating is two surfaces, 
each controlled by a redundant actuator with a minimum of 
two channels operating ix one channel has failed actively . 
or one channel operating if two have failed passively. 
The central computer system is not included in the reli-
ability analysis since the computer has a very high level of 
reliability . In addition, failure mo~es of the computer do 
not i nteract with failure modes of the communication system. 
Hence, if the computer has not failed, then it can complete-
ly support the communication system. Since unique interface 
circuits in the central computer system are included with 
the communication link, the total reliability of the func-
tion can be determined by adding the failure rate of the 
computer to the failure rate of the rest of the system. 
Representative numbers for "the probability of failure in 
the actuator channels provide a consistent basis to compare 
the contribution of the communication structure. The servo 
electronics are included with the hydraulic channel since 
one cannot operate without the other. The numbers chosen 
for the combined hourly failure rates are: 
3 . 0 X 10- 3 for a passive failure 
3.0 X 10-~ for an active failure 
Conservative rates are chosen to create a realistically com-
plex environment for the communication system . 
The baseline reliability requirement for the pitch con-
trol function assumed for this study is a f ailure rate of 
10- 9 per hour at the end of a 10 hour flight . A flight time 
is given because the failure rate for a highly redundant 
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system will be a strong function of time. The failure rate 
will increase due the failure of redundant resources. It is 
thus required that the instantaneous failure rate at the end 
of the expected operational time of the aircraft be within 
the required value. The probability of functional failure 
of the sys t em during a short period of time at the end of 
the flight will thus be approximately this maximum failure 
rate times the time period. A nominal maximum operational 
time for a commercial aircraft is assumed to be 10 hours. 
In addition, this reliability requirement must be met 
with any component failed at the beginning of the flight. 
This requirement is necessary, otherwise all equipment must 
work at dispatch. The levels of redundancy necessary to 
meet the reliability requirements will involve a large num-
ber of elements. The probability that all of these are 
working at dispatch may be too low to be acceptable for com-
mercial operations. A fault-tolerant system can reconfigure 
available resources to assure that the most critical func-
tions are performed. Thus, any practical design will in-
clude more resources than the minimum required for opera-
tional reliability. These additional resources will allow 
dispatch with one or more elements failed. The end result 
will be a significant increase in dispatchability over cur-
rent experience. This philosophy is used in the communica-
tion systems considered in this study. 
6 . 2 RELIABILITY ANALYSIS OF CANDIDATE ARCHITECTURES 
A reliability analysis for the critical elements involved 
in the pitch control function will be made for each candi-
d a te architecture. The analysis technique used is the reli-
ability equation method, described in Volume I, Section 6.7. 
6 . 2. 1 One Location Configuration 
6.2. 1 .1 Dedicated Links 
The dedicated link system is simple enough that a direct 
computation of reliability is practical. The other system 
c~nfigurations cannot be analyzed as easily, however. 
Therefore, the equation diagram method is · used for the dedi-
cated link system, both to maintain consistency with the 
analyses of the other systems and to begin the explanation 
of the reliability analysis with a less complex system. 
The reliability analysis will be discussed in terms of 
the steps described for this technique in Volume I . These 
steps are summarized here, along with their application to 
this system. 
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step 1: Pa~tition the System into Basic Elements. 
Fi~st, the system must be pa~titioned into elements. A 
diagram of the c~itical pa~ts of the system using dedicated 
links is shown in Figure 17. The partitioning of this sys-
tem is straight fowa~d. Since a dedicated link exists fo~ 
each actuato~ channel, the communication channel can be com-
bined with the servo elect~onics and the hyd~aulic actuator 
channel. If any of these components fail, the othe~s in the 
se~ial chain cannot be used. Consequently, this system can 
be described using only one type of element, which includes 
all of these components, including the dedicated pa~ts of 
the link inte~face within the cent~al compute~ system. The 
entire system is modeled by 12 o£ these elements. 
step 2: 
ment 
Identify Events that Define the state of Each Ele-
The condition of this one type of element can be defined 
by th~ee states: (1) the good state, (2) the failed state 
with the actuator failed passively, and (3) the failed state 
with the actuto~ failed active ly. The probability ~ate of 
ente~ing a failed state is the failu~e rate of the link, as-
sumed here to be 1.0 x 10-~, added to the approp~iate ~ate 
fo~ the actuator channels. 
Step 3: Select an O~der for the Application of the Equations 
An o~der must be selected to inco~po~ate the elements 
into the ~eliability analysis. Dependency p~ima~ily dete~-
mines the order in the analysis of most systems, i.e., how 
one element depends on othe~s fo~ p~oper operation. In the 
dedicated link system, none of the elements depend on an-
other; thus the o~der can be somewhat arbitrary. To simplify 
the diagram, a minimum sequence of elements is chosen to ac-
complish system success. The sequence chosen he~e is fi~st 
link/actuato~ channels 1 and 2. If both a~e good, the ope~­
ation of one surface is assu~ed independent of the state of 
channel 3. For symmet~y, channels 10 and 11 a~e chosen 
next. If these two channels are good, a second su~face is 
ope~ational and thus the pitch function is assu~ed. The se-
quence fo~ the ~emainde~ of the system is determined prima-
rily by how elements are added to replace failed elements, 
described in step 4. 
step 4: construct the Diagram of the Equations 
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The equation diagram is now constructed using the analy-
sis program described in Volume I; the results of this pro-
cess are shown in Figure 18. The label chosen for the basic 
system element is "dac" for dedicated link/actuator. A num-
ber is attached to distinguish which element is considered. 
The process of building the equation diagram begins by en-
tering the codes for channels 1, 2, 10, and 11. The first 
state considered by the program is all of the elements good. 
If these four elements are good, the pitch function is good 
independent of the state of any other element. The unreli-
ability of 0 can then be specified by entering "qO". The 
next system state prompted by the program is channel 11 
failed passively, with the other three channels still good. 
Channel 12 must be added to account for the possibility that 
is has failed actively. If it has not, the unreliability is 
still 0; if it has, another channel must be considered. 
Channels 4 and 5 are now added. If both are good, the unre-
liability is again O. If not, channel 6 is again added. If 
this surface is also not functioning, channels 7, 8, and 
then 9 are added in the same way as the previous ~hannels. 
For the states of any successful channels, the system unre-
liability is again O. For states of unsuccessful channels, 
the unreliability of the system is now 1 since three surfac-
es have failed and no other resources are available. 
The process of constructing the equation diagram contin-
ues by accounting for the system states as they are prompted 
by the program. The pattern followed by the program is 
first to go down the left hand edge of the diagram and then 
to fill in the branches beginning from the bottom left hand 
corner and moving up and to the right until the diagram is 
finished . 
step 5: Compute the System Unreliability 
The analysis program automatically computes the unreli-
ability for each branch when all necessary information is 
available. Thus, when the diagram is complete, the computed 
unreliability will be available, as shown in Figure 18. In 
this diagram, the number at the top is the unreliability of 
the system. Under that number are those components summed 
to give the top number. These numbers are the result of the 
analysis of the remainder of the system, given the state of 
the first element. This state is shown by the code above 
the number. The analysis that produces each of these num-
bers is shown by the branch of the diagram. The same pro-
cess is repeated at each level until the system is deter-
mined to be either good or failed. A more complete 
description of this analysis process is given in Volume I. 
This diagram gives the unreliability after one hour, assum-
ing all components are good at the beginning . The failure 
rate of a highly redundant system is a very strong function 
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of time. The present version of the program cannot directly 
compute the failure rate as a function of time. This fail-
ure rate can be estimated, however, by computing the unreli-
ability at two times at the end of the required time period . 
Figures 19 and 20 give the unreliability at 9 and 10 hours 
respectively. 
The unreliability analysis can now be interpreted to de-
termine the implications for comparison with other system 
designs. The dramatic growth in the unreliability as a 
function of time can be seen by comparing Figures 19 and 20. 
The unreliability increases by almost 6 orders of magnitude 
between 1 hour and 10 hours . To be conservative in this 
analysis , the total unreliability after 10 hours will thus 
be used to determine how well the system meets its require-
ments . 
Even after 10 hours the analysis shows that the system 
exceeds the requirements by several orders of magnitude un-
der the conditions that all equipment is working at the be-
ginning of the time period. The unreliability for different 
initial failure conditions can be determined by looking at 
various branches of the equation diagram. 
The unreliability of the system with one channel failed 
passively can be seen in Figure 20 on the third line, column 
four to be 9.7 x 10-1~ . The unreliability is approximately 
two orders of magnitude less than the system with no initial 
failures. The unreliability of ' the system with one channel 
failed actively can be ' seen at location 3,7 to be 1 . 3 x 
1 0- 1 2 , another order of magnitude larger. The unreliability 
of the system after one surface is completely lost is 5.6 x 
10- 1 ', as shown at the location 7,4. 
This analysis shows that this system exceeds the require-
ments . The development of a system intended to go into a 
prod u c t ion aircraft would likely have a finer tuned design 
t hat would not exceed the requirements as much, allowing 
some s a vings in hardware. However, for the purposes of this 
comparative analysis, a conservative approach is taken to 
fully e xercise the communication system. 
6.2. 1 .2 Multiplex Bus 
A d i agram of the critical parts of a multiplex bus system 
i nvol ved in the pitch control function is sh own in Figure 
6.5 . There are six buses, with a primary and backup con-
troller for each. Two actuator channels are serviced by 
each bus . The assignments are made so that a bus f a il u re 
will not cause the loss of anyone con t rol surface. Th e re-
l iabil i ty analysis procedure is similar to that us e d for the 
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3 4 5 6 7 
1.574E-21 
datI G-------datl fp------datl fa 
8.0t5E-Z2 1.725E-22 3.,91E-22 
I I 
8.0 9E-22 9.312E-19 1 . 330E-17 
8 9 
dat2 G---dat2 fp--dat2 fa dat2 G----<lat2 fp-<lat2 fa dat2 G----<lst2 fp--(lat2 fa 
10 11 
4.1-140-22 t.858E-22 1.996E-22 4.644E-19 2.661E-21 4.642E-19 6.651E-18 6.189E-18 4 .642E-19 I I 4.8 4.11 5.10 4.11 5.10 5.10 
44.1,6E-22 4 . 646E-19 6.6S4E-18 
12 13 
datlO G--d3tlO fp~atlO fa dat3 G ___ dat3 fp--dat3 fa dat3 Go- daB fp --dat3 fa 
1.3!lE-22 j.344E-22 1.441E-22 4.174E-22 1.670E-25 4.6t2E-19 4.174E-Z2 6.189E-18 4.642E-19 
\ I I 4.1 4.1 4.1 5.10 5.10 
5 1.3 lE-ZZ 3.361E-19 4 .804E-18 1.5 7E-14 
datU G-- datU fp --datU fa datU G-- datll fp -----datll fa da tll G--datll fp--datll fa -da UO G --ElatlO fp--datlO fa 
14 15 16 
O.COOE.OO 6.705E-23 7.207E-23 1.675E-19 9.610E-22 1 . 676E-19 Z.401E-18 Z.2 35E-18 1.676E-19 8.663E-15 3.596E-15 3.2t4E-15 
QO J I 6.2 6.5 7.4 6.5 7.4 7.4 I I I 
6 l.6/6E-19 2.402E-18 8.667E-15 8 . 9~OE-12 1.07lE-I0 
17 18 
Qa tlZ G -<latl2 fp -----<latl2 fa datl2 G---datlz fp--dat12 fa datll G~atll fp-datll fa datll G -- datU fp-- datll fa datll G--datll fp ---datll fa 
G.OOOE.OO O.OOOE+OO 1.676E-19 O. OOOE+OO Z.Z35E-18 1.676E-19 5.585E-15 1.796E-15 1.Z86E-15 4 .488E-IZ 1 .714E-14 4.485E-IZ 4.Z84E-ll 5 . 980E-l1 4.485E-12 
GO QO I QO 7.4 7.4 7.4 I I 7.11 7.14 8.13 7.14 8.13 8.13 
5 . 587E-15 4.4~OE-12 4. Z85E-11 7 
dat4 G ___ dat4 fp--dat4 fa datlz G~atl2 fp __ datl2 fa datlZ G--datl2 fp---datlZ fa 
8 
1.8tOE-15 1.799E-15 1.9~8E-15 5 .585E-I5 Z.235E-18 4 .4t5E-IZ 5.S8SE-lS 3 . 936E-ll 2.989E-12 I I I 7.4 7.4 7,4 9,13 9,13 
1.8 lE-IS 4.497E-l2 6 . 4Z7E-ll 1.4 SE-07 
datS G---datS fp----dat5 fa datS G ___ cat5 fp---da t5 fa dat5 G--- dat5 fp----<lat5 fa dat4 G--- dat4 fp-<lat4 fa 
19 
O.OOOE+OO 8.970E-16 9 .64ZE-16 Z.Z41E-IZ 1 .286 E-14 Z.Z4ZE-IZ 3 .Z13E-ll Z.990 E-l1 Z.242E-12 9.960E-08 2.409E-08 2.5fOE-08 
QO l I 9,5 9.8 10.7 9,8 10.7 10,7 l I ~ 
2.24ZE-12 3.z14E-11 9.9 SE-08 6.023E-05 8 . 5 9E-04 9 
20 21 
dat6 G ___ dat6 fp----dat6 fa dat6 G _ _ _ _ da t6 fp ----dat6 fa da t5 G---datS fp-----dat5 fa datS G---dat5 fp--dat5 fa dat5 G ___ dat5 f p----dat5 fa 
QO QO QO 10.7 10.7 10.7 10,14 10,p Ql 10,17 Ql Ql 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
II 
9 
10 
O.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO Z.ZtZE-lZ O.OOOE+OO Z.990E-ll Z.242E-12 7.471E-08 1.Zbo3E-08 1_2rOE-08 3 . 006E-05 1 . 7Z0E-07 3.000E-05 4 . Z99E-04 4 . 000E - 04 3 . 000E-05 
7.4 5E-08 3.0 7E-OS 4.301E-04 10 
U 
12 
13 
1 
Figure 18: 
3 
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dat7 G -----------oat7 fp--_ dat7 fa dat6 G--- dat6 fp-dat6 fa dat6 G--- dat6 fp dat6 fa 
2.4(9E -08 Z.4f6E-08 Z.579E-08 7. 471E-08 Z.990E-ll 3.000E-05 7.471E-08 4 . 000E-04 3.000E-05 
I -----"l 10.7 10,7 Ql 10.7 Ql Ql 
Z.4 OE-08 6.016E-05 ~ . 598E-04 11 
d:>t8 G--dat8 fp-dat8 f a dat8 G---dat8 fp---dat8 fa dat8 G---dat8 fp--dat8 fa 
O.OOOE+OO 1.ZIoE-08 1.Z90E-08 Z.999E-05 1 .7Z0 E-07 3 . 000E-05 4 . Z98E-04 4.000E - 04 3 . 000E-05 
QO I 12.8 12 .11 Ql 12, II Ql Ql 
3.0 OE-05 4 . 30 0E-04 12 
dat9 G---dat9 fp--dat9 fa dat9 G--dat9 fp-----dat9 fa 
0 . 000<+00 O. OOOE+OO 3 . 000E-05 O.OOOE+OO 4.000E-04 3.000E-05 
QO QO Ql QO Ql (ll 
13 
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 ZO Z1 
for the Dedicated 
r 
L __ 
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
8.486E-16 
datl G --- datl fp --datl fa 
4.30
t
·E-16 Z.0,7E-16 2 . 137E-16 
I 
3 4.31 E-16 5.685E-14 7.914E-13 
d3t2 G---dat2 fp--dat2 fa dat2 G-__ dat2 fp-__ dat2 fa dat2 G---dat2 fp-dat2 fa 
2.24?E-16 1 .014E-16 1.071E-16 2.777E-14 1.428E-15 2.765E-14 3 .9S0E- 13 3.687E-13 2.765E-14 
I I 4.8 4.11 5.10 4.11 5.10 5.10 
~ <.'~'~-lO 2.788E-14 
d3tlO G--<fatlO fp--datlO fa dat3 G--- dat3 fp--dat3 f a 
7.440E-17 7.3~OE-17 7.72~ E-17 2.245E-16 8.112E-19 2.7j5E-14 
I ! . I 4.1 4.1 
5 7.46 9E-17 2.047E-14 2.861E-13 1 . 024E-I0 
11 12 13 
3.966E-13 
dat3 G--dat3 fp--dat3 fa 
2.245E-16 3 . 687E-13 2 . 76SE-14 
4. 1 5.10 5.10 
datIl G-- datll fp--datIl fa datIl G---datIl fp--dat11 fa dat11 G--datIl fp--dat11 fa datlo G---datlo fP-'datlO fa 
14 15 16 
O.OOO E+OO 3.599E-17 3 . 869E-17 9 . 9S9E-15 5.159E-16 9 . 998E-lS 1 . 428E-13 1 .333E-13 9 . 998E-15 5 . 710E-ll 2.41 ,E-l1 2.1~6E-ll 
ao I L 6.2 6.5 7.4 6.5 7.4 7.4 I L. --~~=====::::;--------------'l 
6 9 .993E-15 - 1.433E-13 S . 73'oE-11 6.709E-09 7.837E-08 
17 18 
datl2 G--datl2 fp--datl2 fa datl2 G--datlZ fp--datl2 fa d3t11 G--datll fp - datIl fa datIl G---datIl fp--datll fa datIl G--datIl fp--datll fa 
O.OOOE+OO O. OOOE+OO 9.993f-lS O.OOOE+OO 1 .333E-13 9.993E-lS 3.689E-l1 1 . 196E-l1 8.476E-12 3 . 310E-09 1.130E-I0 3 . 286E-09 3.127E-08 4 . 381E-08 3 . 286E-09 
QO QO I QO 7.4 7.4 7.4 I I 7.11 7.14 8.13 7.14 8 . 13 8.13 
3 .703E-ll 3.323E-09 3 .139E-08 7· 
dat4 G -- dat4 fp--dat4 fa datl2 G--datl2 fp--dat12 fa datl2 G----dat12 fp--dat12 fa 
1 . 223E- ll 1.211E-l1 1.269E-l1 3.689E-ll 1.333E-13 3 .286 E-09 3.689E-ll 2.917E-08 2.188E-09 
I I I 1 7.4 7.4 I 7.4 9.13 9.13 
8 1 . Z27E-l l 3.364E-09 4.701E-08 1 .217E-OS 
dutS G ~at5 fp----<latS fa dat5 G--- datS fp--datS fa datS G--- dat5 fp-- d;>tS fa d3t4 G--- dat4 fp-cat4 fa 
19 
O.O OOE+O O S.91SE-12 6.3S8E - 12 1.637E-09 8. 4 78E-l1 1 .64 3E-09 2.346E-08 2.1 91E-08 1 .643E-09 8 .07~E-06 Z.012E-06 2.087E-06 
QO I 1 9.5 9. . 10.7 9.8 10.7 10.7 I I i I 
1.643E- 09 2.15SE-08 8 . 10 ZE- 06 S.590E-04 7.731E-03 9 
20 21 
dat6 G---dat6 fp--dat 6 fa dat6 G---dat6 fp--dat6 fa datS G---datS fp--dat5 fa datS G-datS fp--dats fa datS G--- datS fp--datS fa 
O.O OOE+OO O.OOOE+OO 1.o4~E-09 O.OOOE+OO 2.191E-08 1. 643E-09 6.06Z E-Ob 9.939E-07 1 .047E-06 2.7S0E-04 1.39SE-05 2.700E-04 3.8blE-03 3 . bOOE-03 2.700E- 04 
1 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
ao ao I QO 10 . 7 10 .7 10.7 I I 10.14 10.17 Ql 10.17 Ql Ql 
6.08S E-Ob 2.761E-04 3.876E-03 10 10 
11 
lZ 
13 
Figu:r::e 19 
dat7 G---dat7 fp--dat7 f a dat6 G--- dat6 fp-- dat6 fa dat6 G---datb fp--dat6 fa 
2.00jE-Ob 1 . 990E-06 2.086E-Ob 6.0b2E-Ob 2.191E-08 2.700E-04 6.06 2E-06 3.600E-03 2 . 700E-04 
I L-- ----. 10.7 10.7 Ql 10.7 Ql Ql 
2.017E-06 S.529E-04 7.725E-03 
d3t8 G---dat8 fp---dat8 fa datS G---dat8 fP--dat8 fa dat8 G---dat8 fp--dat8 fa 
O.OOOE+OO 9.72 pE-07 1.04CE- 06 2.690E-04 1 . 393E-05 2.700E-04 3 .85SE-03 3.600E-03 2 . 700E-04 
QO I 1 12.S 12. 11 Ql 12.11 Ql Ql 
2.700E-04 3.870E-03 
dat9 G---dat9 fp--dat9 fa dat9 G--dat9 fp---dat9 fa 
O.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO 2 . 700 E-04 O.OOO E+OO 3 .6 00E-03 2.700E-04 
QO QO Ql 110 III III 
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
Reliability Equation Diag:r::am fo:r:: the Dedicated 
Link System Time = 9 Hou:r::s 
105 
11 
12 
13 
20 21 
3 4 5 6 7 8 q 10 11 lZ 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1.600E-15 
datl G-d.,tl fp--datl fa 
8.1~4E-16 3 86rE-16 4.0?4E-16 _~ 
3 8.1~9E-16 9.667E-14 1.341E-IZ 
datZ G--- datZ fp--datZ fa datZ G--- datZ fp-- datZ fa datZ G--- datZ fp--datZ fa 
4.230E-16 1.892E-16 2.017E-16 4.710E-14 2.690E-15 4.688E-14 6.695E-13 6.251E-13 4.688E-14 I 1 I 4,8 4,11 5,10 4 , 11 5,10 5,10 
44.Z4SE-16 . 4.731E-14 6 .724E-13 
datlO G--datlO fp----<latlO fa dat3 G---dat3 fp---dat3 fa daB G-- dat3 fp---iat3 fa 
1.4IIE-16 1.392E- 16 1.4r5E-16 4.230E-16 1.699E- 18 4.6f8E-14 4.230E-16 6 .251E-13 •. 688E-14 I I 4,1 4,1 4,1 5,10 ;,10 
5 1.4 7E-16 3.481E-14 4.849E-13 1.S63E-IO 
d.t11 G -- d3t11 fp--datll fa d3tll G-- datll fp-datll fa datll G-- dat11 fp~atll fa datlO G--datlO fp-datlO fa 
O.OO OE+ OO 6 .781 E-17 7.Z90E-17 1.688E-14 9.720E-16 1.69SE-14 2.420E-13 2 . 260E-13 1.695E-14 S.709E-ll 3.692E-ll 3 . 2~7E-ll 
QO \ I 6,2 6,5 7,4 6,5 7,4 7,4 I I , 
1.69SE-14 ·_·Z:-430E-13 S.746E - ll I.Z30E-09 6 ~6E-07 
datlZ G--datlZ fp--datl2 fa datlZ G--datl2 fp--datlZ fa catll G-_ dat11 fp--datll fa jat11 G--dat11 fp--dat11 fa 
O.OO OE.OO O. OOOE'OO 1. 69SE-14 O.OOOE.OO 2.260E-13 1.695E-14 5.6 27E-ll 1. B27E-ll 1 .293E-ll +.S47E-09 1.724E-IO 4.S10E-09 
QO QO J QO 7,4 7,4 7,4 1 I 7,11 7,14 S,13 
dat11 G-- datll fp-- datll fa 
4 . Z90E-08 6.014E-OS 4.510E-09 
7,14 8,13 8,13 
7 5.6 lE-ll 4.S6fE- 09 4.309E-08 
d3t4 G---dat4 fp--dat4 fa datl2 G--dat12 fp--datlZ fa datl2 G--datl2 fp~atl2 fa 
1.8j40-11 1.SSZE-ll 1.9iSE-ll 5.6 27 E-ll 2.260E-13 4.S10E- 09 S.627E-ll 4.003E-OS 3.002E-09 
1 .__ I 7,4 7,4 7,4 9,13 9,13 
l.S72E-ll 4.630E-09 6 . 4S1E-OS 1.503E-05 B 
d;;tS G---d3tS fp--dat5 fa datS G--- datS fp--dats fa datS G---datS fp--datS fa d3t4 G---dat4 fp--dat4 fa 
19 
9 
O.OOOE.OO 9.0ZlE-IZ 9.697E-IZ 2.Z46E-09 1.293E-IO Z.Z5SE- 09 3.Z19E-OS 3.007E-OS Z.~SSE-09 9.96
1
4E-06 Z.4
l
9_4_E_-O_6 __ Z_._SI.':7=E=-=0=6===::;------------------, QO I I 9, 5 9,S 10,7 9,8 10,7 10,7 \ I 
ZO Zl 
Z.2SSE-09 ~32E-08 1.OOlE-OS 6.234E-04 S.5S9E-03 
dat6 G---dat6 fp--dat6 fa clat6 G---dat6 fp-- dat6 fa datS G --datS fp--datS fa dat5 G---dat5 fp - --dat5 fa dat5 G---datS fp--datS fa 
O.OOOE.OO O.OOOE+OO 2 .2~SE-09 O. OOOE.OO 3.007E-OS 2.ZSSE-09 i.48SE-06 1.Z30E-06 1.29Z E-06 3.062E-04 1.723E-OS 3.000E-04 4.ZS9E-03 4.000E-03 3.000E-04 
10 
11 
lZ 
13 
Figure 20 
QO QO I QO 10,7 10,7 ll,7 I I 10,14 10,17 Ql 10,17 Ql Ql 
7.S17E-06 3.07SE-04 4.307E-03 
3 4 S 
Reliability Equation 
Link System Time = 
107 
dat7 G--- dat7 fp---dat7 fa dat6 G---dat6 fp-- dat6 fa dat6 G---dat6 fp---dat6 fa 
2.47
1
90-06 Z.464E-06 Z.574E-06 . 7.4SSE-06 3.007E-OS 3 . 000E-04 7.48SE-06 4.000E-03 3 . 000E-04 
I I ---"l 10,7 10,7 Ql 10,7 Ql Ql 
2.490E-06 - ---.-.. - '·i,-:TS9E-04 S.S8'l.E-03 
dats G--- datS fp-- datS fa dat8 G---datS fp--dat8 fa d< ts G---dat8 fp-datS fa 
O.OOO E'OO 1.200E-06 1.290E-06 2.987E-04 1. 720 E-OS 3.000E-04 4.ZS1E-03 4.000E-03 3.000E-04 
QO I I lZ.S 12,~1 Ql lZ ,l1 Ql Ql 
6 
Diagram for 
10 Hours 
7 
the 
3.000E-04 4.300 E-03 
dat9 G--- dat9 fp--dat9 fa d3t9 G--dat9 fp--dat9 fa 
O.OOOE'OO O.OOOE'OO 3.000E-04 O.OOOE+OO 4 . 000E-03 3.000E-04 
1;0 QO Ql QO Ql Ql 
B 9 10 11 12 13 14 IS 
Dedicated 
16 17 IS 19 20 21 
1 
Z 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
S 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
, 
, -
I • 
L 
------------------------- --, 
dedicated link system. The steps taken a~e b~iefly 
discussed, with emphasis on any different aspects . 
In the first step, the system is pa~titioned into two ba-
sic elements: One is the actuator channel which includes 
both the servo elecronics and the hyd~aulics_ The other el-
ement encompasses both the controlle~s and the bus itself . -
These two types of elements cannot be combined into one 
since the failure of one actuator channel does not cause the 
loss of the bus or the other actuator channel on that bus. 
The two controllers and the bus itself can be combined 
into one element for the total system analysis. The commu-
nication function is not lost on that bus fo~ most of the 
failure modes of one controller, although it will fail if 
both cont~olle~s fail o~ if the bus itself fails. The way 
the bus fails is not significant as far as any interaction 
with the failure of othe~ elements. The failu~e mechanism 
within the bus element can be separately analyzed and the 
resulting net failure rate used in the analysis of the total 
system. This situation significantly simplifies the analy-
sis of the total system. 
The actuator element again has active and passive failure 
modes, as dicussed earlie~. The failu~e ~ates will also be 
the same, as previously assumed. The bus element will have 
only two states: good and failed. The ~ailure rate for the 
cont~oller is assumed to be 1.0 x 10-~. The bus can fail 
either from broken or shorted wires or from any failed units 
on the bus that prevent its use. These failures not only in-
clude grounds or highs on the bus, but also include more 
comp l ex failure modes, such as responding to the wrong ad-
dress or transmitting when not commanded. Also , many other 
units exist on the bus, other than those sh~wn·in Figure 21 
which directly involve the pitch control function . As many 
as 20 other units on each bus are not directly i nvolved in 
the pitch control function but can become indirectly in-
volved since they are attached to the same . bus car~ying 
pitch control commands: The bus interfaces in the units 
will be designed to make these failure modes very unlikely. 
Howe ver, these types of failures are still possible . For 
this analysis, a conservative failure rate of 1 . 0 K 10- 5 per 
hour is used . The failure rate fo~ the bus element is thus: 
Q = Q(cont)Z + Q(bus) 
= 1.001 X 10- 5 
The failure rate is essentially the rate for the bus itself 
with almost no contribution from the failure rate of the 
controllers. The sensitivity of the system unreliability to 
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Figure 21 : Multiplex Bus System for Pitch Control 
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this failure rate number and the design decision to use dual 
controllers is discussed a little later. 
The order in which the elements are i ncorporated into the 
analysis follows much the same pattern as fo r the dedicated 
link system. However, now two d i fferent types of elements 
and dependancy are important. The state of the bus must be 
determined before any of the elements attached to that bus 
may be considered . The order chosen for this analysis is 
bus 1, actuator channels 1 and 3, bus 6, and actuator chan-
nels 10 and 12. Other elements are added in a similar se-
quence until all elements are included, with the appropriate 
bus accounted for before the attached actuator channel can 
be considered operational . 
The equation diagram and the results of the analysis are 
shown in Figure 22. The entire diagram is given for com-
pleteness. It will only be necessary, however , to review 
several of the branches in the upper left hand corner to 
learn the nature of the failure process for this system con-
figuration and assess the results, . The diagram is developed 
by entering the ,codes for bus 1, then actuators 1 and 3, 
followed by bus 6 and actuators 10 and 11. At this point, 
the pitch control :'function is assured and an unreliability , 
of 0 is entered. The next state considered is actuator 
channel 12 failed passively with the earlier elements still 
good . To determin~ the success of the ' system , channel 1 1 
must not be failed actively . This channel does not have to 
be working since channel 10 is already good, t hus bus 5 does 
not have to be considered. However, ' when channel 12 is 
failed actively , bus 5 and actuator channel 11 must be add-
ed, a s s h own in the diagram at location 8 , 6. For a complete 
failure of surface 4; bus 3, actuator 5, bus 2, and actuator 
4 are added, starting at location 9,4. Location 9,4 is the 
point i n the diagram that corresponds to t h e system state 
that includes the active failure of actuator c h annel 12. 
This same sequence is also used for the other states, which 
result in the failure of the channels 10-11-12 actuator sys-
tem. The result of the sequence is transferred to the other 
places where it is needed, as shown by all of the 9,4's in 
rOWS 7, 8, and 9 . A similar process is continued until the 
entire diagram is complete. 
The results of the analysis prove that the requirements 
are comfortably met when all elements are working at the be-
ginning of the 10 hour flight. The reliability drops sig- , 
nificantly , but the requirements are st i ll met if a bus i s 
bad at the beginning of the flight. This result is sh o wn at 
location 3,4, the conditional unreliability of t he syste m, 
given that bus 1 failed . In fact , the requ i re ments ar e met 
when one entire surface is failed , as shown at location 9, 4. 
- 1 11 -
Figu~es 23 and 24 show the sensitivity of the system un-
reliability to changes in the failure rate for the bus. 
These figu~es give only the uppe~ left hand part of the to-
tal diag~am, which sufficiently shows the ~esults. Figu~e 
23 is for a bus failu~e rate of 1.0 x 10- 6 pe~ hou~. The re-
liability is not signficantly imp~oved. Figu~e 24 is fo~ a 
bus failu~e ~ate of 1.0 x 10-~, co~~esponding to the case 
whe~e the backup cont~olle~ is eliminated. The ~eliability 
still meets the ~equi~ements, but is almost two o~ders of 
magnitude wo~se. 
6.2 .1. 3 Mes h Network System 
A diagram of the critical parts of a netwo~k system in-
volved in the pitch control function is shown in Figure 25 . 
The analysis of a system that uses a mesh network is signif-
icantly more complex than the analysis of the previous sys-
tems. Nume~ous comb inations of failures within the network 
that can be sustained before a communication failure will 
cause the loss of a critical ~unction . The analysis of a 
complete system, such as the one shown in Figure 10, would 
be very complex and beyond the sd6pe of th i s study . A sim-
plified system can be defined, however, that adequately rep-
resents the full system for the purpose of this comparative 
analysis. The analysis is consid~rably more involved than 
it was fo~ the previous two systems although it can be per-
formed. 
The system is simplified by including only those elements 
directly involved in the pitch control function. This sim-
plification is performed by assigning those nodes interfaced 
to the se~vo elect~onics to adjacent positions, that are 
also adjacent to the ports i n the cent~al computer system. 
The rest of the system is then deleted and the affected 
links joined togethe~. The ~esulting s ystem is shown in 
Figure 26. 
This system is a conservative simplification since it 
will have a lower ~eliability than the or i g i nal system for 
two reasons: First, if the nodes servicing the ser v o elec-
tronics a~e not placed in adjacent positions , the number of 
failures requi~ed to is o late particular channels will be 
considerably greater and thus less probable. Second, by 
eliminating other nodes fr om the analysis-, alternate paths 
that could have compensated for failed nodes or links are 
now unavailable . The app~opriateness of this simpification 
can only be judged after the results of t he analysis are 
available. If these results show that communication fail-
ures do not significantly contribute to the failure of the 
critical function, then the simplification is successful . 
- 112 -
r 
... 
'--
- .----
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
7 .998E-15 
busl G ---busl f 1 
6 . 671E-15 1 . 3,8E-15 
3 6.JIE-15 L-----------l-. ..,3~8E-11 
actl G----actl fp--actl fa actl G act! fp_ctl fa 
2.756E -lS 1 .240E-lS 2 .~E-lS 8 .881E-12 3 . 996E-12 3.996E-13 
! 1 LlJ, 4.26 6.21 6.21 4 2 . 7 7E-lS 4 . 134E-13 
act3 G---act3 fp----act3 fa act3 G---act3 fp--ect3 fa 
2 . 0ISE-16 1.20~E-lS 1 . 3~9E-lS 2 . 088E-16 1.359E- 14 3 . 996E - 13 
LZl L3l 5.1 5.23 6.21 
5 2 . 0 SE-16 
bus6 G-------bus6 fl 
1 .9t 9E-16 1.363E-17 
l 1 
6 1 . 9 9E- 16 1.363E-13 
actIO (;.--.actlo fp---actlO fa actlO G----act10 fp ~ctlO fa 
6.523E-17 6.230E-17 6.810E-17 1 . 2~7E-13 3.782E-16 1 . 023E-14 
I I ,I I 7.14 9.4 6.5~4E-17 2.077E-14 2.280E-13 1.261E-13 
ac tl2 G---actl2 fp-----actl2 fa ac t12 G---actl2 fp-----actl2 fa busS G---bus5 fl actl2 G---ect12 fp--actl2 fa 
O.OOOE+OO 3 . 068E-17 3 .477E-17 1.019E-14 3.477E-16 1.023E-14 2.246E-13 3.409E-lS 1 . 1S5E-13 3 . 477E - 16 1 . 023E-14 
ao I I I 8.2 I 9.4 1 
8 1 . 0~3E-14 1 . 1S9E - 13 1 . 150 E-13 2.246E-13 9.4 8.6 8.6 9.4 
act11 G---act11 fp-----act11 fa bus S G---busS fl busS G---busS fl act11 G--actll fp~ct11' fa 
0.000£+00 0 . 000£+00 1.0j3£- 14 1 . 12iE-13 3 . 409£-15 1.125£-13 3 .409E-15 1 . 121E-13 1.023E-13 1.023E-14 
ao ao 9.4 I 9.4 I 9.4 9 .4 
9 3 . 40 0 £- 11 1 . 12SE-13 1 . 12SE-13 1 . 12SE-13 
bus3 G---bus3 fl actl l G--act11 fp_ct11 fa act11 G--act11 fp--sct11 fa actl2 G--act12 fp---sctl2 fa 
3 . 373£-11 3.5S1E-13 O. OOOE+OO 1.023E-13 1 . 023£-14 0.000£+00 1.023E-13 1.0 23E-14 O. OOOE+OO 1 . 023E-13 1 . 023E-14 
I I QO 9.4 9.4 ao 9.4 9.4 ao 9.4 9.4 
3 . 3~4E-ll 3 .SS1E-09 10 
actS G--- acts fp----actS fa acts G--- acts fp-- acts fa 
1.129E-l1 1.062E- l1 1.1 3£-11 3.529E-09 1.062E- ll 1.183E-ll 
1 11.15 11.15 11 . 21 
11 1 . 132E-11 3.S40E-09 
bus 2 G--- bus2 f I bus:? G---bus2 fl 
1.115E-l1 1 .748E-13 
1 1 I 
3 . S38E-09 2.148E -12 
12 1. 11 5E- 11 1. 748E- 09 3.538£- 09 
act4 G act4 fp-----act4 f a act4 G ---act 4 fp-- act4 fa act4 G-------act4 fp------ect4 fa 
13 
14 
15 
O.OOOE+OO S .227E-12 S .924 E-12 1. 7?7E - 09 5 .227E- 12 S .924E-1 2 
ao 1 I I I 13.12 13.10 
1. 742E- 09 1 . 975E-08 1 . 742E-09 
actio G---act6 fp---act6 fa buS4 G---bus4 fl actio G---act6 fp --act6 fa 
O. OOOE +OO O.OOOE+OO 1 .742 E-09 1 .9f7E-08 5.808E-I0 O.OOO E+OO O.OOOE+OO 1.7~2E-09 
ao ao 1 14.7 ao QO 14.7 
5 .800E-06 1.917E- 08 
a ct7 G---act7 fP---6Ct7 fa act6 G---act6 fp-
1 .94
1
3E-06 1.829E-06 2.016E-06 O.OOOE+OO 1.742E-08 
1 ~ ao 14.7 
1. 950E-06 
busS G---buss f 1 
act6 fa 
1 .742E-09 
14.7 
1.737E-09 5 . 924E-ll 1.742E-09 
13.5 13.10 14.7 
6.095E-04 
busS G ---busS f 1 
18 19 20 
2 . 148 E-08 
act4 G---act4 fp--act4 fa 
1.968E-08 5.924E- ll 1 .742E- 01 
13.10 13 . 10 ]4.7 
6. 011E -04 3 . 69"',9_E_-_07 _________ ." 
6.0 2E-04 3 . 699E-03 
1 .9fOE-06 3 . 0~~_9_E_-_0_8 ___________________________ ,1 
1 .92 0E-06 3.009E-04 16 
21 
act9 G--- act 9 fp-- act9 fa act9 G-act9 fp-- act9 fa act9 G--- act9 fp---act9 fa act9 G --- act9 fp----act9 fa 
O.OOOE +OO 9.000E- 07 1 . 020E-06 2 .990E-04 9.000E-07 1.020E-06 
17.11 17.11 al 17.11 17.11 al 
1 
2 
3 
" 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
2 . 9(OE-04 1.020E-05 3 . 000E-04 3.388E-03 1 . 020E-05 3 . 000E-O~ 
3.0 OE-04 17 17 
ao I 1 1 I 17. 13 
3.000E-04 3 . 400E-03 3. oboE-04 
18 
19 
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ac t a G--- act8 fp-- acta fa bus4 G--- bus4 fl acta G~cta fp---act8 fa 
O. OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO 3.000E-04 3 .300 E-03 1 . 000 E-04 O.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO 3.000E-04 
ao ao al 1 Ql aD ao al 
8 9 10 
Multiplex 
3 . 300E-03 
act8 G -- act8 fp -act8 fa 
O. OOO E+OO 3 . 000E- 03 3 . 000E-04 
ao al Ql 
11 12 13 14 15 
act8 G---act8 fp_ct8 fa 
O.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO 3.000E-04 
ao ao a1 
18 
19 
16 17 18 19 20 21 
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4 .& 8.910E-12 4 
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5 3.998E-13 4 .~E-12 
bus2 G---bus2 f I 
8.7r7E -12 1 . 332E-13 
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act2 G ------act2 fp------act2 fa bus2 G---buS2 fl act2 G ___ act2 fp ad2 fa 
2. 080E-16 6.286E-19 
5.1 5.1 
3 .9r6E-13 
1 . 3~2E-09 
bus6 G --bus6 f I 
1.046E-I0 1.227E-09 
l 10.24 1. 0 6E-I0 
4.39\6E-12 1.332E-13 
6.21 
4.396E-12 
act2 G---act2 fp - - -<lct2 fa 
2.085E-16 3.996E-12 3.996E-13 
5.1 6.21 6.21 
4.3!2E-12 3.996E-12 3.996E-13 
6.21 6.21 
4.36E-12 
act3 G ___ act3 fp---<lct3 fa 
2.088E-16 3.996 E-12 3.996E-13 
5.1 6.21 6.21 
actIO G ~ctl0 fP---actl0 fa 
S"j6E-ll 2.2j4E-l l 2.4Y4E-ll 
5.765E-ll 7.512E-09 
actl2 G-_ act12 fP--actl2 fa actl2 G---actl2 fp--ectl2 fa 
3.397E-ll 1 . 1(5E-ll 1 .253E-ll 3.704E-09 1.213E-I0 3 .682E- 09 9.4 , 9.22 10.24 
3.77E-09 4.176E-08 4.176E-08 
actl l &--- act11 fp --actll fa busS G---bus5 f I busS G---bus5 f I 
3.397E-ll 1.023E- 13 3.6j2E-09 4.054E-08 1. 227E- 09 4.0?4E-08 1. 227E-09 
9.4 9.4 I 10.24 I 10.24 
1.227E-05 4.054E-08 4.054E-08 
bUS3 G---bus3 fl act11 G----act11 fp--ectll fa act11 G---actll fp--act11 fa 
1.2~lE-OS 6.172E-08 3.397E-ll 3.682E-08 3.682E-09 3.397E-l1 3.682E-08 3 .682 E-09 
1 
8.213E-08 
busS G ---busS f I 
8,Or1E-08 1.227E-09 
10.24 
8.0 lE-08 
actll G --actll fp-actll fa 
4 . 041E-08 3.682E-08 3.682E- 09 
I 10.24 10.24 
4.054E-08 
actl2 t7-actl2 fp-actl2 fa 
3.397E-ll 3.682E- 08 3.682E-09 
6.794E-03 
bus2 G ------bus2 f' 
6.694E- 03 1.000E- 04 
6 
8 
10 
I I 9.4 10. 24 10.24 9.4 10.24 10.24 
1.221E-05 6.172E-04 
& 
3.943E-08 
9.4 10.24 I Ql 11 
6.694E - 03 
10.24 
19 
22 
20 
bus2 G--- bus2 f' 
3.8I~E-08 5.808E-I0 
14.7 
3.8 5£-08 
act4 G--- act4 fp--act4 fa 
1 .968E-08 1 .742 E-08 1.742E-09 
13.10 14.7 14.7 
A 
6. 788E- 03 
bus5 G --~usS f I 
6.6r8E - 03 1.000E-04 
Ql 
6.688E-03 
acts G ---acts fp-act5 fa acts G~ct5 fp ----act5 fa 
8.330E-06 1.846E-06 2.038E-06 6.133E-04 1.846E-06 2.038E-06 
I I I 12.33 12.33 12 ,39 
8.358E-06 -
bliS2 G---bus2 fl 
7.727E-06 6.305E-07 
I' ~----------------------------~, 
7.728E-06 6.305E- 03 
act4 G---act4 fp-ect4 fa act4 &----act4 fp---act4 fa 
5.789E- 06 9.174E-07 1.022E-06 3.0~8E-04 6.000E- 03 1.742E-09 
14.7 I I , I 13.30 14.7 
3.058E-04 3 . 405E-03 3.058 E-04 
act6 G---act6 f~ct6 fa bus4 G- bus4 fl act6 G---act6 fp--act6 fa 
5. 789E-06 1 .742 E-08 3.000E-04 3.305E-03 1 . 000E-04 5.789E-06 1.742E-08 3.000E-04 
14.7 14.7 Ql I Ql 14.7 14.7 Ql 
3.306E-03 
act6 G---act6 fp ----act6 fa 
5 . 789E-06 3.000E - 03 3.000E- 04 
14.7 Ql Ql 
act9 G ---act9 fp-- act 9 fa 
3 .388E-03 3 . 000E-03 3.000E-04 
17.11 Ql Ql 
21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 
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Equation Diagram 
Time = 10 Hours 
for the 
(Cont.) 
Multiplex 
1 15 
act4 G act4 fp------act4 fa 
3.394E-03 3.000E-03 3.000E-04 
6.153E-04 14.28 Q1 Ql 12 
bus2 G --bus2 fl 
6.1 jOE-04 3.704E-07 LI __________ --" 
6 .150E-04 3.704E-03 13 
act4 G-- act4 fp--act4 fa act4 G---act4 fp--- act4 fa 
3.048E-04 1.022E-05 3.000E-04 3.394E-03 1 . 022E-05 3.000E-04 
14.25 14.28 Ql 14.28 14.28 Ql 
14 
15 
16 
17 
16 
19 
33 34 35 36 37 36 
3 4 5 6 
2 1.ZFE-15 
t>C1s1 G---b'Jsl fl 
1 . ==S~-15 ~.100E-17 I LI ______________ ~ 
1 . :C~E-l, 2.106E-12 
8C~1 G----<lctl fP---8Ctl fa actl G---actl fP--8ctl fa 
5 . B72f-1S 1.~8r'E-16 4.Z09E-16 1.39~E-IZ 6.377E-13 6 . 377[-14 
I _ 4.Z6 6.21 6.21 
4 5./18': - 16 0:-607E-14 
a : t:; G_ct3 fp_ct3 fa <lct; G---8ct3 fp---act3 fa 
1. £5';-16 1 . ~1~E-16 2 .111E-16 1.eS o o-16 2.111E-15 6.377E-14 
I 5.1 5.::3 b.a 
5 l. E,: :::-16 
~"J~ ' G - __ t:,,~~ fl 
l ' ~;:T-16 1 . Z7ZE-16 
6 l.e~2~-!6 
ac~l~ G--actlO fp--actlO fa 
6.1:;:-17 5.~43E-17 6.441E-17 
76.1SSt17 
8ctlZ <:--acU2 fp--actlZ fa 
O . O~~E.O~ Z.~~8E-17 3.230E-17 1)0 I LI ______________ ---, 
8 9 . 759E-15 1.077E-13 
ccUI G act11 fp act11 f8 b'J35 G 
O.OOOE'OO O. OOOE.OO 9 . 759E-15 1.073E-13 
00 00 I I 
3 . 253E-11 1.073E-13 
7 
busS fl 
3.253E-16 
9.4 
bus3 G ___ buS3 fl act11 G---tlctll fp----actll fa 
10 
11 
12 
13 
1" 
3.Z4 0 <-11 3.463E-14 O.OOOE'OO 9.759E-14 9.759E-15 
I 00 9.4 9.4 
3 . Z50E-11 
acts G--- actS fp-- acts fa 
1 .076E-l1 1 . 0.ZE-1l 1 . 130E-l1 
I 
1.061E-11 
bus: G ---bU5Z fl 
1. 07 ~f-11 
1.07Q :-11 
1. 716E-14 
8ct4 G ---act4 fp--act4 fa 
O. OOOE'OO 5.130E-IZ 5.660E-12 
00 I 
1. 710E-09 
3.463E-09 
act5 G--- acts fp 
3.461E-09 1.04ZE-ll 
11.15 11.15 
act6 G ---act6 fp __ act6 fa 
0.000:.00 O. OOOE'OO 1.710E-09 
00 ao I 
5.700E-06 
9 
act7 G ·--Bct7 fp---act7 fa 
15 
16 
17 
Figure 23: Multiplex 
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Bus 
by 
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a Factor of 10 
1 17 
1.89,E-06 1 . 827E-06 1 . 983E-06 
1. 896E-06 
buss G-------bus5 fl 
1 . 69~E-06 3.010E-09 
1 . 893E-06 
act9 G---"ct9 fp--<tCt9 fa 
O. OOOE'OO 9.000E-07 9.930E-07 
ao 
Bus Failure Rate 
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
3 . 34~E - 13 
bt.:s l G __ - b'Js1 f 1 
l.llr -13 Z. ZiL4_E -_1_3 _______ --,1 
1 .1 1 ~ E - 13 Z.Z34E-I0 
ac tl G---acU f p --acU f a ac U G ---ac U fp --acU fa 
4 . 54jE - 14 1. 9~E-14 4 . 660E- 14 1 . 555E-IO 6 . 17ZE-ll 6 . 17ZE-12 L 4.Z6 b. 21 b . n 
44 . 56le - 14 6 . 437E-12 
aot 3 G_~t3 fp--sc1:l f a ac t3 G---a ct3 fp--act3 f a 
5 . ;~. E- 16 1 . 85ZE-14 2 . 65ZE-14 5 . 78ZE- 16 ~ . 6 5 ~ E -1 3 6 . 17ZE-12 1 5 .1 5 .2 3 6.21 
5 5 . 7~ - E-1 6 
t:·.!o6 G---c,-,s6 f l 
3. ~6C = - !'6 Z . 53 ~ E- 1 6 
1 
oS 3 . ~63E-!'6 
actto G --ao tlO f p 
1.13~ E- l~ 9 .520 E- 17 
ac UO fa 
l. 180E- 16 
7 1. 13J"-16 
actl~ G --a:tl2 f p-_acU2 f a 
O. 0 ~ ~ E' 00 4 .66 7E-17 6. 68~_E_-_l_7 ______________ _, 
0 0 I I 
8 1. 556E-14 Z. U SE- 13 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
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act11 G--act 11 fp--act11 fa busS G busS f 1 
O.OOOE ' OO O.O OOE . OO 1 . 556E-14 1 . 70 9E-ll 5 . 1S5E-14 
Cl~ 00 I I 9,4 
1. 7l!e-13 
2 4: Mult i pl e x 
Incre a sed 
5.185E - ll 
bus3 G---cus3 fl actll G--actll fp--actll fa 
4 . 758E-11 4 . 269E-12 I 1_ 
4 .763E-ll 
acts G---ac t 5 fp--act5 fa 
O. OOOE ' OO 1 . 556E-13 1: 556E-14 
QO 9.4 9.4 
4 . 269E- 09 
actS G ---actS fp--aet5 fa 
1 .71f E-11 1 .• 75E-11 1 . 776E-l1 
1. 7117E-11 
4 . Z3S E-09 1 . 275E-ll 1 . 776E-1l 
11,15 11,15 11. 21 
bus2 G ---bu52 f 1 
1.50,9E-U Z. 079E-12 
1. 511E - 11 
ac t 4 G--- act4 fp --act 4 fa 
O. OC OE ' OO 6 . c l lE-12 6 . 696E- 12 
QO I 
Z. 070E-09 
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The network system is p~rtitioned into three elements: 
One of the elements is the actuator channel, as also seen in 
the previous system configurations. The network itself is 
divided into two elements: One is the core of the communi-
cation node and the other is the link between nodes, or "be-
tween a node and the computer system. This division is nec-
essary since a node can be used after a link to that node 
has failed by using an alternate path through other links 
and nodes still operating. The link element includes all of 
the interface circuits unique to that link on both ends, 
plus the wire and connectors in between. The node element 
includes all of the equipment common to all paths through 
that node . This partitioning is shown in Figure 27. 
The actuator element has the same failure modes and the 
same pxobabilities as in the pxevious system. The node and 
the link are assumed to have only one failure mode, with a 
failure rate given by: 
node 
link 
2.0 x 10-" 
1.0 x 10-~ 
The order in which the elements are included in the anal-
ysis begins with a node that has a potential link to the 
computer system. The node must be good before any links to 
that node can be used. Also, a sequence of good elem~nts 
must be established between the compu~er and the element in 
question. The next element after the node is the link from 
that node to the computer. Then, the actuator channel at-
tached to that node is added . This pattern cont i nues until 
enough good elements assure the operation of the pitch func-
tion. When an actuator channel fails, a similar strategy to 
the previous analysis is followed. When a link fails, al-
ternate pa t hs are added. 
Part of the equation diagram, and the computed unreli-
ability, are shown in Figure 28. The upper left hand corner 
of this diagram sufficiently illustrates the failure charac-
teristics of the system and provides enough information to 
compare to other systems. The computer program used to per-
form this analysis is an older version that does not present 
the results in as readable a format . Therefore, lines have 
been added to show how the branches relate . The nodes are 
represented by the letter N, then by a number to designate 
which node , followed by a G for good or- an F for failed. 
The links are represented by an L, plus either a C (for com-
puter) and/or numbers to designate what two ports are con-
nected by the link. Again, a G or F show whether the link 
is good or failed . The actuator is represented by A with a 
number, plus either G for good , S for passive (soft) fail-
ure, and F for active failure. 
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The initial sequence . can be seen by following down the 
I left hand edge of Figure 28, then relating this to the sys-
tem diagram in Figure 25. To establish one control surface, 
th is ini tial sequence is node 1, link from the computer to 
1, actuator channel 1, node 3, link for 1 to 3, and actuator 
c hannel 3. To establish a second surface, these are fol-
lowed by node 7, link from C to 7, node 9, link from 7 to 9, 
and actuator channel 9 . If all of these elements are good, 
the function is assured. If these elements fail, elements 
are added i n a similar way to the analysis of the previous 
syste ms . The most significant difference will be when a 
link fails. When a link fails, normally a large number of 
alternate routes can bypass the failed link . This factor is 
the primary reason for the increased complexity of this 
anal y sis . Of course, this factor is also the reason for the 
high reliability of the network system. Experience gained 
as the diagram was constructed , made it possible to deter-
mine where approximations could be made without affecting 
the re sults . These points are designated by the letter X. 
The results in Figure 28 show that the system easily 
meets the requirements. The results given in this figure 
are in a different format from the previous analyses . The 
n um ber at the top of the diagram is the unreliability of the 
total system after 10 hours of operation. The number under 
e ach symbol is the unreliability, given the state of the 
sy stem as defined by the state of the elements on the branch 
down t o that symbol. For example, th~ first number on the 
second line under N1G is the unrelibility of the system, 
given that node 1 is good. The second number on that line 
is the unreliability of the system, given node 1 is failed. 
The 0 on line 13 means that the system state defined as good 
by the 12 elements in the first column assures the success 
of the functi on . 
The result s given in this figure also show that the re-
quirements are met when anyone element is initially failed. 
The result on line 2 show the requirement is easily met when 
one no de is failed and likewise for a failed link, as shown 
on line 3. The results on line 4 indicate that the require-
ment s can also be met when an actuator channel has failed, 
either passively or actively . The results under A8F show 
that the requir~ments can be met after the complete failure 
o f one surface, but only by a narrow margin. 
The contribution of the network communication structure 
to the unreli ability of the system can be estimated by ob-
serving several of the results shown in the diagram. First, 
a significant drop in reliability by two ord e rs of magnitude 
is seen when node 1 fails. This drop in reliability is pri-
marily due to t he loss of the use of the actuator channel 
connected directly to that node, rather than an indication 
of the reliability of the communication sys tem itself. This 
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fact can be dete~mined by obse~ving the ~esults on line 4. 
The un~eliability of the system, given that actuato~ channel 
1 is failed·passively, is almost as la~ge as the un~eliabil­
ity with node 1 failed, confi~ming that the loss of the ac-
tuato~ channel is the majo~ component in the un~eliability 
with the node failed. 
Line 3 shows ' a mo~e di~ect measu~e of the cont~ibution of 
the communication system to the un~eliability of the system.' 
The un~eliability of the system with the link f~om the com-
pute~ to 1 failed is no g~eate~ than with this link good, 
illust~ating that the failu~e of the link makes no cont~ibu-
tion to the un~eliability of the system. This same ~esult 
is obse~ved by compa~ing the un~eliability of the system 
with a link good to that same link failed fo~ all of the 
other links shown in Figure 28. These results show that the 
netwo~k communication st~uctu~e makes an insignificant con-
tribution to the unreliability of the system. This result 
also confirms that the simplifications made in the system 
are legitimate. The complete system would have only added 
more alternate paths to replace a failed link . Since the 
failure of links makes an insignificant contribution to sys-
tem 'unreliability, additional redundancy is unnecessary. 
6.2 . 1.~ Local Bus 
The configuration of the system using the local bus is 
log i cally identical to the multiplex bU$ configuration. In 
both cases, there a~e two ' controlle~s each fo~ six buses. 
The ~ e are also se~vo electronics fo~ two different actuato~ 
channels on each bus. Most probably, the , failure rates for 
the elements will vary , although the direction of the dif-
ference is not obvious. The complexity of the local bus 
controllers and terminals are expected to be simple~. The 
local bus requires many more wires so that the failures , 
from such causes as connector failures, will be greater. An 
extensive analysis of a particular system design is neces-
sary for a definitive comparison. 
6.2 . 2 other Configurations 
The reliability analysis of most of the communication al- , 
ternatives for the three location configuration and the em-
bedded configuration, have the same form as the corre-
sponding alternative for the one location configurat i on . 
The failure rates of the elements may vary , particularly be-
cause of the greate~ distances involved . Aiain, only a de-
tailed analysis of a particular design could produce any 
quantitative difference. However, the essential purpos e of 
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this study is to compare communication alternatives within a 
given system configu~ation. Fo~ this pu~pose, the completed 
analysis is adequate for most of the necessary comparisons. 
The two level dedicated link configuration will have a 
different form for the analysis since an extra element is 
present in the system. This extra element is the intermedi-
ate terminal in each location. However, this system config-
uration is not of sufficient interest to justify creating an 
additional detailed analysis. 
6.2.3 Summary of Reliability Results 
The reliability of all the candidate communication struc-
tures have basically the same level of reliability. This 
level of reliability is significantly greater than necessary 
even when anyone unit is failed initially. Most likely, a 
more optimized design for an actual system would reduce the 
reliability margin somewhat and produce savings in hardware. 
However, this high level of redundancy may be retained so 
that maintenance in~ervals can be extended and/or dispatch 
reliability increased. Yet, the purpose of this study is 
not to perform a detailed design of a system, but to create 
system alternatives with essentially equivalent levels of 
reliability. With these equivalent levels of reliability 
established, the alternatives can be compared to see which 
best achieves the req~irements. In fact, the analysis in 
this ~hapter is a ' part of the iterative design process that 
led to the alternatives described in Chapt'er 5. 
6 .3 SYSTEM CAPACITY ANALYSIS 
The requirement for the actual data rate capacity is giv-
en in Chapter 3. The total requirement is 155K data bits 
per second. The one location system configuration described 
in Chapter 4 requires a total throughput of 18K 16 bit words 
per second to produce the required data . The data through-
put required is thus 288K bits per second. The basic trans-
mission rate assllmed for the communication links for each 
candidate is 1 MHz . This rate is based on the soundest 
technology and is consistent with MIL-STD-1553B. This rate 
can be supported by twisted shielded wire~ avoiding the the 
problems and expense of broader bandwidth wire, such as co-
axial cable. 
The dedicated link system can easily meet the capacity 
requirements . Each link can be used independently (unless 
constrained by the use of shared equipment in the central 
computer, which is assumed not to be the case in this 
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study). The data rate capacity is thus judged by how well 
the requirements are met for the link with the greatest 
rate. The link with the greatest requirement can thus be 
easily met. The protocol overhead for a dedicated link is 
minimum, so the 1 MHz rate is more than adequate and could 
be reduced if desired. 
The multiplex bus system can also easily meet the capaci-
ty requirements. With a total of six buses, units are as-
signed to the buses in a way that balances the communication 
load. The data rat~ requirement for each bus is thus ap-
proximately a 72K bit rate. The protocol overhead for a 
multiplex bus is much greater than the dedicated link. In 
the worst case, the multiplex bus is expected to be 45% ef-
ficient. Thus, a 1 MHz bus will easily meet the require-
ments. 
The network can also fulfill the capacity requirements, 
although the margin may be less depending on the mode of op-
eration of the network. The worst case is that the network 
operates as a single logical bus. The overhead will be the 
same as the multiplex bus system, except during network re-
configuration. Presumably, reconfiguration seldom happens 
and can be accomplished in a short enough time that it has 
no effect on critical functions. Thus, the capacity re-
quirements can be met in this worst case configuration. Un-
fortunately, there is little flexibility for growth. This 
problem can be alleviated either by llsing dedicated links 
between nodes with high data rate requirements, or by organ-
izing the network as more than a single logical bus. 
6.4 COMPARISON OF CANDIDATES 
The previous sections established that the systems em-
~loying the candidate communication techniques have equiv-
alent levels of reliability and capacity. The systems can 
now be compared to see which best meets the requirements. 
However, to establish firm quantitative distinctions between 
these alternatives is impossible without the detailed design 
of each system. Nevertheless, some general observations can 
be made to aid in making effective choices at the beginning 
of a system design effort. 
Several of the advantages and disadvantages of each can-
didate have already been discussed in Chapter 5. These com-
parisons are summarized for the candidate systems for the 
one location configuration. This comparison will also gen-
erally apply to candidate systems for the three location 
configuration because they have similar characteristics. A 
trade-off is unnecessary for the embedded system since, in 
this study. the mesh network is considered to be the only 
likely candidate for this configuration. 
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The e££ectiveness o£ the candidate systems £or the one 
location configu~ation can be compa~ed using seve~al diffe~-
ent c~ite~ia. Some of these c~ite~ia a~e initial develop-
ment costs, p~oduction costs, maintainability, availability, 
flexibility, and technical ~isk. Most of these factors can 
eventually be resolved in terms of the total life cycle 
costs. The initial development and production costs along 
with much of the maintainence costs, will primarily depend 
on the amount and complexity of the hardware. Lack of flex-
ibility will require greater costs when future modifications 
must be made to the system. Higher . technical risk gives the 
probability of higher costs when technical problems must be 
solved, or replacement equipment must be utilized. 
The comparison of development and production costs based 
on complexity can be estimated quantitatively, with the oth-
er standards compared only qualitatively. 
6 .4. 1 Compa~ison of System Complexity 
The complexity of the communication system can be com-
pared by looking at the equipment ~equired to provide the 
basic interface at the using terminals. To form a common 
basis fo~ compa~ison, each unit connected to the communica-
tion system p~esumably has an embedded digital p~ocesso~. 
This assumption is essentially t~ue fOL most of the units in 
cu~~ent avionics systems and will be more common in future 
syste ms . The circuits to compa~e among the alte~nate commu-
nication techniques are those that provide the interface be-
tween the internal bus of a typical mic~oprocesso~ system 
and the communication system. 
The dedicated se~ial bus is taken as the baseline fo~ the 
compa~ison of complexity . . The format of the data must be 
ch a nged using se~ial-to-pa~allel and pa~allel-to-se~ial con-
verters. Cont~ol logic must be included to sequence the data 
through the conversion process. A clock signal must be pro-
vided fo~ t~ansmitting data, and the clock ~econstructed for 
received data. A method must also be implemented to syn-
chronize the ~eceive~ to the t~ansimitted data. There must 
also be differential line drive~s and line receive~s . Large 
scale integ~ated ci~cuits already exist that may be ~ppro­
priate for this application, making it the least complex in-
terface . 
The multiplex bus interface becomes substantially more 
complex since it has all of the components of the dedicated 
bus, plus the additional functions required to operate in a 
multiplex environment. These additional functions include : 
responding only to a particular address . recognizing com-
mands from the bus controller, and generating the proper 
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status word in response. The timing restraints will be 
considerably tighter since any delay in response will create 
a penalty for the entire system. These timing constraints 
are likely to be too tight to meet without dedicated hard-
ware. Also, data buffering will probably be needed for en-
tire outgoing and incoming messages. The complexity is thus 
estimated to be 3 times the dedicated bus interface. 
The mesh network system will ' be the most complex, having 
to service three multiplex links. Some of the control and 
data buffering can be shared. However, a limited ability to 
simultaneously monitor all buses will be required for recon-
figurations to be made after failures. Additional control 
logic must be included for the node to respond to the com-
mands that co~figure the mesh. The resulting equipment is 
thus expected to be 5 times as complex as the local bus. 
The local bus is already in a form that is close to the 
internal bus in the terminal unit. The bus is not likely to 
be identical, however. There will thus be some logic cir-
cuits necessary to convert the signals into the correct 
form. Bidirectional three state buffers will be required on 
most of the lines. The number will be a function of the de-
sign of the local bus. For example, the number will be less 
if data and address are multiplexed on the same lines. Data 
storage buffers may also be required if the terminal unit 
cannot respond within the timing requirements of the local 
bus. Particular care must be taken to assure that the fail-
ure modes of the interface that would disrupt communication 
on the bus have very low probability. Extra hardware may 
thus be required to reduce the probability that a unit can 
put a high or a ground on any of the bus lines, primarily 
because of the circuits required to support the large number 
of lines, the local bus interface is expected to be 2 times 
as complex as the dedicated bus interface. 
The comparative complexity of the candidate systems can 
now be estimated by multiplying the number of interfaces by 
the complexity factor for each case. The interface at the 
central computer system for the dedicated link system is as-
sumed to be essentially the same as the interface at the re-
mote unit. T~e total number of interface circuits is thus 
twice the numbe~ of units. The bus controller for the mul-
tiplex bus system is assumed to be approximately 50% more 
complex than the interface in the remote unit. Since there 
are 12 controllers, one primary and one backup for each bus, 
there are an equivalent of 18 interfaces. The interface at 
the computer for the network is assumed to be the equivalent 
to two nodes since each node has three ports, giving the six 
ports assum~d for this system. The controllers for the lo-
cal bus system are assumed to be twice as complex as the in-
terface in the remote unit. Since there are 12 controllers , 
this is equivalent to 24 interfaces. The results are com-
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bined to form an index that gives an appr o ximate t o tal 
measu~e of the complexity o f the alte ~native systems . These 
results are summa~ized in Table 27. 
TABLE 27 
Summa~y of Estimated Relative Complexity 
SYSTEM 
DEDICATED 
LINKS 
MULTIPLEX 
BUS 
MESH 
NETWORK 
LOCAL 
BUS 
REMOTE 
TERMINALS 
(NUMBER) 
92 
92 
92 
92* 
COMPUTER TOTAL COMPLEXITY 
INTERFACE FACTOR 
(EFFECTIVE 
NO. OF TERM. ) 
92 184 
18 100 3 
2 94 5 
24 1 16 2 
COMPLEXITY 
INDEX 
184 
300 
475 
232 
*NOTE: THIS NUMBER INCLUDES THE REMOTE TERMINALS WHICH CANNOT 
ACTUALLY BE SERVICED BY THE LOCAL BUS. A DEDICATED LINK 
IS ASSUMED FOR THESE INTERFACES WITH ESSENTIALLY THE 
SAME COMPLEXITY. 
6.5 SUMMARY COMMENTS ON TRADE-OFF ANALYSIS 
The relative complexity will be a major factor in deter-
mining which communication structure is best for a particu-
la~ application but it will not be the only factor. The 
complexity will be important since it will have a major in-
fluence on the initial and support costs. The significance 
of complexity will decrease with time, however, with the in-
troduction of special purpose VLSI circuits. When these 
circuits are produced in high quantities, the advantages of 
a more complex system can be obtained at little additional 
cost. Other factors, such as flexibility and technical 
risks, may outweigh strict cost considerations in some cas-
es. 
The dedicated bus system is not likely to be the most ef-
fective choice for any very large system because of the awk-
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wa~dness and inflexibilty of the inte~face at the cent~al 
computer system. The wiring installation in the aircraft 
will also requi~e a la~ge amount of wire and be difficult to 
modify. 
The multiplex bus system has the g~eatest current accep -
tance. It provides a reasonable amount of flexibility and 
installation efficiency. The difficulty of designing a re-
liable and efficient bus will become harde~ as more units 
are attached to the bus. The bus will also become more 
vulnerable to failure and damage when it attempts to support 
units distributed throughout the aircraft. 
The netwo~k system is cur~ently mo~e complex than the 
other alternatives. However, as the technology becomes 
available to implement the node with VLSI technology, there 
is likely to be a shift from a multiplex bus to a network 
system to avoid the problems of designing a very large and 
flight critical multiplex bus system. 
The use of a local bus system will depend largely on what 
trends develop in the architectural design of large, highly 
integrated systems. If a modular system emerges and if 
these modules are packaged as individual line replaceable 
units within environmentally controlled compartments, the 
local bus is likely to be the most effective communication 
structure within those compartments, particularly since it 
can support a much higher data rate than serial buses can. 
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Chapter 7 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study contributes to the technology base necessary 
for the development of effective avionic communication sys-
tems. A general study such as this cannot recommend a uni-
versally preferred communication structure. The best choice 
for a particular system must be the product of an analysis 
of the requirements, oppurtunities, and constraints of that 
particular situation. This study does discuss, however, 
some of the factors involved in choosing the best communica-
tion technique and also provides some of the necessary de-
sign and analysis tools. 
This report first establishes a realistic environment for 
the study of communication techniques. The communication 
structure is highly dependent on the overall configuration 
of the equipment to be serviced. One of the most important 
characteristics is the distribution of the equipment in the 
aircraft. The next generation of aircraft will probably 
have a significant percentage of the hardware in compart-
ments where the environment is controlled and maintenance is 
simple. Future generations of aircraft will most likely 
have electronics distributed throughout the aircraft. 
An important factor influencing future system development 
1S the state of electronic technology. Inexpensive devices 
that operate in severe environments will presumably be 
availabl e in the next few years. This development will en-
courage the introduction of electronics within equipment 
distributed throughtout the aircraft. This same technology 
will , of course, also support the communication system that 
services this distributed equipment. 
This study concludes that the best choice for near term 
systems , where a large percentage of the system is contained 
in centralized compartments. i s some form of multiplex bus. 
This bus would be either a serial two wire system similar to 
the current MIL-STD-1553B, or a local bus patterned after a . 
conventi onal minicomputer interface bus . A multiplex bus 
provides a good compromise between complexity and flexibili-
ty . Multiple buses must be used to provide the necessary 
fault tolerance. 
The conclusion for future systems, where equipment is 
.distributed throughout the aircraft, is that a mesh network 
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is most effective. Cost effective, integrated circuit 
technology is predicted to be available to perform the com-
plex operations required in extreme environments. The net-
work will be an efficient solution for meeting the problems " 
that would be encountered in designing a multiplex bus sys-
tem that supports critical functions throughout an aircraft . 
It will be difficult and cumbersome to design a multiplex 
bus system for t "hese long and exposed distances to meet the 
reliability requirements for life critical functions in the 
presence of the inevitable failure and damage hazards. The 
inherent characteristics of the network provide effective 
techniques for containing these hazards. The primary disad-
vantage of complexity will diminish with the development of 
the new technology. 
Extensive research is needed to provide all the technolo-
gy necessary for developing the communication structure for 
highly integrated avionic systems. One area of research re-
commended for the next generation aircraft is further study 
of the communication techniques within an avionics compart-
ment. Current multiplex buses, such as MIL-STD-1553B, are 
designed for longer distances and do not have the simplicity 
and throughput appropriate for communication between modules 
within a relatively small compartment. On the other hand, 
the system buses developed in the commercial industry re-
quire a large number of connections and may be difficult to 
make fault tolerant. Some compromise between these two con-
cepts may be appropriate. A thorough study is necessary to 
arrive at that compromise. 
In the longer term, more work is recommended on network 
communication concepts. Work is needed particularly to de-
velop the technology that will provide the n ecessary func-
tions cost effectively in a severe environment. Additional 
work is also needed to develop the design tools and guide-
lines for effectively constructing the network comfiguration 
withi n an aircraft. 
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I. Introduction 
APPENDIX A 
PHYSICAL DAMAGE HAZARDS TO FLIGHT 
CRITICAL ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT 
Advanced electronic flight control equipment is being developed 
to perform increasingly flight-critical functions. These functions are 
becoming integral parts of the basic aerodynamic and structural designs 
of aircraft, thereby creating control-configured vehicles (CCV). 
Electronic equipment is also providing the basic connection between the 
pilot controls and the aerodynamic control surfaces, replacing 
mechanical linkages to give fly-by-wire systems. 
In commercial aircraft, these advanced avionic systems must meet 
the Federal Aviation Regulations, which state that it must be extremely 
improbable that a system failure cause a catastrophe. ~fuere numerical 
analysis is appropriate,"extremely improbable"is interpreted as a rate 
of 10- 9 per hour or per flight. These systems are becoming so critical · 
to safe flight that a complete failure is almost certain to be catas-
trophic. Thus the required functional fail ure rate for the systems is 
-9 10 per hour. 
Electronic components inherently have much too high a failure 
rate to provide the required reliability. This problem has been 
attacked by building redundant systems that are tolerant to individual 
electronic failures : by using techniques to detect and identify failures 
and reconfigure the system to allow continued operation. Advanced 
systems are being developed which give reasonable confidence that they 
can provide the required functional reliability in the presence of 
random failure-.s. 
The success in solving the problem of random failures has 
significantly increased the relative importance of other hazards. Other 
hazards such as damage and design faults hav e been considered suf-
ficiently unlike ly so that they could be realistically ignored in the 
past. However, dra matic reductions in primary failure rates and 
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lowering failure rate requirements have made it necessary that other 
types of hazards be carefully considered. They could become the 
dominant contributors to the total failure rate. The hazard of 
particular 'concern in this discussion is physical damage. 
Physical damage can result from collision with other aircraft, 
birds, collision with the ground or other stationary objects, excessive 
aerodynamic loads due to abrupt maneuver or turbulence, explosion 
(terrorist or accidental), massive failure of engine or other equipment 
such as air conditioning turbine including effect of parts thrown out, 
loose objects such as cargo, and damage due to rapid decompression. Fire 
can result from many of the same causes plus massive failure of 
electrical and electronic equipment, cargo fires, accidental trash fire 
such as a cigarette in a waste container, etc. Physical damage would 
also include liquid damage due to fuel, hydraulic, galley, and toilet 
leaks. 
Physical damage to the flight control system has been involved 
in the two worst single aircraft accidents. The Turkish DC-IO 
ultimately crashed because of lack of pitch control due to damage to 
the control lines under the floor. Preliminary reports or the American 
DC-IO indicate that a major contributor to the ultimate loss of control 
was the retraction of the leading edge flaps due to damage to the 
hydraulic lines or control lines. 
In order to begin to account for the damage hazard, it is 
necessary to establish some measure of the rate of damage events and 
estimate the effects they are likely · to have on electronic equipment. 
This paper is intended to be a first step toward estimating these rates 
and effects. 
II. Method of Estimating Damage Hazard Rate 
The method used here for estimating damage failure rate is based 
on a survey of all U.S. air carrier accidents from 1964 through 1977. 
The initial survey was done using the briefs of accidents in the Annual 
Reviews of Aircraft Accident Data published by the National Transporta-
tion Safety Board (NTSB). For selected accidents, the complete 
accident file or report was reviewed at the NTSB offices in Washington, 
D.C. 
The electronic system assumed for this study involves electronic 
units contained primarily in bays within the fuselage with some 
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electronic equipment contained in other areas including the wing J the 
tail, and on the engines. These e l ectronic units are assumed to be 
interconnected with a communications system. It is assumed that normal 
. practice has been used in installing this equipment, and that no 
extraordinary steps were taken to avoid physical damage. 
For each accident, a determination was first made on whether 
damage to the electronic system could have contributed to an accident. 
Two classes of accidents were eliminated; those where it was judged to 
be very unlikely that any part of an electronic system would be damaged, 
and those where the results of the accident would be the same whether 
the electronic system was damaged or not. 
For each of the remaining accidents, rough estimates were made 
in three categories; the probability that at least one cable containing 
a communication line or communication terminal was damaged J the 
probability that more than one line or terminal was damaged, and the 
probability that one particular area in the forward avionic bay was 
damaged which could correspond to a system controller. 
These estimates were based primarily on the limited amount of 
information available in the briefs of accidents in the NTSB reports. 
In a few cases these estimates were reviewed and refined by the 
complete accident report file which contained pictures of the damage 
in many cases. 
III. Estimates of Damage Hazard Rates 
The time period 1964 through 1977 produced 771 accidents for 
u.s. air carriers including the certificated route carriers and supple-
mental carriers. This represents a total flying time of approximately 
83 million hours. 
Of these accidents, 58 were judged to be ones where damage to a 
flight critical electronic system could have been a factor. For each 
of these accidents, estimates were made of the probabilities in each 
category that the electronic s ystem would be damaged. Detailed reports 
were reviewed for nine accidents (see Table I). These detailed reviews 
led to revision of the estimates in some cases but in general confirmed 
the original numbers. 
The damage probability estimates are given in Table II. These 
probabi lities are then sum.~ed and divided by the total flight hours to 
give the estimate of the damage hazard rate. The results are:~ 
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1. Damage rate to at least one communication line 
in the system 
2. Damage rate to two or more communication 
lines 
3. Damage to one particular unit in the forward 
avionic bay 
IV. Conclusions 
-7 2xlO /Hr 
-8 6xlO /Hr 
-9 4xlO /Hr 
The damage hazard rates estimated here are not intended to be 
definitive. Because of the limited amount of information available for 
the preliminary study, the rates may be in error by as much as an order 
of magnitude in either direction. One potentially significant source 
of damage hazard which was not considered was incidents which might 
have caused damage but were not . severe enough to be reported to the 
NTSB ~s an accident. 
These preliminary estimates do indicate, however, that physical 
damage can be a significant failure mode for advanced electronic flight 
control equipment in a commerical airplane. It is recommended that . 
more work be done to improve the estimates of the damage rates and that 
damage be i ncluded in any failure analysis of any flight critical 
electronic system. 
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TABLE' I 
DETAILED ACCIDENT REPORT REVIEWED 
DATE LOCATION AIRLINE AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT TYPE 
Jan. 9, 1979 Newark American B-707 Collison, Mid-Air 
July 
Nov. 
Substantial damage to No.1 engine, nacelle, strut, and lead-
ing edge of wing out board of No. 1 engine. 
30, 1979 San Pan AM B-747 Collison, Landing 
3, 
Franciso Lights 
Fuselage pierced by multiple steel beams. Landing gear forced 
up into cabin. Damage bulk head. Three of four hydraulic 
systems lost. 
1973 Boston Pan AM B-707 Fire 
Chemical fire in cargo producing dense smoke. Little actual 
damage to aircraft equipment. Factor in accident was loss of 
yaw damper inadvertently turned off because crew thought fire 
was from electrical equipment. 
Nov. 3, 1973 New Mexico National DC-IO Engine Explosion 
Engine disintegrated probably due to crew experimenting with 
auto throttle. Numerous punctures in fuselage. Power lines 
cut. Two of three hydraulic systems damaged. Control cables 
in tail severed. 
Feb. 4, 1975 Miami Eastern B-727 Fire 
Missing clamp caused rubbing between wire and hydraulic line. 
Power wire arched through hydraulic line causing fire. 
Sept. 8, 1975 San Juan American B-747 Structure 
Flap separated. Punctured fuselage, broke windows, dented 
horizontal stabilizer. 
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DATE LOCATION 
Sept. 20, 1975 JFK 
TABLE I (CONT . ) 
AIRLINE 
Airlift 
Inter. 
AIRCRAFT 
DC-B 
ACCIDENT TYPE 
Collison, Landing 
Lights/ILS 
Fuselage punctured, pressurization valve damaged, wheels 
damaged, anti-skid junction box damaged. 
June I , 1976 Kansas TWA L-lOll Fire 
Small hydraulic leak created mist which was ignited by elec-
trical arc. Fire destroyed all electrical cables and 
hydraulic lines in compartment. 
Sept. 3, 1977 Tuscan Continental B-727 Collison, Power Lines 
Wind shear on take-off. Hit power lines. Damaged wings, 
wing root, engine cooling. 
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ESTIMATES OF 
TYPE OF ACCIDENT 
1964-1969 
Engine 
Fire 
Fire 
Fire 
Engine 
Collision, Mid-air 
Collision, Mid-air 
Engine Fire 
Engine 
Hail 
Hail 
Bird 
Lightning 
Bird 
Collision, Trees 
Engine 
Engine 
Engine 
Structure 
Engine 
Fire 
Fi re , Electrical 
Fire 
Mid-Air 
Collision, TV Tower 
Engine 
Col l ision, Mid-Air 
Colli sion, Mid-Air 
I 
L 
TABLE II 
POTENTIAL DAMAGE 
ONE LINE 
DAMAGED 
.05 
.2 
.5 
.1 
.0 
.8 
.8 
.5 
.1 
.05 
.05 
.05 
.1 
.05 
.1 
.1 
.1 
.05 
.3 
.1 
.3 
.3 
.3 
.5 
.05 
.3 
. 05 
.6 
14 0 
TO ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS 
ESTIMATED PROBABILITIES 
MORE THAN ONE LOCATION 
ONE DAHAGED DAMAGED 
.1 .03 
.1 
.01 
.3 
.2 .01 
.2 .01 
.05 
.01 
.01 
.01 
.05 
.01 
.01 
.1 
.1 .01 
.1 .01 
.03 .005 
.1 .005 
.1 
.2 .05 
~ 
I 
--~ 
I 
TABLE II (CONT.) 
ESTIMATED PROBABILITIES 
TYPE OF ACCIDENT ONE LINE MORE THAN ONE LOCATION 
DAMAGED ONE DAMAGED DAMAGED 
, 
I 
I 
- 1970-1972 I 
I Engine .1 I 
Lightning .4 .05 
Engine .05 
Collision, Mid-Air .6 .05 .005 
Collision, Landing Lights .9 .6 .05 
Fire .4 .1 .01 
Engine .2 
Bird .6 .1 .05 
Structure, Decompression .8 .5 
Engine .1 
Fire .1 
Engine .3 .02 
1973 
Engine .9 .5 .01 
Fire .2 .01 
Engine .3 .05 
<- Fire .6 .1 .01 
1974 
Fire/Engine .05 
Structure .1 
Engi ne Cowl .3 .1 
Hail .1 .03 
Bomb .06 .02 .005 
1975 
Fire .4 .05 .005 
Engine .2, .05 
Control Surface .1 
Collision, ILS .2 .05 
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TYPE OF ACCIDENT 
1976 
Fire 
Engine Fire 
Engine 
1977 
Collision, Power Line s 
TOTALS 
TOTAL FLIGaT HOURS 
DAMAGE RATE/HOUR 
TABLE II (CONT.) 
ESTI~~TED PROBABILITIES 
ONE LINE 
DAMAGED 
.9 
.1 
.5 
.1 
17.3 
83.06 x 106 
-7 2.1xlO 
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MORE THAN 
ONE DAMAGED 
.5 
.01 
.1 
.05 
4.8 
-8 5.8xl0 
ONE LOCATION 
DAMAGED 
.05 
.33 
-9 4.0xlO 
I 
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AB 
ADDCS 
ADF 
AEEC 
APU 
ARINC 
ATC 
Cp 
CRT 
DABS 
DADS 
DITS 
DME 
GPS 
HF 
ILS 
LRU 
LSI 
LVDT 
MCU 
modem 
Appendix B 
ACRONYMS 
avionics bay 
Analog and Discrete Data Conversion 
System 
automatic direction £inding 
Airline Electronic Engineering Commit-
tee 
auxilary power unit 
Aeronautical Radio, Inc . 
Air Traffic Control 
cockpit 
cathode ray tube 
Discrete Address Beacon System 
digital air data system 
digital information transfer system 
distance measuring equipment 
Global Positioning System 
high frequency 
instrument landing system 
line replaceable unit 
large scale integration 
linear variable differential trans-
former 
modular concept unit 
modulator/demodulator 
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MTBF 
NIC 
NTSB 
VHF 
VLSI 
VOR 
mean time between failures 
New Installations Concept 
National Transportation Safety Board 
very high frequency 
very large scale integration 
VHF omni range 
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